



ASTROS

PROCAD DEFESA

# BOLETIM ASTROS

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# BOLETIM ASTROS

A Newsletter da Equipe Procad ASTROS



O Boletim Astros é uma publicação mensal que reúne informações sobre Segurança Internacional, Defesa Nacional & Forças Armadas, Tecnologia, Mísseis & Sistemas de Defesa e ASTROS & Indústria de Defesa. Elaborado pela equipe de pesquisadores do Projeto Procad Defesa ASTROS, o boletim oferece um panorama geral de notícias e artigos publicados em portais especializados, revistas, jornais, magazines, periódicos, sites institucionais e *think tanks* com foco nas temáticas mencionadas.

# Equipe editorial

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# NOVIDADES DO PROJETO

Últimas atividades – Projeto Procad Defesa ASTROS

## Destaque do mês

### Entrega da Nota Técnica 1 - Projeto Procad Defesa ASTROS



O dia 22 de abril de 2021 marcou a entrega da primeira Nota Técnica do Projeto Procad Defesa ASTROS ao Chefe do Estado-Maior Conjunto das Forças Armadas (EMCFA), Tenente-Brigadeiro Raul Botelho. Participaram da ocasião o Gerente da Divisão de Cooperação Acadêmica do Departamento de Ensino (DICOOP) do Ministério da Defesa (MD), Coronel Celso Bueno, o Diretor do Departamento de Ensino do MD, General de Divisão Paulo Roberto Viana Rabelo, o Coordenador-Geral do Projeto Procad Defesa ASTROS, Alcides Costa Vaz (UnB), e os pesquisadores e professores Juliano Cortinhas (UnB) e Peterson Ferreira (ESG).

O documento destina-se a analisar os possíveis efeitos do emprego de uma ampla estratégia de defesa de antiacesso e negação de área (A2/AD), tendo em vista a implementação do Sistema ASTROS, bem como questões relativas ao processo dissuasório e ao equilíbrio estratégico regional e extrarregional. A elaboração do documento envolveu os pesquisadores da equipe, a partir de uma força multitarefa, de modo a cumprir as diretrizes estabelecidas no âmbito do projeto.

A Nota Técnica 1 apresenta aspectos sobre a dissuasão e A2/AD como postura estratégica brasileira, o contexto regional, eventuais implicações da implementação da capacidade dissuasória do país a partir do Sistema ASTROS e possíveis respostas no plano regional, bem como recomendações para a conduta brasileira perante tal implementação.

Para alcançar a estrutura apresentada na versão final do documento, o projeto contou, além de pesquisas e seminários internos, com a coleta de insumos no I Workshop do Procad Defesa ASTROS, realizado nos dias 3 e 4 de novembro de 2020, em Brasília, na Escola Superior de Guerra (ESG). O evento contou com a participação dos pesquisadores do projeto, de oficiais militares do alto escalão das Forças Armadas, integrantes do Ministério da Defesa e do Ministério da Relações Exteriores e representantes da Avibrás - empresa responsável pelo desenvolvimento do Sistema ASTROS.

# NOVIDADES DO PROJETO

## Últimas atividades – Projeto Procad Defesa ASTROS

### Publicação de artigo do Dr. Carlos Eduardo Valle para Revista de Geopolítica

O artigo intitulado "Geopolítica e poder aéreo: a participação da Força Aérea Brasileira na 2ª Guerra Mundial", publicado na edição de abril/junho da Revista de Geopolítica, aborda a atuação da Força Aérea Brasileira em tal conflito sob a perspectiva da contribuição geopolítica. Realizada a partir de uma concepção geográfica, a análise concentra-se na performance da FAB no Atlântico Sul, desempenhada, especialmente, por meio da aviação de patrulha e da aviação de caça.



### Participação do Prof. Augusto Teixeira Jr. no XXIII Ciclo de Estudos Estratégicos realizado pela ECEME

Nos dias 6 e 7 de abril de 2021, foi realizado o XXIII Ciclo de Estudos Estratégicos na Escola de Comando e Estado-Maior do Exército (ECEME), cujo tema central foi a "Análise das Estratégias Militares da Presença e da Dissuasão". A palestra proferida pelo Prof. Augusto Teixeira Jr. versou sobre "O desafio da Dissuasão Convencional no ambiente multidomínio: antiacesso e negação de área como resposta".



### Participação do Prof. Alcides Costa Vaz no Podcast Café da Manhã

No dia 31 de março de 2021, o Prof. Alcides Costa Vaz participou do podcast Café da Manhã, da Folha de S. Paulo, para conversar sobre as substituições do Ministro da Defesa e dos Comandantes da Marinha, do Exército e da Aeronáutica. Durante a conversa, debateu-se sobre as perspectivas para as relações entre militares e governo a partir das trocas realizadas e as possíveis consequências políticas da decisão para o país.



### Participação do Prof. Juliano Cortinhas na Roda de Conversa 2021

Aconteceu no dia 09 de abril de 2021, a primeira edição da Roda de Conversa 2021. O evento teve apoio do GEPSI-UnB (Grupo de Estudos e Pesquisas em Segurança Internacional da UnB), do GEDES (Grupo de Estudos de Defesa e Segurança Internacional) e do NEPHS (Núcleo de Estudos da Política e História Social da UFRuralRJ). O webinar foi intitulado "Militares na política: perspectiva histórica e crise atual".



### Entrevista do Prof. Érico Duarte para o portal O Antagonista

O artigo intitulado "Renúncia dos comandantes foi sinal também para os militares, diz professor", publicado no dia 30 de março de 2021 no portal O Antagonista, apresenta a avaliação do Prof. Érico Duarte sobre a renúncia conjunta dos comandantes das Forças Armadas.



### Participação dos Profs. Juliano Cortinhas e Eduardo Svartman na reportagem do Defense News sobre a substituição dos Comandantes das Forças Armadas

Intitulada "Brazil's president picks Army chief amid tension with military", a matéria da Defense News analisou a nomeação do General Paulo Sérgio Nogueira como Comandante do Exército após a saída dos Comandantes da Marinha, do Exército e da Aeronáutica. O artigo analisa a conjuntura que marcou as recentes substituições e suas possíveis consequências políticas.



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
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


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## 1. US, UK surge surveillance flights over Ukraine and Black Sea

12.04.2021

Janes

<https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/us-uk-surge-surveillance-flights-over-ukraine-and-black-sea>

US and UK surveillance aircraft have surged their operations in response to Russia's military build-up along Ukraine's eastern border and in Crimea since the end of March.

Open source tracking detected the increase in allied airborne surveillance flights following the reported increase in US European Command's (USEUCOM's) watch condition (WATCHCON) from "possible crisis to potential imminent crisis" after Russian troop movements started to be detected during the last week of March. According to ADS-B transponder data, since the end of March, the United States and the United Kingdom have been flying daily surveillance missions over eastern Ukraine where government troops are facing off against Russian-backed separatists in the Donbass region and around the coast of Russian-controlled Crimea. Prior to the current crisis, allied surveillance missions were only flown two or three times a week.

The bulk of the missions are being flown by UK Royal Air Force (RAF) RC-135 Rivet Joint signals intelligence (SIGINT) aircraft, US Air Force (USAF) RQ-4 Global Hawk unmanned aerial vehicles, and US Navy P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft. RAF 51 Squadron aircraft have been tracked flying seven missions since 30 March from their home base at RAF Waddington in Lincolnshire. Since 1 April Global Hawks have flown four missions and P-8As have flown 10 missions, both from the US airbase at Sigonella in Sicily, Italy. USAF RC-135 and US Navy EP-3E SIGINT aircraft have also flown a handful of missions over the Black Sea from their forward operating base at Souda Bay in Crete, Greece. Some of the missions involve multiple aircraft being on station simultaneously near Russian-controlled territory.

## 2. Military balance in Indo-Pacific region 'becoming more unfavourable to US', says Adm Davidson

10.03.2021

Janes

<https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/military-balance-in-indo-pacific-region-becoming-more-unfavourable-to-us-says-adm-davidson>

US Navy Admiral Philip Davidson, the commander of the US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), has warned that the "greatest danger" facing the United States in the Indo-Pacific region is the "erosion of conventional deterrence capabilities vis-à-vis China".

Testifying before the US Senate Armed Services Committee on 9 March, Adm Davidson warned that "without a valid and convincing conventional deterrent", China "will be emboldened to take action in the region to supplant US interests", adding that as the military balance in the Indo-Pacific becomes "more unfavourable" to the US, "we are accumulating additional risk that may embolden our adversaries and competitors to attempt unilaterally changing the status quo".

"Our deterrence posture in the Indo-Pacific must demonstrate the capability, the capacity, and the will to convince Beijing unequivocally, the costs of achieving their objectives by the use of military force are simply too high," he said. In this context, he expressed concern that China's rapid military modernisation along with its "increasingly assertive military posture to exert pressure and expand its influence across the region" appears to be geared towards "aggression".

"I see them developing systems, capabilities, and a posture that would indicate that they are interested in aggression ... I cannot for the life of me understand some of the capabilities that they're putting in the field, unless it is an aggressive posture," he said, adding that he fears Beijing might attempt to seize control of Taiwan before the end of this decade.

### 3. Iran, Saudi Arabia said holding direct talks to mend regional rift

18.04.2021

Times of Israel

<https://www.timesofisrael.com/iran-saudi-arabia-said-holding-direct-talks-to-mend-regional-rift/>

5 years after diplomatic ties were severed, contacts reportedly resume in Iraq to end Yemen civil war, restore relations.

Five years after severing diplomatic ties, Iran and Saudi Arabia have reportedly been holding direct talks in Baghdad to mend relations and end the Yemen civil war. A [Financial Times report](#) on Sunday, which cited three officials familiar with the negotiations, said a first round of talks was held on April 9, with additional discussions slated for next week. The talks were described as positive.

"It's moving faster because the US talks are moving faster and [because of] the Houthi attacks," an unnamed official said, referring to indirect negotiations between the Biden administration and Tehran over its nuclear program, and stepped-up attacks on Saudi Arabia by Iran-backed rebels in Yemen, respectively. However, according to the [Reuters news agency](#), which cited several officials from both sides, no breakthrough was reached. "This was a low-level meeting to explore whether there might be a way to ease ongoing tensions in the region," an Iranian official told Reuters, adding that the meeting was urged by Iraq.

A Western diplomat in the region told Reuters that the United States and Britain were informed in advance of the Saudi-Iran meeting. Saudi Arabia cut diplomatic relations with Iran following 2016 attacks by demonstrators on its missions in Iran after the kingdom executed revered Shiite cleric Sheikh Nimr al-Nimr. The reported direct talks come amid an international and regional diplomatic push to end the Yemen conflict. Saudi Arabia and the Biden administration have recently offered separate ceasefire proposals. The Iran-backed Houthis, however, turned them down.

Since US President Joe Biden took office, his administration reversed a decision by his predecessor Donald Trump naming the Houthis as a foreign terrorist organization, allowing American aid to flow into rebel-held territory. He also ended US support for the Saudis in the war. The conflict in Yemen began with the 2014 takeover of the capital Sanaa by the Houthis. A Saudi-led coalition has been fighting the rebels since March 2015. The war in Yemen has spawned the world's worst humanitarian crisis, leaving millions suffering from food and medical shortages. It has killed some 130,000 people, including fighters and civilians, according to a database project that tracks the violence. The Iranian-backed rebels have also recently stepped up their cross-border attacks by missiles and explosive-laden drones on Saudi Arabia. Since severing ties with Iran, Saudi Arabia has also fostered its covert

ties with Israel over shared concerns about the Islamic Republic's nuclear program and regional aspirations.

#### 4. Hezbollah said making preparations for Lebanon's possible collapse

17.04.2021

Times of Israel

<https://www.timesofisrael.com/hezbollah-said-making-preparations-for-lebanons-possible-collapse/>

Terror group stocking up on supplies, including fuel from Iran, as it prepares to protect its Shiite backers, assume an even larger role in society if country's leadership crumbles.

The Hezbollah terror group is preparing itself for the possibility of the collapse of the Lebanese state amid a spiralling economic and political crisis, according to a report Friday. Reuters [said](#) preparations include issuing ration cards for food supplies, stocking up on medicine and preparing to import and store fuel from Iran. It cited three sources with knowledge of the plans. It said the plan would help protect Shiite communities Hezbollah dominates from the worst of such a national crisis, while expanding its already extensive role in Lebanese society.

As the economic hardships have mounted, Hezbollah has already been growing its clout in recent months. Stepping in where the state and financial institutions have failed, Hezbollah has been providing a vital lifeline for some Lebanese through the al-Qard al-Hasan Association, its financial arm. In the country's wrecked economy, everyone is desperate for hard currency and liquidity as the local currency plummets in value. At commercial banks, depositors stand in line for hours and fight with managers in vain to access their dollar savings. Most banks have stopped giving loans. But at Hezbollah's al-Qard al-Hasan people can take out small, interest-free loans in dollars, enabling them to pay school fees, get married, buy a used car or open a small business. They can also open saving accounts there.

The association, officially a non-profit charity, is one of the tools by which Hezbollah entrenches its support among the country's Shiite population, even as the group has come under enormous criticism over the past year among Lebanese furious at the political elite. With poverty rising across Lebanon, Hezbollah provides its community with low-cost schools and hospitals and distributes heating fuel to the poor. Hezbollah continues to pay its fighters and employees in its institutions in US dollars, while everyone else gets their salaries in Lebanese pounds, which lost about 90 percent of their value in the crisis.



Lebanon's economic and financial crisis is the country's worst in modern history, with the economy contracting 19% in 2020. Tens of thousands around the country have lost their jobs, and nearly half the population of more than 6 million is in poverty. The crisis has been caused by years of mounting debt amid corruption and mismanagement by the country's elites. The crisis shattered people's confidence in Lebanon's banking system, once among the most respected in the region. As banks took a hit, many people decided to keep their money at home, amounting to up to \$10 billion, according to central bank governor Riad Salameh.

Meanwhile, political bickering has delayed the formation of a new cabinet. The outgoing government resigned last August, following a massive explosion at Beirut's port that killed 211 people, injured more than 6,000 and damaged entire neighborhoods in the capital. Prime Minister-designate Saad Hariri has failed to form a new government since he was named for the post in October. Hariri has been insisting on forming a cabinet of experts whose main job will be to get Lebanon out of its paralyzing economic crisis. Other groups, including Hezbollah, insist on a mixed cabinet of politicians and experts.

A senior US official warned Thursday that Lebanese politicians who continue to block reforms could face punitive actions by Washington and its allies. US undersecretary of state for political affairs David Hale did not provide details on the nature of the potential actions. But appeared to refer to reports that the United States and its allies may impose sanctions on Lebanese politicians in order to force them to end the monthslong political deadlock and start badly needed reforms to fight corruption.

## 5. Salvaging the Iran Nuclear Deal: Round One in Vienna, and What Comes Next

13.04.2021

Royal United Services Institute

<https://rusi.org/commentary/salvaging-iran-nuclear-deal-round-one-vienna-and-what-comes-next>

Tough negotiations to save the Iranian nuclear deal are resuming, and they are by no means guaranteed to succeed. The original participants in the Iran nuclear deal are gathering in Vienna for a second round of negotiations following last week's attempt to salvage the agreement. Last week was the first time that the group had met since former US President Donald Trump withdrew from the deal in 2018, and the first such meeting – after several failed attempts to kick-start talks – since President Joe Biden entered office pledging to seek a return to the deal. But there are limits: Iran

joined on the condition that there would be no direct US–Iran talks, meaning that the other participants – the UK, France, Russia, China, Germany and the EU – have to play the role of intermediaries.

## **Progress So Far**

By all accounts, the first round of talks which concluded last week were constructive. Two expert-level working groups were quickly formed on sanctions and nuclear issues to develop a plan for what the US and Iran would need to do to come back into compliance with the deal, known as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). Furthermore, all parties agreed to reconvene in Vienna this week for further discussions – a positive result in and of itself.

But it is also clear that significant hurdles exist to revitalising the deal. While the specific details of what transpired in Vienna are unknown, comments by US and Iranian officials have helped shed light on the positions of each side and the related sticking points.

During the talks and in a follow-on press call, US officials stated what was already largely assumed: that the US is willing to lift ‘all sanctions that are inconsistent with the JCPOA and are inconsistent with the benefits that Iran expects from the JCPOA’ as part of a mutual return to compliance. The first part of the statement likely refers to the nuclear sanctions re-imposed by Trump that are clearly inconsistent with US commitments under the JCPOA.

The latter phrase is likely a nod to the sanctions the Trump administration imposed on major Iranian entities under non-nuclear sanctions authorities (i.e. terrorism), including the Central Bank of Iran, the National Iranian Oil Company and the National Iranian Tanker Company. These sanctions may not be technically inconsistent with the JCPOA (though Iran argues that they are), but if left in place they would make it virtually impossible for Iran to realise the benefits of the deal, thus preventing its revival.

Less clear, however, are the specific designations that the US believes would be consistent with its JCPOA commitments and that it therefore intends to keep in place – an issue that will almost certainly be a point of contention between Washington and Tehran. Notably, this US position is still far apart from Iran’s demand that the US remove *all* sanctions imposed under the Trump administration (more on that below).

## **The Less Obvious Nuclear Track**

Compared with the sanctions track, almost nothing is known about the discussions on the nuclear track, and some reports suggest this issue took a backseat to the sanctions debate in Vienna. Iran is fond of talking about how quickly it can roll back its nuclear programme, but the US is likely to insist that such actions do not outpace the ability of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to

monitor them. As a sequencing matter, it would be prudent for Washington to ask that Iran first restore the deal's added transparency measures – such as IAEA access to cameras at Iran's nuclear facilities and Iran's implementation of the Additional Protocol – *before* Iran begins its nuclear reductions.

In addition to ensuring that Iran's nuclear rollback adheres to the letter of the JCPOA, new compromises may need to be developed for technical advances that do not have a neat solution in the deal. It is also likely that the US will closely evaluate whether and how any of Iran's nuclear advances impact its one-year breakout timeline (not a requirement of the deal, but a result of the JCPOA's technical constraints and an important US political selling point), or its ability to produce nuclear weapons. Examples of activities that may require discussion include Iran's expanded production and use of advanced centrifuges, as well as recent and planned production of uranium metal. It is generally a safe bet that the nuclear issue will be easier to work out and less contentious than sanctions rollback, but it is hard to know for sure given that the US and Iran have yet to meet to dig into the details and Washington has not spoken much in public about its objectives.

While the US appeared to show some flexibility in Vienna, Iran doubled down on the key elements of its negotiating position during and after the talks, including that: 1) the US must remove all sanctions imposed by the Trump administration; 2) Iran will then verify their removal before bringing its nuclear programme back into compliance; and 3) all of this has to happen in one move, not as the result of a step-by-step process. There was also no indication that Iran was willing to engage in direct dialogue with the US. These positions are in direct conflict with US ones and, in some cases, the agreement itself. As a result, they present a significant challenge to reviving the deal. Resolving them will require creativity, compromise and a softening of Iran's demands.

### **Iran's Demands**

Regarding the first demand, multiple Iranian officials have gone to great lengths to clarify that when they say all sanctions imposed under Trump must be removed, they do in fact mean *all* sanctions (even those that would be permissible under the deal, such as those on Iran's missile programme or related to cyber activities and human rights issues). The US has made clear that it will not remove the full slate. So the question becomes: how much flexibility, if any, is there in Iran's position?

It is also hard to see how the US would agree to meet Iran's second demand: removing all sanctions, followed by a period in which Iran verifies their removal, and only then begins to dial back its nuclear programme. Trying to borrow the JCPOA's implementation process – in which the US first issued sanctions waivers (Adoption Day) that then went into effect once Iran met its nuclear obligations (Implementation Day) – seems unlikely to work. Iran has suggested that verifying sanctions removal could include steps such as successfully exporting oil, signing new oil contracts and conducting

financial transactions through multiple channels. A symbolic delivery of oil is one thing, but waiting for Iran to sign multiple new contracts is quite another.

Finally, Iran's demand that all of this happen in one move – which appears slightly at odds with its demand that the US goes first – is likely to be the easiest to resolve, provided that Iran is willing to identify a detailed list and sequence of steps that each side will take under a 'single' move. Recent Iranian statements suggest that Tehran may be open to such an approach. In effect, this could resemble the JCPOA's Implementation Plan but without identified transition periods: it would begin with countries taking the first steps, and end when they are done.

### **All In The Balance**

It remains to be seen whether the parties can build on the constructive start in Vienna. The recent sabotage efforts against Iran's main enrichment facility will probably make that harder in the short term. It is also still quite possible that Tehran is not intending to compromise any time soon: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei could judge that his interests – and those of Iran – are best served by waiting until after the country's June elections before trying to engage in serious dialogue. But that is certainly a testable hypothesis. The US and the remaining parties to the deal will get a better sense this week of whether Iran's positions are 'red lines' or 'pink lines'.

## **6. The Imperfect Equilibrium of Russian Civil–Military Relations**

12.04.2021

Royal United Services Institute

<https://rusi.org/commentary/imperfect-equilibrium-russian-civil%E2%80%93military-relations>

Although the Russian military tends to be apolitical and obedient to civilian authorities, its political role is complicated in the increasingly authoritarian regime of Vladimir Putin. Russia has not had a successful military coup since 1801. This fact is often mentioned in research and commentaries to prove that the Russian military has been effectively subordinated to civilian control. However, its tanks were on the streets of Moscow in 1991 and 1993, its soldiers have been mired in conflict in Chechnya, and its recruitment officers used to stop likely draftees outside metro stations to send them to the barracks. At the same time, since 1997 over 60% of Russians have considered mandatory military service as a sacred male duty. The same trend has been displayed in public opinion on Russia's military security since 2000: today, 88% of Russians believe the military is ready to defend their homeland.

One of the reasons for this seemingly toxic relationship is that the military is an essential component of Russian national identity. Emperor Alexander III once said: 'Russia has only two allies: the army and the navy' – and President Vladimir Putin revived this phrase in 2015. Russia's official history glorifies its military victories over the Mongols, Swedes, Poles, Napoleon, the Ottomans, and finally, the Nazis. The Main Cathedral of the Russian Armed Forces displays frescos with Second World War veterans, as well as Special Operations Forces soldiers armed with Kalashnikov machine guns in Crimea.

The military occupies an important part of the Russian national self-image, as a weapon for protecting the homeland and projecting Russian power abroad. However, having a strong military is not sufficient to overcome the post-Soviet inferiority complex. Russians know they are not wealthy, and it is something they are ashamed about. Only 12% of survey respondents think that the government should spend more on defence, instead of welfare improvements. Guns cannot buy butter, and Russians know it.

Russian society is going through a generational change. The opinions of people who grew up in the USSR seem increasingly alien to young Russian citizens. Educated young Russians are less willing to **serve** in the military and less likely to respect military traditions than their older compatriots. For example, 75% of respondents over the age of 60 believe that a young man must go through military service. Only 40% of people under 30 years old agree. Although most Russians respect the military, not everyone is ready to bear the costs. This is one of the aspects of the overarching civil–military divide in Russia.

The average Russian knows very little about the military. Few can name Russia's military branches, and even fewer would have a considered opinion on their operational purpose. Former Minister of Defence Anatoly Serdyukov paid special attention to public relations and media engagement, and his successor Sergei Shoygu has invigorated the Ministry of Defence's social media presence. The military TV channel 'Zvezda', active social media engagement, and general praise for the military in state-controlled media create an echo chamber where positive news is amplified, and negative stories are marginalised or silenced.

This was all too clear in 2019, when the head of the association of military officers of Russia, the decorated one-star general Sergei Lipovoi, blamed the internet and computer games for a tragic shooting involving eight fatalities. Private Shamsutdinov shot and killed his fellow soldiers and officers for alleged hazing, sleep deprivation and threats of sexual violence. Reportedly, Minister of Defence Shoygu expressed an opposite and highly critical opinion compared to that of Lipovoi, ordering the regiment's dissolution at a private meeting at the Ministry. Lipovoi's comments explicitly show that there is a lack of evidence-based discussions on problems in the military, and that the Russian public has little knowledge of the military it praises.

Not surprisingly, Russians place less trust in the coercive institutions with which they routinely interact. The police and the office of the federal attorney are the least trusted security institutions. Brutal, corrupt and often ineffective police officers and prosecutors have a direct impact on the lives of ordinary citizens, whether they are reporting a crime or being investigated for one.

The public perception of the military, by contrast, is highly mythologised. Most Russians have little understanding of the unique nature of military service, and they are even less aware of command-and-control failures. That Russian citizens do not have to interact with the military on a daily basis makes it a useful tool for legitimising the current government.

This limited awareness of military matters, amplified by generational differences, creates a civil–military divide that may contribute to an overestimation of national military capabilities. This could be particularly problematic in the current period of economic difficulties, as defence cuts could jeopardise the socio-economic wellbeing of military officers, and hence, the quality of military personnel. An unsubstantiated belief in military supremacy can lead to budgetary miscalculations and unintended negative consequences for domestic and international security.

Confidence in the military has always been a vital aspect of Russian politics. Due to its association with national identity and the securitised perception of Russia's place in the world, promoting trust in the military is a fruitful tool for achieving political legitimacy. The question of military reform was highly topical during Putin's first term. Back then, Boris Nemtsov, a member of the State Duma, was the leading advocate of one of the reform proposals. Grigory Yavlinsky, the leader of the Yabloko party, put forward another. Putin ultimately opted for a Ministry of Defence proposal that did not solve any structural problems, but cemented unilateral presidential control over the military. Nemtsov and Yavlinsky did not make it into the next Duma, and the former was killed next to the walls of the Kremlin in 2015. No matter how democratic or authoritarian the Russian regime is, development of the military will always be on the agenda.

Russian civil–military relations are in an imperfect equilibrium. On the one hand, the Russian military is professional and subject to unquestionable civilian control. It is not actively involved in politics, although the highly centralised power of the president ensures it is obedient to politicised civilian orders. One need only consider the case of Ruslan Shavedinov, an associate of Alexei Navalny, who was kidnapped by the police and forcefully sent to serve a draft in the Arctic. Local officers and soldiers clearly disliked the political attention associated with such a special draftee and relocated him to a remote auxiliary helipad with no mobile network or roads.

On the other hand, the military as an institution occupies a special position in Russian national identity. It is an important source of political legitimacy; Russians value it for its ability both to provide security and to furnish an image of Russia as a great power. However, the existing civil–military divide creates an imbalanced perception of Russian military power. It also contributes to the miscalculation



of military threats and a general acceptance of military assertiveness as a key element of Russian foreign policy. Accepting international practices of civilian control, rooted in all branches of government, should be an important element of efforts to bridge the civil–military divide and ensure military security in Russia and abroad.

## 7. Army Analytic Capabilities: A Case Study Within Army Contracting Command and Its Implications

2021

RAND Corporation

[https://www.rand.org/pubs/research\\_reports/RRA106-1.html](https://www.rand.org/pubs/research_reports/RRA106-1.html)

The U.S. Army faces two analytical and management challenges because its data are locked away in siloed and proprietary databases and it lacks access to modern, commonplace analytical tools. To solve these two problems, the authors developed a case study with Army Contracting Command (ACC) to determine if there is a simple and effective way to overcome these challenges and found an effective, efficient, and quick path forward.

The authors conducted a proof of concept for data sharing and analytics with ACC, which has high volume and value of annually awarded contracts. They migrated large contracting data sets from ACC, built a robust querying and analytics platform for exploring that data, piloted a method for accessing heretofore inaccessible unstructured text data from contracts, and conducted a pilot machine-learning analysis highlighting how a cloud-based contract analysis system for ACC could lead to cost savings.

The team found that the Army can achieve immediate cost savings and efficiencies through advanced data analytics and the use of currently available commercial off-the-shelf technology. The Army should immediately conduct multiple similar proofs of concept that take siloed and inaccessible data to the cloud to be analyzed using modern analytical tools to validate the methodology from this report across multiple commands.

### Key Findings

The U.S. Army can achieve immediate cost savings and efficiencies through advanced data analytics and the use of currently available commercial off-the-shelf technology. The Army does not need to wait for a complete system to reap efficiencies and cost savings. The Army can build off the proof of

concept developed for this study. The Army can leverage commercial cloud infrastructure and software to immediately begin robust data sharing, querying, and analytics.

Going to the cloud would provide infrastructure efficiently without large initial capital expenditures. Maintenance, upgrades, and hardware availability would be baked in. As a matter of policy, ACC data scientists lack access to common data-science tools and lack permissions for remote access to computing infrastructure that allows for robust data-processing pipelines and analytic interfaces.

### **Recommendations**

The Army should immediately conduct multiple similar proofs of concept that take siloed and inaccessible data to the cloud to be analyzed. This analysis would be conducted using modern analytical tools to validate the methodology from this report across multiple commands. The Army should develop a policy on the use of open-source analytical products and create cloud-storage requirements to ensure that multiple ongoing data efforts are interoperable. The Army should set a goal, perhaps not more than one year out, to have access to a scalable analytics environment for all of its key operational and business data.

## **8. Countering the Risks of North Korean Nuclear Weapons**

2021

RAND Corporation

<https://www.rand.org/pubs/perspectives/PEA1015-1.html>

North Korea's leaders have sought to dominate the Korean Peninsula since their failure to conquer the Republic of Korea (ROK) in the Korean War. However, they have lacked the economic, political, and conventional military means to achieve that dominance, having instead come to rely on their nuclear weapon and ballistic missile programs. Today, North Korea's nuclear weapons pose an existential threat to the ROK, and they might soon pose a serious threat to the United States; even a few of them could cause millions of fatalities and serious casualties if detonated on ROK or U.S. cities.

The major ROK and U.S. strategy to moderate this threat has been negotiating with North Korea to achieve denuclearization, but this effort has failed and seems likely to continue failing. North Korean leader Kim Jong-un, despite committing to denuclearization, has continued his nuclear weapon buildup.

The authors of this Perspective argue that there is a growing gap between North Korea's nuclear weapon threat and ROK and U.S. capabilities to defeat it. Because these capabilities will take years to develop, the allies must turn their attention to where the threat could be in the mid to late 2020s and identify strategies to counter it.

Doing this will help establish a firm deterrent against North Korean nuclear weapon use. The authors conclude that North Korea will be most deterred if it knows that any nuclear weapon use will be disastrous for the regime — that these weapons are a liability, not an asset.

## 9. The United States Considers Reinforcing Its 'Pacific Sanctuary'

12.04.2021

RAND Corporation

<https://www.rand.org/blog/2021/04/the-united-states-considers-reinforcing-its-pacific.html>

Could Japan see an increase in the presence of U.S. military capabilities and personnel in the years ahead? It's looking possible. Soon after he took office, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin ordered a posture review to ensure that the U.S. global footprint is the right size to support U.S. strategy. The results of the review will inform the Biden administration how best to allocate military forces in pursuit of U.S. interests.

As part of the review, the United States will consult with its treaty allies and consider its alliance commitments. In the Indo-Pacific, the U.S. presence is concentrated in Japan, with about 56,000 active military personnel and all four services represented. Despite agreements between the United States and Japan years ago that have led to a gradual reduction in the U.S. presence in Japan, such as the number of U.S. Marines in Okinawa, Japan's continued importance to U.S. strategy and Tokyo's increased willingness to be more proactive in the security domain mean that Japan could see an uptick in U.S. military presence — more ships, more troops, even long-range strike missiles — after this review is complete.

The current U.S. force presence in Japan, including its capabilities and disposition, is a product of history and U.S. vital interests. Immediately after World War II, U.S. occupying forces used many of the same bases and airfields that Imperial Japanese forces had used. Then, guided by the logic inherent in NSC-68 — the historic presidential directive issued in 1950 that called for a military buildup to compete with the Soviet Union — the U.S. presence grew after the end of the American occupation of Japan in 1952. The exigencies of the Korean War also shaped the U.S. presence in

Japan. Although the Korean conflict was confined to the peninsula, because North Korea (and, by extension, China) had no power-projection capabilities beyond their immediate shores, Japan was a sanctuary for the United States. As such, Japan and Okinawa (which, unlike the rest of Japan, remained under U.S. occupation until 1972) served as a power-projection platform for U.S. operations and a sustainment and logistics hub. Both served a similar role in the Vietnam War.

Collectively, unchallenged U.S. air and sea control in the region became the foundation for U.S. regional presence. This enabled the United States to project force when, where, and how it wished from its secure bases in Japan. While the shape of the U.S. presence in Japan has changed over time, its contribution to U.S. and allied interests has been reaffirmed by every administration from President Harry S. Truman through President Joe Biden.

### **Sanctuary No More**

Japan is no longer the sanctuary for U.S. forces that it once was, and this has been true for several decades. First and foremost, all U.S. (and Japanese) bases are well within range of adversaries' air, sea, and missile platforms. China, for example, has invested heavily in missile and rocket forces to achieve sea control over the East and South China Seas from an arsenal spread throughout its vast continental hinterland. North Korea, too, has developed significant missile capabilities. The fact that weapons today are much more accurate at distance further sharpens the challenge. For example, China's development of a variant of its DF-21 missile, dubbed a "carrier killer," threatens to keep the U.S. Navy at a considerable distance from any potential operation. Finally, emerging technologies provide U.S. adversaries with ubiquitous, pervasive, detailed, and accurate surveillance of all of Japan, thereby improving their ability to strike with greater accuracy and lethality. For example, more sophisticated satellites will provide near continuous coverage of the Japanese archipelago and the waters around it, hypersonic weapons with evasive trajectories will make defending against them more difficult, and AI combined with autonomy will provide faster decision-making and greater domain awareness, thereby disadvantaging militaries that rely solely on the speed of humans. Gone are the days of the United States being able to surreptitiously move forces to and within the region without an adversary taking note or holding the forces at risk. Taken together, these developments mean that U.S. force posture in the Western Pacific, long a strong bulwark of U.S. conventional deterrence, has become increasingly vulnerable.

The United States understands this. China projects power on almost a daily basis in campaigns designed to intimidate Taiwan, Japan, and other nations. China's forces are routinely present in the air and seas surrounding Japan and Taiwan, presumably to test opposing forces' reactions and possibly coerce a response. In addition to other reasons, Washington's continuing attention to protecting U.S. vital interests, fulfilling its alliance commitments, and protecting the territory and lives of U.S. allies and partners has meant that the United States has not simply pulled back from its overseas presence and let other countries fend for themselves.

## What Could Change?

Being within range of adversary weapons does not sound the end of U.S. forward presence, particularly given the global range of some types of weapons. Nor can U.S. allies change their geography. If U.S. withdrawal is not an option, and long-range precision weapons have made every U.S. base in Japan a target, there are several areas that potentially could see change after the Department of Defense's posture review.

One area could be air and missile defenses. Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps Gen. David Berger recently commented that it is imperative to think anew about overseas installations, acknowledging that U.S. forward bases and infrastructure are vulnerable to adversaries. In the Indo-Pacific, for example, Chinese ballistic missiles pose a considerable threat to U.S. air bases. A 2015 RAND report examined the effect of ballistic missile salvos targeted at Kadena Air Force Base in Okinawa and found that a large salvo could close the runway for days or even weeks. Because abandoning U.S. forward bases is not realistic, Berger suggests that more efforts are needed to raise the costs of launching an attack on these bases, to reduce operational dependence on them, and to improve their resilience across dimensions and domains. With such a heavy U.S. presence in Japan, the United States may look to pursue improvements in both passive and active defense measures. Some would be invisible to the general public, such as the hardening of critical infrastructure like munitions and fuel depots or airplane shelters. Others would be more visible, such as dispersing and distributing forces across greater areas. Spreading out U.S. capabilities as well as fuel, apron space, runways, and prepositioned munitions would require physical space, which would likely mean increasing the U.S. footprint in Japan. Similarly, if the United States seeks to improve active defense capabilities in Japan, perhaps by installing more American-operated Patriot systems or Terminal High Altitude Area Defense batteries, this too could necessitate a greater U.S. presence.

Related to improved defensive measures is a second possible change: offensive long-range ground fires. Adm. Phil Davidson, head of U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, recently outlined his requests to Congress for the Pacific Deterrence Initiative, which included calls for ground-based, long-range fires. These precision-strike fires, meant to support air and maritime maneuver at great distances, would help to hold Chinese assets at risk, including those at sea, in the air, and at considerable distance from the coast on the Chinese mainland. Ever since the United States withdrew from the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces Treaty in 2019, there have been persistent rumors of the United States wanting to secure bases in the Pacific for missiles with ranges formally prohibited by that treaty, anywhere between 500 to 5,500 km. In August 2019, then-Secretary of Defense Mark Esper said he was in favor of placing such missiles in the region relatively soon. With the threat posed by China not going away, it would not be surprising if, as part of the posture review, the United States approaches Japan with requests to host these types of strike capabilities. This is particularly appealing not just because of Japan's geography, but because of Japan's own incremental movements toward achieving stand-off missile capabilities. If the United States and Japan are

concerned about trying to offset the threat posed by China, including eliminating the missile gap they currently face with China, then fielding long-range ground fires in robust numbers would make sense as one possible option.

In addition to strengthening base defenses and an offensive strike element, a third possible change could be the United States seeking to increase its “sealift” capabilities — ships that can carry soldiers, weapons, or supplies. Berger’s vision for the U.S. Marine Corps a decade hence, *Force Design 2030*, proposes new operational concepts to protect U.S. interests from a widely distributed, mobile, operationally resilient network throughout the First Island Chain. Maneuvering agile, mobile, compact forces, such as squads and platoons, throughout the littoral among islands calls for small, speedy, agile ships. Specifically needed are relatively small ships with enough square footage for vehicles mounting long-range weapons to support sea and air control, and troop capacity of around 40 people. In Japan, this could mean the need for finding homeports for more of these types of ships.

Surface combatants, carrier strike groups, and established amphibious group forces may also need reinforcement. When we consider that China’s three maritime forces — the People’s Liberation Army Navy, the China Coast Guard, and the People’s Armed Forces Maritime Militia — outnumber the forces that the United States and Japan can bring to bear against them, the demand for naval forces in an emergency or conflict will likely far exceed the supply of what the U.S. Navy, U.S. Marine Corps, and Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force could provide. The United States and Japan have not been growing their fleets at the same pace as China, meaning that they will likely have fewer available ships than China in the future. Fewer ships mean reduced ability to deliver force by sea. Should the United States want to try to reverse this, it may choose to move naval combatants currently based in Guam, Hawaii, and California to Japan. Back in 2015, the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments found that basing an additional aircraft carrier at Yokosuka would meet the entire demand for carrier coverage in the Pacific without having to build more ships to fulfill the U.S. Navy’s regional commitments. If the same logic holds true, it is possible that the United States may seek a second carrier strike group to be homeported in Japan. Or, understanding that a carrier strike group may be impractical due to space concerns, a second option could be another amphibious ready group. One is already homeported at Sasebo. Deploying a second would enable one group to stay in port and one to be deployed, thereby permitting nearly continuous deployed amphibious capability without demanding any large space requirement.

A fifth possible posture change could come in the form of a joint warfighting U.S. command element in Japan. Since the Korean War, the United States has maintained a combined headquarters in the Combined Forces Command that allows a U.S. commander in Seoul to maintain a posture prepared to fight at a moment’s notice should North Korea resume hostilities, which the Army refers to as a “fight tonight” posture. The United States has nothing close to that in Japan, even though Japan is home to the largest number of U.S. regional forces. China’s force projection capability puts Japan



in a similar “fight tonight” situation where hostilities could break out at a moment’s notice, which could demand similar structure and readiness to that in place on the Korean peninsula. Instead, the individual service components report directly back to their service boss in Hawaii and, in a contingency, the U.S. Indo-Pacific Commander would exercise operational command. Maintaining the type of command and control necessary in an environment where U.S. equipment and personnel have difficulty communicating with one another, as well as with the commanders overseeing an operation, would challenge any type of U.S. operation run out of Hawaii. And in peacetime, as long as command and control resides at the Indo-Pacific headquarters in Hawaii it will be difficult to foster the type of daily interaction and training that is needed in Japan to build a coherent combined response. Given that China has moved to unify its forces, there is always the possibility that the United States may seek to counter this with a U.S. joint command element in Japan to drive joint and combined contingency plan development and planning for a combined fight.

There are other possible options not reviewed here that the force posture review may also recommend. One is increasing the size of U.S. Forces Japan through an increase in permanent staff to perform the duties of an operational command element. Another is the periodic reinforcement of either the U.S. Seventh Fleet or III Marine Expeditionary Force with certain skills and expertise to create a joint command element from the nucleus of a service command element. Yet another would be increasing the U.S. Army contribution through the addition of a Multi-Domain Task Force including air and missile defense forces.

None of these changes would be easy or cost-free for the United States or for Japan. It is also possible that they could elicit local Japanese opposition. While there are many cases of local communities accepting an expanded U.S. or Japanese presence, such as Yamaguchi prefecture’s support of the expansion of Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni or Okinawa’s acceptance of the expansion of the Air Self-Defense Force base in Naha, there are also examples of local opposition to new or relocated U.S. presence. The most well-known example is the ongoing effort to relocate the Marine Corps Air Station Futenma from its current location in southern Okinawa to a new location in northeast Okinawa. While objections to changing the footprint of the U.S. presence in Japan will differ depending on the community, one can imagine possible reasons ranging from noise concerns, environmental issues, and opposition to plans for greater pier space or expanded fencelines that infringe upon existing fishing grounds or agricultural lands. And if Japan’s cancellation of Aegis Ashore last summer teaches us anything, it is that one can never rule out the possibility that the public may oppose the introduction of something new out of fear of safety issues it might pose to the local community.

The possibility of local opposition suggests that the development and implementation of any force structure recommendations should be an all-of-government effort in both nations. Through close and continuous consultation, the allies could better position themselves to show their publics and relevant government agencies the purpose of the proposed force posture changes to enhance their

shared security. Close consultation may also lead the Japanese government to consider valuable force structure changes on their part, thereby further enhancing overall alliance effectiveness. Such an alliance effort is much more powerful than just the sum of its parts.

While it is still unknown what results the posture review will bring, the recent 2+2 meeting in Tokyo demonstrated that the alliance is stronger than ever given the common positions shown on China and the need to find ways to bolster the alliance. That strength, combined with an increased proactiveness by Japan, means that it is possible that Japan could see an uptick in U.S. military presence after this review is complete. One thing is clear. If the words of the late Sen. Mike Mansfield were true in the past, that the "U.S.-Japan relationship was the cornerstone of stability in the Far East and in the world, bar none," the regional challenges that the alliance faces now may make that sentiment even truer today.

## 10. Beijing is Training to Kill U.S.-Made Tanks, Taiwan's That Is.

15.04.2021

The National Interest

<https://nationalinterest.org/blog/reboot/beijing-training-kill-us-made-tanks-taiwans-182785>

Here's What You Need to Remember: Beijing has been training to invade Taiwan now for some time. It has also ramped up its military modernization and its threatening rhetoric.

Months back, the Chinese People's Liberation Army (PLA) announced that it had conducted a test of a new anti-tank missile system as part of a so-called "Taiwan Drill." The exercise, which was conducted in an island-landing exercise from the Bohai Bay earlier this year, was only disclosed on Tuesday—and was possibly meant to serve as a message as much to Taiwan as to the United States.

The South China Morning Post reported that a rocket brigade from the Northern Theater Command conducted the live-fire test from a wheeled vehicle-mounted platform. Beijing didn't specify exactly which system was involved in the recent exercise, but analysts have speculated it likely was the HJ-10 (also called the Red Arrow-10), a vehicle-loaded guided missile. It was developed to combat enemy armor such as the U.S.-made M1A2 Abrams main battle tank.

"The drill is definitely aimed at Taiwan's M1A2 Abrams tanks," Hong Kong-based Chinese military analyst Song Zhongping told the South China Morning Post. "The PLA realised that warnings alone

are useless against Taiwan's independence-leaning forces, so they are now stepping up drills for island seizure to show that the mainland is well prepared to take back the island at any time."

A year ago Taipei announced that it would buy the American-built Abrams and other hardware in a deal worth \$2.2 billion—pending Congressional approval. The sale would include one hundred M1A2T tanks, fourteen M88A2 tank-recovery vehicles, sixteen M1070A1 Heavy Equipment Transporters plus two hundred and fifty Stinger Block I-92F shoulder-fired anti-air missiles.

The M1A2T is a special Taiwanese configuration of the U.S. Army's latest M1A2C and feature improvements that include more electrical power, a new auxiliary power unit and an ammunition data link for "smart" shells with reprogrammable fuses.

Taiwan has sought to purchase the Abrams for more than a decade to bolster its aging tank force. The island nation remains one of the last operators of the Cold War-era M60 "Patton" tank, which Taipei has steadily updated in recent years.

### **Beyond the M1 Abrams**

While Taipei's M1A2T MBTs are likely what Beijing could have in the crosshairs of the HJ-10, the anti-tank missile system could certainly take on the Soviet-era T-72 and T-80 tanks currently being deployed in the Ladakh Valley along the border with India. China deployed the all-terrain light armored vehicles used to carry the HJ-10 missile launcher to the region in August, during which a live-fire test was conducted at an elevation of 4,500 meters.

Whether the HJ-10 could endure the extreme winter cold is an issue however, as is the vehicle platform that carries the guided anti-missile system. Yet, the recent tests suggest that Beijing has great confidence in the platform whether in an amphibious landing or in a mountainous assault.

Both China and India have deployed troops and armored vehicles to the Line of Actual Control (LAC) in recent weeks, and each side apparently is preparing for a long cold winter ahead.

## 11. Democracy and Grand Strategy

15.04.2021

War on the Rocks

<https://warontherocks.com/2021/04/democracy-and-grand-strategy/>

Chris, Zack, and Melanie discuss Hal Brands and Charles Edel's article "A Grand Strategy of Democratic Solidarity." Is it possible, and is it wise, to construct a grand strategy of democratic solidarity to counter China and Russia? How might the United States and other countries implement this strategy in practice? Should President Joe Biden host a "summit for democracies," or would that cause more problems than it would solve?

Melanie criticizes Biden's infrastructure plan, Zack praises Congress for bipartisan work on the Strategic Competition Act of 2021, and Chris has some tender words for his daughter, Katelyn, as she finishes her time in high school just as she's spent the last few years — enjoying every moment.

## 12. Europe urgently needs a geopolitical purpose

09.04.2021

International Institute for Strategic Studies

<https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2021/04/russia-eu>

The weaknesses and contradictions within the EU have emboldened Russia in its policy regarding Ukraine, writes Nigel Gould-Davies.

Russia's build-up of forces on its border with Ukraine is not only a challenge to Ukraine. It also marks the latest phase of a campaign of pressure on the EU. The weaknesses and contradictions of the EU's response have emboldened Russia to pose a more severe test now. This is a dangerous moment for Europe and the transatlantic alliance.

The campaign began in early February when EU High Representative Josep Borrell visited Moscow and was humiliated at every turn. Borrell concluded that "Russia is progressively disconnecting itself from Europe and looking at democratic values as an existential threat". Yet on the three issues that dominate its relations with Russia, Europe has shown inconsistency and weakness

The EU has been most vocal about Russia's treatment of opposition leader Alexei Navalny, who last year nearly died from poisoning by the internationally-outlawed nerve agent Novichok. Arrested on return to Moscow, he now languishes in a penal colony. Russia has made this a European case, finding Navalny guilty of embezzling a French company (which says it suffered no damage) and failing to report while recovering in Berlin from his poisoning. The European Court of Human Rights has condemned the guilty verdict.

But the EU has not matched its words with actions. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov threatened to break off relations with the EU if it imposed sanctions that "pose risks for our economy, including in the most sensitive areas". Though a candid admission of sanctions' effectiveness, this threat caused the EU to limited itself to token measures. Crucially, it did not impose the far wider sanctions that Navalny himself advocated.

The second issue is the Nord Stream 2 gas pipeline. If completed (it is 94% built) this will deepen Kremlin's influence on German and weaken Ukraine. It is unpopular within the EU and opposed by the United States. Yet Germany insists that the issue be kept separate from the Navalny case, human rights concerns, cyber-hacking of the Bundestag and a growing agenda of other difficult issues.

The third issue is Russia's Sputnik-V vaccine. In February EU Commission president Ursula von der Leyen pointedly asked why Russia was offering Sputnik-V to other countries despite low take-up in Russia itself. Yet after tensions over poor vaccine procurement dominated the latest EU summit, Emmanuel Macron and Angela Merkel phoned Putin to discuss potential Russian production and supply of Sputnik-V for the EU.

This phone call served Russian ends in three ways. First, it shows that member states are ready to override von der Leyen and Borrell's concerns.

This meets Russia's wish to deal with them individually, not with the EU as a whole. Second, on the vaccine issue the EU is *demandeur*: Russia can explore its need and extract a political price. Third, France, Germany and Russia spoke in the so-called Normandy Format, agreed in 2014 to discuss the Ukraine conflict. But though Ukraine was excluded from the call, Merkel, Macron discussed it and other regional security issues with Putin.

Merkel and Macron also raised concerns about Navalny's health. Putin is unlikely to worry about a man who has released a video, watched over 100m times, that portrays him as a deranged kleptocrat. The day after their phone call, Navalny began a hunger strike in desperation at his declining condition.

Russia can draw three conclusions from its diplomacy of pressure. First, EU solicitude about Putin's personal enemy — a man he has tried to kill and is now at his mercy — will carry no consequences. Second, Germany will oblige Russia in its strategic goal of completing Nord Stream 2 regardless of

Russia's behaviour in other areas. Third, domestic EU criticism of a vaccine rollout that lags by only a few months is strong enough to compel member states to override Commission concerns and seek Russia's help.

In short, the EU has responded with division, gesture politics and strategic impatience. Russia has exploited this weakness to condition Europe to accommodate, not resist, it in advance of its military build-up. This appears to have worked.

While the U.S. and Britain have expressed grave concern, France and Germany have issued a statement calling on both sides to de-escalate — as if Ukraine is a potential aggressor in the defense of its territory.

The risk now is that a major Russian offensive against Ukraine splits the continent from the Anglo-American world.

Russia may believe this is the right moment to attempt a decoupling of the Atlantic Alliance that the Soviet Union never achieved. If it waits, Biden will heal the damage done by his predecessor to the alliance and Europe will recover from COVID-19. The stakes are high not only for Ukraine but for the West. To avert this, the EU urgently needs to find geopolitical strength and purpose.

## **13. Thousands of Venezuelans flee to Colombia amid violence on border**

25.03.2021

Al Jazeera

<https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/25/thousands-of-venezuelans-flee-to-colombia-amid-border-operations>

Venezuela's military says it is fighting Colombian armed groups in rural areas, Colombia says people 'forcibly displaced'.

Tensions on the border between Colombia and Venezuela continued to escalate on Thursday, amid military operations that sent thousands of Venezuelans fleeing to Colombia from their homes located along the border. Thousands of Venezuelans have fled to Colombia from the province of Apure in the wake of continuing military operations, the Colombian government and some of those displaced said.

Venezuela has said its military is fighting Colombian armed groups in rural areas and has its population's support.

"When the bombs were falling I felt so nervous," said Niomar Diaz, 26, who arrived in Colombia by canoe told the Reuters news agency. "In one house, a grandfather died, an eight-year-old boy died, a nine-year-old girl and her mom. The situation was terrible." Diaz said the Venezuelan military was abusive and his family and several neighbours chose to flee. More than 3,100 people in 780 families make up the group, which began arriving in the Colombian municipality of Arauquita starting on Monday because of the military operations, Colombia's migration agency said.

The border is currently closed due to COVID-19.

"The foreigners are in eight shelters in Arauquita municipality and the national government, the governor of Arauca and the international community are making efforts to provide them with assistance," the agency said.

On Wednesday Venezuela's Foreign Minister Jorge Arreaza denounced attacks by Colombia on civilian targets on the border, as well as the use of antipersonnel mines, and said his country would have a "strong reaction".

"Venezuela will effectively guarantee peace within the national territory and ratifies that any attempt to violate territorial integrity," Arreaza said in a statement, "whether conventional or covert, by any armed organization, be it regular or irregular, will have a strong reaction."

The operations have been conducted against illegal camps of Colombian armed groups, according to the statement, and two Venezuelan soldiers have been killed.

Colombia's foreign ministry on Twitter this week expressed worry about the situation and urged the international community to contribute help for the displaced. On Twitter on Wednesday, Colombia Defence Minister Diego Molano said the nation will increase military and police presence in the area. Colombia's government has vehemently criticised what it characterises as the Venezuelan government's protection of Colombian rebels and criminal gangs. Venezuela has denied protecting such groups. Colombia said last month it would grant 10-year protected status to some 1.7 million Venezuelans.

## 14. Why Is It So Tough to Withdraw from Afghanistan?

08.04.2021

War on the Rocks

<https://warontherocks.com/2021/04/why-is-it-so-tough-to-withdraw-from-afghanistan/>

Twice in the past three weeks, President Joe Biden has commented publicly on how difficult it would be to withdraw all U.S. non-diplomatic personnel from Afghanistan by the deadline stipulated in the U.S.-Taliban agreement. “It’s going to be hard to meet the May 1 deadline,” he said in his first press conference, “just in terms of tactical reasons, it’s hard to get those troops out.” While the sheer duration of U.S. combat operations in Afghanistan, Iraq, Syria, and elsewhere illustrates how *politically* difficult it is for the White House to completely disengage from U.S. counter-terrorism efforts overseas, in this case the president’s comments were referring to how tough it would be to do so *logistically*. But why are the logistics so hard? What are the “tactical reasons” Biden refers to?

Large military withdrawals are complex operations — especially those that require a *complete* drawdown of troops and equipment in theater. The mechanics of withdrawing troops and their equipment through an insecure environment, transferring or destroying excess matériel and facilities, and then transporting everything else out of theater requires time and effort to do in an orderly way. In Afghanistan, the process is further complicated by geographic, diplomatic, and legal constraints. The United States could withdraw its forces over the next few weeks, but it would be difficult and enormously costly. It would almost certainly require pulling transportation and logistical resources away from other missions around the world, abandoning a bunch of perfectly good equipment in Afghanistan, signing expensive contracts for quick-turn transportation capacity, leaving allied and partner forces in Afghanistan twisting in the wind, and potentially increasing the risk to U.S. troops on the ground during the withdrawal. If the United States is unwilling to pay these costs — and it appears Biden is unwilling — it will likely need some number of months, not weeks, to complete a full withdrawal from Afghanistan.

### Current U.S. Force Posture in Afghanistan

The United States currently has between 2,500 and 3,500 troops on the ground in Afghanistan alongside about 7,000 or so from its allies in NATO, for a total of around 10,000 troops that would need to be withdrawn. While the United States could in theory leave NATO forces to their own devices, that seems unlikely given the Biden administration’s goal of repairing the U.S.-NATO relationship and Secretary of State Tony Blinken’s recent statement that the United States and NATO would “leave together.” Adding contractors — which the U.S.-Taliban agreement states must leave Afghanistan as well — increases the total number of people for withdrawal to somewhere in the range of 15,000 to 20,000.



The vast majority of these people are housed on roughly 12 to 15 bases, which include considerable amounts of military and other equipment required to support their basic needs and daily operations. For example, on every base, there are assortments of high-mobility multipurpose wheeled vehicles, mine-resistant ambush protected vehicles, and related all-terrain vehicles that are used for combat operations, as well as smaller vehicles such as M-Gators and ruggedized golf carts used to move around the bases themselves. There are stacks of shipping containers, some of which are housing units and office spaces, and some of which are filled with supplies, equipment, and military gear. And some bases have aircraft — drones and helicopters — that cannot fly out of Afghanistan by themselves.

In terms of raw capacity, the U.S. military has the assets to pull all of these people out by May 1. For example, a single C-17 can carry 188 passengers, which means it would take 80 to 106 sorties to withdraw 15,000 to 20,000 people from Afghanistan. Even at the moderate pace of eight C-17 sorties per day, it would take only about two weeks to fly all those people out. The U.S. military has 223 C-17s in total. But of course, raw capacity does not translate directly into the “safe and orderly” withdrawal that Biden has promised if he decides to leave. That goal requires a notable amount of sophisticated planning and sequencing of logistics operations — which take time to do well — in order to draw down the U.S. and NATO presence in a safe and methodical way.

In his excellent new book on the U.S. experience in Afghanistan’s Pech Valley, *The Hardest Place*, author Wesley Morgan describes the tactical pullout of a few U.S. Army companies (several hundred soldiers) from roughly a half-dozen combat outposts in Afghanistan’s infamous Korengal Valley, as follows:

It was going to take twenty helicopter flights a day for four days to get everybody and everything — including half a million pounds of equipment — out of the outposts that needed to go. [U.S. Army] Rangers and a company of [Afghan National Army] Commandos were going to fly in for the evacuation too, to provide extra security.

While this is a small, tactical example, it illustrates several of the physical challenges that need to be overcome to withdraw forces from Afghanistan. For example, it shows the required scale of withdrawal efforts (and associated pre-mission planning) relative to the number of combat troops involved. It also illustrates the additional costs imposed by the requirement for continuous security of troops and equipment on the ground. These include real and opportunity costs for military assets (including the deployment of additional troops) being used to cover the withdrawal as opposed to being used for offensive operations. And it hints at the requirement for secure positions to which to move the people and equipment being withdrawn.

## The Logistics of a Complete Drawdown

Of course, the United States has removed forces and equipment from Afghanistan before, most notably in 2014. While the United States undoubtedly learned some lessons from that experience that will help it in a final withdrawal, there are important differences between removing *some* troops and equipment from a theater of conflict and removing *all* troops and equipment. As suggested above, while analysts often use troop levels as a benchmark, they can usually be removed much faster and with less difficulty than their equipment. Equipment — especially, but not only, vehicles — is heavy and bulky, and usually requires significantly more time to clean and prepare for inter-theater transport than personnel. Further, legal constraints prevent U.S. forces from simply walking away from equipment and facilities they would rather not retrograde. Only certain categories of equipment can be transferred to the Afghan government, for example. And before the U.S. military can destroy a piece of equipment still in good working order, it must either certify that there was no way to reuse or transfer it, or certify that a cost comparison determined destruction was the most cost-effective option. To meet these requirements requires an enormous amount of effort and coordination across multiple layers of the military bureaucracy.

In a *partial* drawdown, the military can usually remove a bunch of troops quickly to hit the target troop level while leaving a disproportionate share of the equipment behind for the residual force to either demilitarize or retrograde. The preferred “hub-and-spoke” drawdown technique U.S. forces used successfully during the 2014 drawdown — in which the United States moved people and equipment from smaller bases that were being closed to larger bases that were being retained (such as Bagram and Kandahar airfields) — naturally lends itself to this approach. But when the target is zero troops (and zero contractors) by a specific deadline, the military loses the flexibility that a residual force provides, which necessarily changes the way it plans and executes the drawdown, and almost always makes the final phase “tough.”

To get out by May 1, the United States would need to remove both its troops and a large portion of their equipment quickly. While the United States has recent experience withdrawing quickly from Iraq in 2011, in that case it was able to drive and haul the last of its people and equipment over land to bases in Kuwait, where it had the luxury of secure facilities to process the last of the items being withdrawn. In the case of Afghanistan, the United States will not be able to drive the last of its people and gear into a neighboring country. As a result, redeployment from Afghanistan typically requires troops and equipment to move over different supply lines using different modes of transportation, at different rates and with different in-transit requirements. When the United States drew down its surge forces from Afghanistan in 2014, most of the troops were flown directly out of country to regional way-stops and to their home station shortly thereafter. Their gear, on the other hand, was removed using a combination of airlift over Pakistan to U.S. bases in Gulf countries, trucking through Pakistan to various ports in that country, and combinations of rail and truck shipments through the Central Asian states to various ports on the Caspian, Black, and Baltic seas. This process, naturally,

was much slower, and had to be carefully choreographed to avoid leaving people or equipment exposed to hostile forces on the ground.

Because of the insecure environment in Afghanistan, the U.S. military cannot allow a situation in which there are troops on the ground without equipment, nor can it allow one in which there is equipment on the ground without troops. Therefore, to truly be safe and orderly, the drawdown may even require a temporary surge of *additional* troops and equipment, further slowing the speed of the withdrawal. During the 2014 drawdown from Afghanistan, the 1st Theater Sustainment Command deployed logistics brigades to each of the regional command areas to facilitate the retrograde (which proved to be an effective way to apply the logistical expertise of these units). A rapid drawdown of forces in Afghanistan would likely, at a minimum, require a surge in aviation maintenance and ground support personnel to handle the influx of aircraft sorties that would be necessary to make the deadline. These forces, of course, need to be protected as they move and operate in the country, which increases both the security and sustainment requirements on the ground.

Several aspects of the current situation in Afghanistan conspire to make a withdrawal even more complicated. The level of violence means that units should retain enough capability to protect themselves and their equipment most of the way through the retrograde process, which imposes constraints on what can be packed and when, and what can be separated from the unit and when. While the “secret annexes” of the U.S.-Taliban agreement reportedly stipulate that the Taliban will not attack U.S. and NATO forces, neither the United States nor NATO would likely trust local Taliban units to completely adhere to that agreement as the withdrawal occurs, and the threat of attacks from Islamic State and other terrorist groups would remain. The fact that the U.S. military provides logistical and other support to its allies and partner forces in the country likewise means that the pace and order of the withdrawal should account for the distinct requirements of these forces as well. This includes NATO forces, which likely will expect some help from the United States as they withdraw. It also includes Afghan forces, who will likely be expected to take control of the bases and any residual equipment that the United States and its NATO partners leave behind, and who will have to adjust their posture and operations to account for the departure of critical enabling capabilities such as advisers, air and fire support, and contracted maintainers and logisticians. Failure to account for the needs of these partner forces could lead to their collapse, which would increase the security risk to U.S. personnel still in the country and have significant diplomatic and reputational costs. And of course, the remote, landlocked geography and underdeveloped infrastructure of Afghanistan make it hard to move large amounts of equipment and personnel quickly — except at enormous expense and with the cooperation of Afghanistan’s neighboring states (none of which, it turns out, are likely to be as accommodating as Kuwait was during the U.S. withdrawal from Iraq in 2011).

The complexity of large-scale drawdowns means that speed is expensive, in dollar costs, opportunity costs, and reputational costs. Compressed timelines for withdrawal also increase the cost of the contracts the U.S. military relies on for part of its logistical operations, since it places increased demands on contracting companies' assets. Compressed timelines also mean that U.S. Transportation Command needs to dedicate a larger portion of its available assets to the drawdown (i.e., to conduct as many aircraft sorties as possible in a short time). The change to its posture increases the risk to other U.S. interests around the world by reducing the command's ability to support other military operations. A quick withdrawal would also mean that otherwise minor delays and hiccups that could be absorbed in the course of a normal withdrawal process may instead result in the need to destroy or demilitarize equipment that would have otherwise been cost-effective to bring home. For example, even with the advantage of a residual force, the U.S. military still destroyed over \$7 billion worth of military equipment in Afghanistan during the surge drawdown in 2014. Withdrawing in a matter of weeks would also give the United States less time to coordinate with its allies and partners to ensure that withdrawing does not leave them in an untenable or unnecessarily dangerous position, as Sameer Lalwani noted in a recent *War on the Rocks* article.

When would the United States cross the threshold for no longer being able to conduct an organized withdrawal by May 1? Given the complexities described above, there is no clean break on the calendar between "safe and orderly" and "unsafe and disorderly." Rather, large-scale drawdowns tend to get more difficult, more chaotic, and more expensive as the time available to complete them decreases. As a result, the amount of time necessary to withdraw the remaining troops and equipment from Afghanistan ultimately depends on how much the United States is willing to pay to get them out — in terms of dollars, opportunity costs, reputational costs, and geopolitical risk.

## Conclusion

The U.S. military has the raw capacity to withdraw all remaining personnel from Afghanistan in just a couple of weeks. It is less clear that it can do so without abandoning a lot of expensive equipment, leaving its NATO allies to fend for themselves, pulling U.S. Transportation Command assets away from missions elsewhere in the world, and perhaps even exposing U.S. troops on the ground to significant risk by deprioritizing tactical considerations during the withdrawal. These are real costs and risks that are a large part of what makes getting out of Afghanistan on a short timeline — whether it be May 1 or a few months down the road — so hard. The "tactical reasons" Biden cited during his press conference are thus not ones of logistical *capacity*, strictly speaking. Rather, they are questions of how much he is willing to pay, and risk, to overcome the logistical difficulties and associated costs of a safe and orderly withdrawal. Given the president's comments to date, it seems he prefers a timeline of several months to withdraw from Afghanistan, not several weeks.

## 15. Crisis of Command: America's Broken Civil-Military Relationship Imperils National Security

2021

Foreign Affairs

<https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2021-04-09/national-security-crisis-command>

When U.S. President Donald Trump left office on January 20, many of those concerned about the state of civil-military relations in the United States breathed a deep sigh of relief. They shouldn't have. Yes, Trump used the military as a political prop, referred to some of its leaders as "my generals," and faced a Pentagon that slow-rolled his attempts to withdraw troops from battlefields around the world. But problems in the relationship between military officers and elected officials did not begin with Trump, and they did not end when Joe Biden took office.

Civilian control over the military is deeply embedded in the U.S. Constitution; the armed forces answer to the president and legislature. Starting in 1947, Congress built robust institutions designed to maintain this relationship. But over the past three decades, civilian control has quietly but steadily degraded. Senior military officers may still follow orders and avoid overt insubordination, but their influence has grown, while oversight and accountability mechanisms have faltered. Today, presidents worry about military opposition to their policies and must reckon with an institution that selectively implements executive guidance. Too often, unelected military leaders limit or engineer civilians' options so that generals can run wars as they see fit.

Civilian control is therefore about more than whether military leaders openly defy orders or want to overthrow the government. It's about the extent to which political leaders can realize the goals the American people elected them to accomplish. Here, civilian control is not binary; it is measured in degrees. Because the military filters information that civilians need and implements the orders that civilians give, it can wield great influence over civilian decision-making. Even if elected officials still get the final say, they may have little practical control if generals dictate all the options or slow their implementation—as they often do now.

Resetting this broken relationship is a tall order. It demands that Congress doggedly pursue its oversight role and hold the military accountable, regardless of who occupies the White House. It requires that defense secretaries hire skilled civilian staffs composed of political appointees and civil servants. But most important, it requires an attentive public that is willing to hold both civilian leaders and the military to account.

## Paradise Lost

Evidence of the decline in civilian control over the military isn't hard to find. Over the last few decades, senior military leaders have regularly thwarted or delayed presidential decisions on military policy. In 1993, Colin Powell, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, helped block President Bill Clinton from ending the policy that banned gays from the military, resulting in the now defunct "don't ask, don't tell" compromise. Both President Barack Obama and Trump complained that officers boxed them in—limiting military options and leaking information—and forced them to grudgingly accept troop surges they did not support. Obama's generals signaled that they would accept nothing less than an aggressive counterinsurgency in Afghanistan—despite White House opposition. Obama later fired Stanley McChrystal, then commander of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, after members of the general's staff disparaged White House officials in remarks to a reporter. Trump, for his part, saw senior military leaders push back against his orders to withdraw troops from Afghanistan and Syria. Although these moves were signature campaign promises, Trump eventually backed off when military leaders told him they couldn't be done and that the policies would harm national security.

Of course, senior military leaders do not always get everything they want, but they often get more than they should. Their power also extends beyond headline-grabbing decisions about overseas deployments or troop reductions. The military's influence manifests hundreds of times a day through bureaucratic maneuvers inside the Pentagon, in policy discussions in the White House, and during testimony on Capitol Hill. These mundane interactions, perhaps more than anything else, steer decision-making away from civilians in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and toward uniformed personnel. Inside the Pentagon, for instance, military leaders often preempt the advice and analysis of civilian staff by sending their proposals straight to the secretary of defense, bypassing the byzantine clearance process that non-uniformed staffers must navigate.

There are signs of the erosion of civilian control outside the Pentagon, as well. Congress too rarely demands that the military bow to civilian authority, instead weighing in selectively and for partisan reasons. During the Obama administration, for example, some commentators and at least one member of Congress suggested that Martin Dempsey, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, should resign in protest over the president's management of the campaign to defeat the Islamic State, also known as ISIS. The goal was to use Dempsey's role as the president's chief military adviser as leverage in a partisan battle over Obama's foreign policy. Under Trump, many Democrats cheered on the retired and active-duty generals who pushed back against the president's decisions. These "adults in the room" included James Mattis (the secretary of defense), John Kelly (the secretary of homeland security and then White House chief of staff), and H. R. McMaster (Trump's national security adviser). At the extreme, some of Trump's opponents even urged senior military leaders to contemplate removing Trump from office. In August 2020, two well-known retired army officers, John Nagl and Paul Yingling, penned an open letter to Mark Milley, the chairman of the

Joint Chiefs of Staff, telling him to do just that if the president refused to leave office after losing the 2020 election. Although these efforts may have comforted those concerned about Trump's erratic policies, they undermined civilian control by suggesting that it was the military's job to keep the executive in check. When politicians endorse military insubordination that serves their interests, they do long-term damage to the principle of civilian primacy.

Oversight itself has also become politicized. Politicians increasingly turn to those with military experience to run the Pentagon. Trump decided to appoint a former general, Mattis, as secretary of defense, and Biden did the same, putting Lloyd Austin in the post. In both cases, Congress had to waive a requirement that officers be retired for at least seven years before serving in the department's top job. The rule, which had been broken only once before, is designed to prioritize leaders with distance from the mindset and social networks associated with military service. Ideally, defense secretaries should be comfortable operating as civilians—not soldiers. Mattis's and Austin's nominations, and subsequent confirmations, therefore represent a break with over seven decades of law and tradition, beginning with the 1947 reforms, stipulating that the secretary of defense cannot be a recently retired general.

There is no obvious reason to think that those with military experience are better suited to controlling the military on behalf of Congress or the president—and plenty of reasons to suspect the opposite. In the military, soldiers are taught to follow orders, not scrutinize their implications, as a cabinet official should. Military personnel, moreover, are ideally taught to stay out of partisan debates, whereas the secretary's job demands well-honed political skill and experience. Yet as Mattis's and Austin's appointments show, military service is becoming a litmus test for Pentagon policy jobs traditionally held by civilians, and this is true even at lower levels.

Meanwhile, the public is failing to insist that elected leaders hold the military to account. Many Americans would rather put troops on a pedestal and admire the military from afar. Repeating the mantra "Support our troops" has become a substitute for the patriotic duty of questioning the institution those troops serve. Large numbers of citizens are now reluctant to even offer their opinions in response to survey questions about the military, let alone to criticize military leaders. In a 2013 YouGov survey, for instance, 25 to 30 percent of the nonveterans asked consistently chose "I don't know" or "no opinion" in response to questions about the military.

At best, these trends immunize the military from scrutiny; at worst, they give it a pass to behave with impunity. An October 2017 White House press conference epitomized this exceptionalism: during a discussion of Trump's condolence call to the widow of a slain soldier, Kelly, who had served in the military for more than four decades and whose own son was killed fighting in Afghanistan, refused to call on journalists who didn't know someone who had had a family member killed in combat. Sarah Huckabee Sanders, the White House press secretary, later admonished journalists for daring to question Kelly. Debating "a four-star Marine general," she said, was "highly inappropriate."

## Origin Story

Part of the decline in civil-military relations can be blamed on institutional changes. As the United States became a global power, elected leaders developed a bureaucratic structure to manage the military on a day-to-day basis. When it became clear at the start of the Cold War that the U.S. defense establishment had become too large for the president and the legislature to control on their own, Congress passed the National Security Act of 1947. The law established what would eventually become the Department of Defense and placed at its head a civilian secretary of defense, who would bring experience managing bureaucratic and domestic politics. That person would have the exclusive job of ensuring that the military's activities aligned with the nation's goals as determined by its elected political leaders. And Congress granted the secretary a civilian staff composed of individuals who could draw on their experiences in government, business, and academia.

But in 1986, Congress unintentionally undid much of this work. That year, it overhauled the 1947 law by passing the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, which shifted power and resources away from civilian leaders and to their military counterparts. Since that law passed, large, well-resourced military staffs have displaced civilians in the Pentagon and across the rest of the government. Today, for example, ambassadors and other civilian officials frequently depend on the military's regional combatant commands for resources, including planes and logistical support, necessary to do their jobs. Regional combatant commanders also have responsibilities that cross national boundaries, giving them de facto diplomatic authority and frequent contact not only with their military counterparts overseas but also with foreign government leaders. The military officials who govern security assistance and cooperation programs have also grown in number and influence, further sidelining their civilian counterparts in the State Department.

It is a truism in national security discourse that diplomats are underfunded relative to the military. Even former defense secretaries, including Mattis and Robert Gates, have warned Congress of the risks of underfunding the State Department. But no one ever does much about it. Without a serious attempt at rebalancing, the military's personnel and resource advantages will only further undermine civilian control, giving the military extra speed and capacity that it can leverage during bureaucratic fights to make and implement policy.

At the same time, there has also been a hollowing out of the processes of civilian control within the Department of Defense itself. In recent years, the Pentagon has faced immense difficulties recruiting, retaining, and managing the civilian professional staff responsible for overseeing the uniformed military. These challenges are the result of underinvestment in the civilian workplace. There is little systematic training to prepare civilian officials for their responsibilities, and they are often thrown into the deep end of the Pentagon and left to sink or swim. In contrast, service members benefit from thorough professional military education programs and other developmental opportunities throughout their careers.



By 2018, this situation had deteriorated to a point where the bipartisan National Defense Strategy Commission, a congressionally appointed panel, concluded that a lack of civilian voices in national security decision-making was “undermining the concept of civilian control.” To be sure, these problems became more acute during the Trump administration, when the Pentagon was littered with acting officials and unfilled positions. But the civilian bench was shallow long before Trump took over.

## Playing Politics

Partisan polarization has also undermined civilian control. After 9/11, the public’s esteem for the military spiked, and politicians noticed. Elected leaders became increasingly willing to disregard civil-military norms, avoid serious oversight and accountability, and encourage military insubordination to score political points against their political opponents.

Today, politicians on both sides of the aisle capitalize on the military’s prestige to shield themselves from criticism and attack their rivals—often a cost-free strategy, given the military’s popularity. During campaigns, candidates often claim that troops prefer them over their opponent; in 2020, a Trump ad featured the tagline “Support our troops,” and Biden cited a *Military Times* poll to suggest that it was he who enjoyed their support. Candidates regularly seek the endorsement of retired generals and even use them as partisan attack dogs. At the 2016 Republican National Convention, the Trump adviser Michael Flynn, who had then been out of the military for just two years, criticized Trump’s opponent, Hillary Clinton, and encouraged the crowd to chant “Lock her up!” As president, Trump repeatedly delivered partisan speeches in front of uniformed audiences, once telling officers at MacDill Air Force Base, “We had a wonderful election, didn’t we? And I saw those numbers—and you like me, and I like you.” In over-the-top campaign videos, some post-9/11 veterans running for office use their experience as a means of dividing those who served from those who did not. In 2020, the Republican Texas congressman and former Navy SEAL Dan Crenshaw released an *Avengers*-themed ad entitled “Texas Reloaded” that featured attack helicopters, fighter jets, and Crenshaw himself parachuting out of a plane.

More frequently ignored, however, are the less egregious moments of politicization, such as presidents donning bomber jackets and flight suits in public speeches to military audiences or venturing to West Point to make major foreign policy addresses rather than to a civilian university. All these actions reinforce the belief that military service is superior to other kinds of public service.

Even though politicians try to gain electoral advantage through such behavior, what they are ultimately doing is damaging their own authority. By lionizing the armed forces, politicians teach the public to expect elected officials to make concessions to military leaders or defer to them on important decisions. This same dynamic motivates civilian leaders to encourage officers to serve as “the adults in the room,” resist or oppose their partisan opponents’ policies, or resign in protest

against a lawful order from an elected president. Although there may be short-term advantages to such behavior (assuming, of course, that the military leaders are correct), it subverts the broader principle that civilians get to pursue the policies they were elected to carry out.

The military has also played a role in the degradation of civilian control. For one thing, its nonpartisan ethic is in decay. Whereas the majority of senior military officers did not identify with a political party as late as 1976, nearly three-quarters do so today, according to surveys of senior officers attending various war colleges conducted between 2017 and 2020. Many service members are comfortable airing their partisan political commentary on social media to wide audiences, an outspokenness that would have made past generations of soldiers blush. Retired generals involved in politics—especially through campaign endorsements—reinforce to those in uniform that the military is riven by partisan divides. Senior military leaders have largely failed to address this behavior, either looking the other way or attributing it to a few bad apples. Their silence, however, normalizes partisanship in the military, with those in uniform concluding that it is acceptable to openly pick political sides. Recent surveys of senior active-duty officers found that roughly one-third had observed their colleagues make or share disparaging comments about elected officials on social media.

Service members also make civilian control that much harder when they act as if they are superior to their civilian counterparts. Research consistently shows that many in the military believe that their decision to serve in uniform makes them morally superior to those Americans who did not make that choice. According to a 2020 survey by the research institution NORC, this sense of superiority extends even to their views of those Americans whose jobs also entail significant risks—including doctors fighting the pandemic and diplomats serving in combat zones or in hardship assignments. At the extreme, military personnel question the legitimacy of the civilians who oversee them, especially if they suspect that those leaders don't share their partisan views.

Another factor undermining civilian authority is the military's attachment to the notion that it should have exclusive control over what it views as its own affairs. This concept, endorsed by the political scientist Samuel Huntington, contends that the military has a right to push back when civilians attempt to interfere in military matters. According to this view, autonomy is a right, not a privilege. But military and political affairs are not as distinct as many officers have been led to believe, and the experience of other countries suggests that alternative models are just as plausible: throughout Europe, for example, military leaders are accustomed to much more intrusive oversight than their U.S. counterparts.

### **Hollywood Treatment**

Trends in American culture underpin many of these problems. Americans increasingly fetishize the armed forces and believe that the only true patriots are those in uniform. According to Gallup polling, the public consistently has more confidence in the military than in any other national

institution. That admiration, coupled with declining trust and confidence in civilian organizations, means that large segments of the population think that those in uniform should run the military, and maybe even the country itself.

This adoration has grown in part out of efforts to bring the military out of its post-Vietnam malaise. In 1980, Edward Meyer, the army chief of staff, declared his force a “hollow army,” and that same year, an operation intended to rescue U.S. hostages in Iran ended in disaster, showing the public just how depleted its armed forces had become. While Congress attempted to rectify the situation by ramping up military spending, the military cannily worked to rehabilitate its image through popular culture. In the 1980s, the Pentagon cooperated with big-budget movies such as *Top Gun*, a practice it has continued to the present with such superhero films as *Captain Marvel*. By conditioning its cooperation and provision of equipment on approval of the script, the military learned that it could influence storylines and enhance its brand.

Another contributing problem is the military’s tendency to recruit heavily from particular subsections of American society. With few calls for shared sacrifice or national mobilization during the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, the majority of the public had little to do besides thank the troops for their service. The military, meanwhile went to great lengths to honor soldiers with patriotic displays centered on the nobility of military service, notably during college and professional sporting events. These trends all reinforced the notion that military service members were truly exceptional—better, different, and more selfless than the civilians who cheered them on.

### **Reform or Perish**

Together, these pressures have weakened the institutional processes, nonpartisan practices, and societal values that have historically served to keep the principle of civilian control of the military strong in its mundane and often unglamorous daily practice. But the damage can be repaired. Institutional reforms have the greatest chance of success. Politicians on both sides of the aisle stand to benefit from better civilian oversight.

Congress could start by rebalancing power in the Department of Defense away from the Joint Staff and the combatant commands (the 11 military commands with specific geographic or functional responsibilities) and toward civilians in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. Legislators can do this by resisting calls to further cut the Pentagon’s civilian workforce and by eliminating duplicate efforts among the Joint Staff and the combatant commands, which together account for an estimated 40,000 positions. A parallel program to train, retrain, and prepare a civilian workforce would help deepen the Pentagon’s civilian bench.

Congress should also rethink efforts to give the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the mission of “global integration” of U.S. military capabilities—an initiative that took root when Joseph Dunford filled the role, from 2015 to 2019. The idea was that the Joint Chiefs could adjudicate the military’s

competing geographic requirements, curb the power of the combatant commands, and prioritize resources. But that role is best played by civilians in the defense secretary's office, not by a sprawling military staff.

The uniformed military must also address its role in undermining civilian control. A hallmark of any profession is its ability to enforce standards of conduct, and yet the military has at times struggled to ensure that its members refrain from partisan activity. To address this, active-duty officers should publicly disavow retired senior officers who damage the military's nonpartisan ethic through campaign endorsements and other political pronouncements. Retired officers should also use peer pressure to curb partisan campaign endorsements among their colleagues. If that fails, Congress should consider instituting a four-year cooling-off period that would prohibit generals and admirals from making partisan endorsements immediately after retiring—similar to what it did with lobbying efforts.

Finally, military leaders must do a better job of educating service members about the importance of nonpartisanship, including on social media. This will require clear regulations and consistent enforcement. The same leaders should also rethink their view of military professionalism, abandoning the notion that they have an exclusive domain and embracing an approach that accepts the need for civilian oversight.

Other areas in need of reform, including among civilian elected leaders, are less likely to see change. Politicians today face few repercussions for politicizing the military, and they have considerable incentives to continue to do so. Still, elected leaders could start to deal with the problem by ending the practice of soliciting endorsements from retired generals. They could also stop using the uniformed military as a backdrop for partisan political speeches and stop running campaign advertisements that insinuate that they enjoy more military support than their opponents. Veterans and active reservists or members of the National Guard should also stop weaponizing their service for electoral gain. That would mean an end to cashing in on public support for the military through campaign ads that suggest their military service makes them superior citizens.

Politicians should also stop propagating the myth that serving in the military is a prerequisite for overseeing it. This belief not only diminishes the important role civilians play but also symbolically raises the military above its civilian superiors in the minds of service members and the public. Instituting a ten-year waiting period—or at least adhering to the existing seven-year requirement—before a retired officer can serve as secretary of defense is a necessary step. So is valuing and investing in the contributions of civilian expertise at all echelons in the Pentagon.

Finally, those who continue to mythologize the military in popular culture should rebalance their portrayals. A little more *M\*A\*S\*H*—the darkly comedic 1970s television series about a U.S. Army medical unit during the Korean War—and a little less righteous soldiering might humanize military

personnel and chip away at the public's distorted view of the armed services. Bringing the military back down to earth and a bit closer to the society it serves would help politicians in their effort to scrutinize military affairs and encourage Americans to see accountability as a healthy practice in a democratic society.

If Americans do not recognize the rot lurking beneath their idyllic vision of civilian control, the United States' civil-military crisis will only get worse. More than most citizens realize, the country's democratic traditions and national security both depend on this delicate relationship. Without robust civilian oversight of the military, the United States will not remain a democracy or a global power for long.

## 16. Com pressão de Biden, Arábia Saudita busca novo cessar-fogo com Iêmen

23.03.2021

Defesa Aérea e Naval

<https://www.defesaaereanaval.com.br/geopolitica/com-pressao-de-biden-arabia-saudita-busca-novo-cessar-fogo-com-iemen>

**São Paulo, 23 de março de 2021** – A Arábia Saudita fez nova proposta aos rebeldes houthis para encerrar o conflito armado que se estende desde 2015 no Iêmen. A oferta do chanceler Faisal bin Farhan é direcionada a todas as frentes de conflito no país vizinho e inclui a sugestão de supervisão política da ONU no processo. O confronto foi iniciado em 2015, durante a administração do democrata Barack Obama, que apoiou a ação do tradicional aliado no Oriente Médio contra os rebeldes. Porém, o posicionamento mudou com a chegada do também democrata Joe Biden à Casa Branca. Antony Blinken, Secretário de Estado dos Estados Unidos, tem demonstrado apoio ao fim do conflito desde o início do mandato de Biden.

A Arábia Saudita tenta negociar há meses uma pausa no conflito com o Iêmen, sem sucesso. “A proposta é mais uma de várias nos últimos meses. Ela veio precedida de uma intensificação dos bombardeios aéreos por parte da Arábia Saudita. É possível que seja resultado da pressão do governo Biden, que não apoia essa guerra. Há dúvidas se o cessar-fogo irá surtir efeito nessa nova tentativa”, afirma Gunther Rudzit, professor de Relações Internacionais da ESPM SP.

Para Gunther, os governos americano e saudita buscam sair do atoleiro do Iêmen para se concentrar em questões consideradas mais estratégicas com Síria, Iraque e Israel. “O foco dos dois governos deve se concentrar em pressionar o governo Al-Assad a negociar com os poucos grupos

opositores que ainda restam na Síria, e em tentar eliminar de vez os alguns grupos do Estado Islâmico que ainda resistem na fronteira entre Síria e Iraque. Para os Estados Unidos, outra pauta importante é aumentar o número de países com relações diplomáticas normalizadas com Israel”, afirma. “Porém, os sauditas ainda não deverão dar esse passo almejado pelos americanos.”

O Iêmen está localizado em região estratégica e de tensão geopolítica, ao lado do estreito de Bab al-Mandab, que separa a África da Península Arábica e liga o Mar Vermelho ao Golfo de Aden. Do outro lado do estreito, a China instalou em 2017 sua primeira base militar no exterior, no Djibouti, que já contava com a única base permanente dos Estados Unidos no continente africano. Além de Estados Unidos e China, França, Espanha e Alemanha também têm presença militar no Djibouti.

## 17. Correcting America's Grand Strategic Failures in Iraq

01.04.2021

CSIS

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/correcting-americas-grand-strategic-failures-iraq>

Press reports indicate that the U.S. is soon to have yet another meeting with Iraq on establishing some kind of future strategic relationship. Unless this meeting makes a dramatic break with the past, it will be a dismal failure and do more to empower Iraq's divisions and Iranian influence than to serve U.S. and Iraqi interests or to help bring any kind of security and stability to the MENA region.

There are twelve reasons why the U.S. may fail, and all of them are issues that the U.S. has so far failed to address at the grand strategic level.

**Thinking tactically, rather than strategically:** From 2003 onwards, the U.S. has focused on dealing with the threat of the day, rather than on creating long-term Iraqi unity, development, and defense capabilities. The U.S. has talked about integrated civil-military plans as well as longer-term civil and security goals, but it has focused primarily on dealing with extremist threats rather than creating some effective longer-term plans to create effective Iraqi military, internal security, and police forces as well as some kind of economic aid program tailored to uniting its Arab Shi'ites, Arab Sunni, Kurds and minorities under one effective structure of governance.

**Underestimating Iraq's strategic importance:** The U.S. has consistently failed to give Iraq its proper strategic value. It focused on engaging Islamic extremists rather than Iraq's critical role in containing and deterring Iran; preventing Iraq from becoming a strategic bridge between Iran, Syria, and the Hezbollah that would link Iraq to the Arab Gulf states, Jordan and Egypt; limiting Turkish pressure and interference; and limiting Russian and Chinese influence.

The U.S. has also confused the reduction in U.S. petroleum imports with a reduction in the strategic importance of the Gulf – although the Gulf exports some 20% of world petroleum. It has understated Iraq’s strategic importance to China and Russia as well as the extent to which it is critical in providing the stable flow of energy to Asian exports to the United States. These exports now make up a critical percentage of U.S. trade and the U.S. GDP.

**Focusing on the wrong enemies:** The U.S. did need to focus on Islamic extremists, Al Qaeda, and ISIS. The main threat, however, has always been Iran, the expansion of Iranian influence, and how Iraq’s relations with Syria will evolve – a threat now compounded by Russia’s role in Syria as well as Russia’s efforts to expand its role in Iraq and the Gulf. The U.S. has failed to understand Iraq’s grand strategic military importance; its critical potential role in bringing stability and security to the MENA region; and the fact that its failed and corrupt governance, internal ethnic and sectarian tensions, and growing economic collapse were the real enemies.

**Rushing in and rushing out:** The U.S. invaded in 2003 with no clear plan for the future beyond removing Saddam, and it originally planned major withdrawals within a year. The U.S. never created stable plans for the future once it had created a new war with Iraqi Sunni extremists. It then rushed out of Iraq in 2011, ignoring many of the limited plans it had made in 2010.

ISIS forces then took advantage of the near U.S. withdrawal in 2011 and conquered most of Western Iraq. This then led the U.S. to rush back in, only to rush out again once the ISIS “caliphate” had been broken up in 2018. The U.S. only had a nominal 3,500 troops present in the spring of 2021, although the surviving cadres of ISIS fighters had become increasingly active, and new threats were emerging from the PMFs and Iran.

Moreover, the U.S. left large numbers of largely Sunni Popular Mobilization Forces behind (many with ties to Iran). It effectively empowered Iran and increased the threat to the limited number of U.S. forces and other personnel that remained.

**Providing erratic and poorly focused security assistance:** After invading in 2003, the U.S. relied largely on its own military forces to fight the rising Iraqi extremist forces from 2004-2009. It also obtained allied help and coalitions. The U.S. was, however, far too slow in its efforts to build up Iraq’s military forces and proper government leadership as well as the management of these forces. From 2004-2009, the U.S. relied far too much on a massive buildup of U.S. ground forces.

This U.S. build-up also only worked because the first round of Iraqi extremists was so extreme in dealing with fellow Sunnis that they alienated large portions of the local population. This created many anti-extremist Iraqi Sunni volunteers like the Sons of Iraq, and they played a major role in defeating the first round of such extremists. Iraqi government forces were still far too much of a hollow shell when the U.S. largely withdrew most of its forces in 2011.

**Failing to sustain key military support and train and assist efforts:** After U.S. forces returned to deal with ISIS in 2014, the U.S. did focus far more on developing Iraqi ground force development and on providing forward-deployed train and assist efforts that often directly supported Iraqi government land forces in combat. The U.S. created important new initiatives like the Security Force Assistance Brigades, new uses of Special Forces, and intelligence personnel to support Iraqi units in combat – while relying heavily on unmanned airstrike and intelligence systems. These shifts also reduced the cost of U.S. efforts to far lower levels in casualties and dollars.

The U.S. did not, however, create longer-term plans or train and assist structures that would make Iraqi forces fully effective once the “caliphate” was broken up. The U.S. repeated its mistakes in Vietnam by leaving Iraq land and air forces grossly overdependent on U.S. combat armor and aircraft that they could not sustain. This made Iraqi government forces steadily more dependent on Russian arms and on the older arms they had imported from the Soviet Union. It also did virtually nothing after 2010 to help develop more effective Iraqi police forces.

**Failing to address the causes of Iraq’s internal violence:** The U.S. failed to understand that defeating the first round of extremists by 2010, and then returning and breaking up the ISIS caliphate would never achieve lasting results unless the U.S. dealt with the causes of violent extremism rather than the latest form of extremist violence.

The U.S. focused almost exclusively on the active extremist symptoms to the near exclusion of dealing with the actual disease: the lack of civil progress; the failures in almost every aspect of governance, political corruption, and factional interest; and the high levels of sectarian and ethnic tension and violence. Leaving in 2011, returning in order to defeat the “caliphate,” and the leaving again after 2019 – with many ISIS fighters still active and after empowering pro-Iranian militias – all helped raised these levels of tension and violence as well.

**Failing to address Iraqi governance, politics, and corruption:** U.S. efforts to remake Iraq in its own image from roughly 2003 to 2009 had little real success or lasting effect. Worse, these U.S. efforts to address Iraq’s civil problems were replaced from roughly 2010 onwards by only very limited and poorly focused aid programs.

Financial aid kept Iraq solvent, but other forms of aid were often poorly managed, wasted, stolen, or had very limited effectiveness. The U.S. made little effort to make aid and other support conditional on its proper use. It did not halt support when Iraqis proved to be corrupt and ineffective. It also failed to use aid to create strong aid incentives and options to unite the Sunnis and Shi’ites as well as the Arabs and Kurds.

**Failing to provide adequate and effective economic aid and support economic reform:** The U.S. has never seemed to realize that Iraq’s economic stability and development have been the critical second half of any meaningful security effort. Economic reform and aid is as important – if not more



– than the security force’s reform and aid. It is also the critical potential tool in uniting the Sunnis and Shi’ites as well as the Arabs and Kurds, in reducing the critical forces that shape corruption, in creating new jobs, in winning popular support for the government and reducing popular protests, and in undermining Iranian and others’ efforts to gain control over key parts of Iraq’s economy.

**Focusing on a narrow, self-seeking U.S. strategic partnership rather than meaningful regional stability:** The U.S. needs to realize that it cannot turn a divided Iraq – caught between Iran, Syria, Turkey, and the Southern Arab Gulf states – into a clear strategic partner of the kind the U.S. now has with the Southern Arab Gulf states.

The U.S. needs to focus on creating a strong and independent Iraq: one with an effective government, developing economy, and enough security forces to both deal with internal security as well as to defend and deter against neighbors like Iran and a post-civil war Syria. This is the best way to unite Iraq, to get broad Iraqi support for U.S. efforts, and to limit Iran’s success as much as possible. Once again, encouraging Iraqis to act in ways that benefit Iraq is far more likely to succeed.

**Failing to work effectively with our allies:** One key way to help accomplish these military goals is to make them as multilateral as possible. Bringing European allies into the military and security assistance efforts – even to the point of organizing a NATO military support or train and assist efforts – to defuse Iraqi resentment of past U.S. mistakes and to make it clear that the end goal was a stronger and independent Iraq. Nations like France and Italy also have far more experience in creating effective paramilitary forces and in dealing with challenges like the Iraqi PMFs.

A second key way to accomplish such goals would be to internationalize economic aid on a stable basis and to use the World Bank to help in economic development instead of the State Department and USAID. The UN has become too political and divided to run a major aid program, and USAID’s strength in emergency and project aid have never been matched in its modern efforts at economic development and reform.

The World Bank would have to adjust its efforts to focus on governance and reducing the ethnic and sectarian divisions in Iraq. It would have to enforce conditionality on aid as long as Iraq remains as corrupt as it is today. However, the World Bank does seem to have a real-world approach to addressing Iraq’s governance, economic, and development programs, and it has developed some excellent assessments of Iraq’s critical, structural economic problems. This is also an area where the U.S. might be able to work with the EU – focusing on the potential to meet common objectives, rather than working on divided efforts.

**Understanding that the U.S. faces three sets of enemies and not just one:** Finally, the U.S. needs to learn a lesson that it should have learned as early as its intervention in the Philippines from 1899-1913, and one that it should certainly have learned in fighting the Vietnam War. A focus on grand strategy and long-term outcomes is critical to avoiding long wars that have no positive ending.

Defeating the immediate enemy is only part of a campaign that has a successful grand strategic ending. The U.S. needs to address all such conflicts with the understanding that it faces three sets of enemies and not just one. The first enemy is the obvious threat posed by direct opponents. The second enemy is the weaknesses, divisions, and corruption of the government and military forces of the country the U.S. is trying to help. The third is America's ignorance of the country, failure to address the complexity of the tasks involved, and the learning curve in developing effective ways to aid a given country at both the security and civil level – as well as its ability predict whether U.S. intervention can actually be effective.

In virtually every such cases, major changes are needed in the host country at both the security and civil levels. Letting the country continue to make the same mistakes by doing it "their way" will not work. However, the U.S. also can only succeed where another state can eventually make real progress in transforming its own goals and values. The U.S. will virtually always fail when it tries to go from providing such aid to trying to transform another country and culture.

## 18. The Most Urgent North Korean Nuclear Threat Isn't What You Think

15.04.2021

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

<https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/04/15/most-urgent-north-korean-nuclear-threat-isn-t-what-you-think-pub-84335>

The most likely nuclear risk Pyongyang poses is spreading WMD technology in the Middle East.

North Korea's resumed nuclear missile testing generates understandable hand-wringing in Seoul, Tokyo, and Washington. Such tests demonstrate Pyongyang's growing prowess with nuclear weaponry and are a frightening reminder that a crisis on the Korean Peninsula could erupt at any time.

Yet, as troubling as missile tests are, the chances of a war on the Korean Peninsula remain very low. Policymakers should be more concerned about the likelier possibility of North Korea selling nuclear and missile technology to countries in the Middle East.

### A Nuclear Power with a Cashflow Problem

For three decades, neither diplomacy nor increasingly stringent economic sanctions have reversed North Korea's ambition to possess nuclear weapons. Nor have they diminished North Korea's illicit trade relationships with Iran, Syria, and other states in the Middle East. Even during the heady days

in 2018 and 2019 of North Korean leader Kim Jong Un and former president Donald Trump's love letter diplomacy, North Korea's arsenal of nuclear weapons and missiles continued to grow. Over the same period, the UN Panel of Experts, which assesses compliance with economic and trade sanctions on North Korea, reported numerous times when North Korean entities sold technology for missiles or weapons of mass destruction (WMD) to buyers in the Middle East.

The threats from North Korea's WMD programs have continued to grow despite Washington's sustained pressure campaign to choke the North Korean economy. Since 2009, the United States has led the UN Security Council to pass eight main resolutions imposing wide-ranging sanctions. These resolutions prohibit, among other items, North Korean exports of coal and seafood and remittances from North Korean overseas workers, while also embargoing North Korean imports of refined petroleum, technology and equipment for its nuclear and missile programs, and a range of other goods. U.S. secondary sanctions also have limited North Korean access to the international financial system.

No doubt the sanctions have damaged North Korea's economy—and have exacerbated the already perilous living conditions of many North Korean citizens—but they have not come close to forcing Kim to decide to disarm or to curb his WMD trade.

Then the coronavirus pandemic made things far worse for North Korea's economy. Kim's decision to seal the country's borders has resulted in economic pain Washington could never have achieved through sanctions. Recent reports suggest growing alarm among North Korea's leadership over failed economic programs, with attendant electrical outages, factory closures, and shortages of some food staples. Foreign diplomats have left North Korea over the difficult living conditions and shortages of medicine and basic goods in Pyongyang. It is little surprise that North Korea is increasingly reliant on cyber attacks and cryptocurrency theft to generate revenue.

### **North Korea's WMD Bazaar**

North Korea's desperation could make a sustained U.S. pressure strategy still riskier. Kim's regime remains remarkably resilient, so collapse seems unlikely—even though U.S. officials would be wise to prepare for that unique scenario. The most likely outgrowth of North Korea's need for cash is an increase in other dangerous behavior. WMD technology represents one of North Korea's few value-added assets.

North Korea's proliferation rap sheet is long: missile and nuclear trade with Pakistan; missile sales to Egypt, Libya, Yemen, and others; chemical weapons assistance to Syria; and more. Notably, North Korea clandestinely sought to construct a nuclear reactor in Syria, a facility that might have provided plutonium for a Syrian bomb program until Israel destroyed the partly built reactor with air strikes in 2007. The March 2021 report by the UN Panel of Experts reported ongoing assistance by North Korea with Iran's ballistic missile and space launch programs. Iranian scientists reportedly went to

North Korea to discuss rocket booster technology, while thirteen North Korean experts are believed to have visited Iran to assist with liquid-fueled ballistic missiles. According to the report, the cooperation between North Korean and Iranian entities also extends to illicit shipments of valves, electronics, and other missile-related equipment.

Until now, apart from the reactor project in Syria, North Korea is not known to have transferred more sensitive nuclear technologies—longer-range missiles, nuclear weapon designs, equipment or technology to produce highly enriched uranium or plutonium for a bomb, or those materials themselves. Presumably, North Korean leaders historically have believed that such transfers could cross an implicit red line and result in harsher consequences when discovered. Now, increasingly desperate for cash, Kim could be more willing to risk sales of these items to interested customers in the Middle East, including possibly terrorist groups.

If such sales come to light, it is reasonable to expect that Israel would again take preemptive action. Israel regularly carries out air strikes against missile construction facilities and other weapons-related sites in Syria. It is also suspected of assassinating the most prominent Iranian nuclear scientist, Mohsen Fakhri-zadeh, in November 2020 and of causing an explosion that damaged the power supply to Iran's Natanz uranium enrichment facility in April 2021.

### **Prioritize Ending North Korean Nuclear Sales**

Relying on Israeli counterproliferation strikes to prevent WMD acquisition by adversaries in the Middle East is a fraught strategy. At some point, that approach could fail in any number of ways, with catastrophic consequences. It is bad enough that Washington faces a complex nuclear challenge from North Korea in East Asia. But North Korean proliferation that yields a new nuclear-armed state or catalyzes a wider conflict in the Middle East could be worse.

Sustaining economic pressure against North Korea without creating an offramp through negotiations is increasingly dangerous. It is too late to stop North Korea's nuclear acquisitions, and pressure will not force Kim to disarm. Yet diplomacy with North Korea could still prevent another nuclear-armed state in the Middle East.

This is the reality of the North Korean threat President Joe Biden and his administration confronts. It is time for a new U.S. policy that mitigates the dangers from North Korea's WMD programs. Avoiding worse outcomes will require offering sanctions relief and steps toward a peace regime in return for an end to North Korean WMD trade and constraints on its nuclear arsenal. This is the deal Biden should seek before economic desperation brings North Korean nuclear weapons to a volatile Middle East.

## 19. AUSA Fires Back At Air Force: Long-Range Missiles Aren't 'Stupid'

06.04.2021

Breaking Defense

<https://breakingdefense.com/2021/04/ausa-fires-back-at-air-force-long-range-missiles-arent-stupid/>

The benefit of diverse and effective long-range precision fires was reinforced by then-U.S. Pacific Command Commander Navy Adm. Harry Harris, who challenged the Army to develop more lethal, long-range precision fires that could not only engage adversary land targets, but also sink ships at sea. In a stunning slap at a sister service, the commander of Air Force's Global Strike Command said March 31 that the Army's deep strike effort was "a stupid idea" that was wasting money on something the Air Force "has mastered."

As the former U.S. Army Pacific commanding general, it is difficult to understand how a senior military officer could be so out of touch with the direction America's most threatening adversaries have taken over the past 10 to 15 years. I'm also disappointed that at a critical time in the defense budget process, Air Force Gen. Timothy Ray would try to plant the idea that the Army is wasting money on something he thinks the Air Force has perfected. In fact, Pentagon planners are carefully working on new warfighting concepts in which U.S. forces and their partners will deter and win fights by overwhelming adversaries with multiple dilemmas.

That warfighting concept, endorsed by all the services, is why the U.S. Army has made long-range precision fires and effects one of its top modernization priorities. It provides combatant commanders with multiple options to "put more challenges on our potential competitors," Army Chief of Staff Gen. James McConville said in March when talking about Army contributions to the multidomain warfighting concept. "We are all together in the joint force," he said, describing hypersonic weapons with deep strike capabilities as a tool that would destroy enemy air defenses so Navy and Air Force aircraft could attack.

Someone in the Air Force didn't get the message about the multiple dilemma joint force plan. The truth is the U.S. faces growing strategic threats from China, Russia and other potential competitors whose capabilities have expanded to negate the advantages once enjoyed by the U.S. military. This requires a response that presents adversaries with a host of simultaneous or near-simultaneous dilemmas across the domains of air, land, sea, space and cyberspace. This is exactly what the Joint

Warfighting Concept and the Army's Multi-Domain Operations concept are intended to do, and the current joint effort by all the services is critical to a strong deterrence or the ability to fight and win if deterrence fails. As the U.S. Army Pacific commander, we were constantly refining Multi-Domain Operations across the region based on the requirement of presenting our adversaries with multiple dilemmas.

The benefit of having diverse and effective long-range precision fires was reinforced by then-U.S. Pacific Command Commander Navy Adm. Harry Harris, who challenged the Army to develop more lethal, long-range precision fires that could not only engage adversary land targets but also sink ships at sea. The need for more options and improved teamwork continues today. "The U.S. [fights as a joint force](#), and long-range precision fires delivered by the ground force, I think, are critically important to enhance the maneuver and positional advantage of U.S. forces in theater," the current U.S. Indo-Pacific Command Commander Navy Adm. Phil Davidson recently said on Capitol Hill.

In numerous exercises and wargames and during critical joint task force certification exercises, we demonstrated the impressive capabilities that long-range precision fires from land gave the joint force commander. These key land-based strategic fires, along with air and sea strategic fires, presented the adversary with multiple dilemmas and significantly increased the ability of friendly forces from the land, sea and air to jointly maneuver to a position of advantage. Nobody can fight as a joint force or make timely and effective decisions like the U.S. military working together. One key example was the use of the Army's long-range precision fires from land to control a key line of communication in a strait at sea. This ability freed naval forces to conduct other key tasks without tying up their forces in the strait, and it confused and outmaneuvered enemy forces. The one-dimensional thinking of Cold War warfighting is long gone — as is service parochialism. No one service, ally or capability can go it alone anywhere without unacceptable strategic risk.

## 20. Can Army Triple PrSM Missile's Range?

02.04.2021

Breaking Defense

<https://breakingdefense.com/2021/04/can-army-triple-prsm-missile-range/>

PrSM is preparing for its first 300-plus-mile flight test this year, while the ERCA cannon and hypersonic LRHW head for key tests in 2023. Lockheed Martin's new Precision Strike Missile hasn't yet been test-fired at its maximum range, a classified figure the Army will only say is more than 500 kilometers (311 miles). But the service is already studying potential upgrades that could give PrSM

what the Army calls “mid-range capability,” something they’ve previously defined as over 1,600 km (1,000 miles) – roughly three times as far.

Currently, the Army is buying the venerable Tomahawk and the supersonic SM-6 as stopgap Mid-Range Capability weapons, but it’s looking at other options for the long term, including DARPA-developed hypersonics and the upgraded PrSM.

The Army’s aspiration is to make PrSM able to fire at “mid-range,” said Brig. Gen. John Rafferty, Army Futures Command’s director of Long-Range Precision Fires, in an exclusive interview. While Rafferty didn’t define that term, the general developing Mid-Range Capability defined mid-range in an earlier interview as “around 1,800 kilometers” — about 1,100 miles.

“We’re also in the early stages of the extended range options for PRSM, and there’s a couple of a couple [advanced propulsion] options that we’re looking at that really get the range of PRSM out to that mid-range,” Rafferty told me. “Then, if we have the Mid-Range Capability out of our existing launchers... then that’s really the future for this mid-range space.”

“That’s what we’re exploring now,” he emphasized. “It’ll take us a while to get there.” Meanwhile, the Army has issued training mock-ups of hypersonic missiles to its initial Long Range Hypersonic Weapon (LRHW) battery. The first live weapons will arrive by September 2023 and will fire well over a thousand miles. By September of *this year*, the battery will have its truck-mounted launchers, command posts, and “everything except their live rounds” so it can begin a two-year train-up, said Bob Strider of the Army’s Rapid Capabilities & Critical Technologies Office in an interview with Breaking Defense. (The Navy and the Army use the same hypersonic missile but with different packing for truck-borne vs. ship-mounted launchers).

Then, for the tactical end – targets less than 100 miles away – the service is building prototypes of the Extended Range Cannon Artillery (ERCA) armored howitzer, with a battalion of 18 prototype vehicles expected, again, in 2023. “Prototype Zero,” which won’t be part of the battalion, has already fired live rounds in last year’s Project Convergence wargames and recently completed extensive “characterization” tests. The upgraded Prototypes 1-4 will be delivered later this year, and 5-8 early next. These guns will fire precision-guided and rocket-boosted projectiles over ranges up to almost 100 miles, but those sophisticated shells will be loaded by hand until an autoloader upgrade is available ca. 2025.

PrSM enters service in 2023. Last year, it did a successful series of three short-range flight tests: PrSM’s rocket motor is so powerful it’s actually more stressful on the missile to rein it in for shots under 100 miles than to let it rip for 300-plus. But the attraction of PrSM has always been its range, which while shorter than hypersonics is still much longer than the longest-range weapon in the Army’s inventory today, the Reagan-era ATACMS, which can fly 300 km (186 miles). How far can PrSM shoot? The original program was constrained by the INF Treaty, which banned the US and Russia

(but not China) from developing land-based missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 km. But that was never a fundamental technical limit of the Lockheed Martin design, and as soon as President Trump pulled out of the treaty, the Army began describing PrSM's range as "500-plus km" (over 311 miles).

PrSM will do four long-range test shots this year, said Brig. Gen. John Rafferty, head of the Long-Range Precision Fires team at Army Futures Command. That'll include a 400-km shot at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico in May and maximum-range, a 500-plus-km shot at Vandenberg Air Force Base in California in August, since Army test ranges aren't big enough. In the fall, there'll be a double shot –two PrSM missiles from the same HIMARS launcher truck – as part of the Project Convergence 2021 wargames.

But the Army is already working on upgrades to the baseline PrSM missile. That includes a seeker to track moving targets on land or sea, homing in on their radio-frequency emissions, which will be added to the missile around 2026-2027. (The Army had hoped to make it by 2025 but couldn't find the funding). The seeker has had two successful "captive carry" tests on aircraft and will be test-fired on a surrogate missile in July at White Sands. Upgrades also include the new advanced propulsion systems that – without making PrSM too big to fit in HIMARS launchers – will dramatically increase the range.

## 21. Britain doubling range of its M270 rocket artillery

04.04.2021

UK Defence Journal

<https://ukdefencejournal.org.uk/britain-doubling-range-of-its-m270-rocket-artillery/>

Following a recent agreement struck with the United States Department of Defense, the British Army say that they will be embarking on a five-year programme to update their M270 Multiple Launch Rocket Systems (MLRS). Upgrades will be made to 44 launchers, which are currently in-service, and will include a new armoured cab and upgraded automotive and launch mechanism components.

"The upgrades will ensure that the Army's Land Deep Fires capability remains strong for the next three decades and that the British Army has the technological capability to quickly meet the threats of today and tomorrow. Taking advantage of the long-standing MLRS collaboration with the US and key allies, work will start on upgrading the first tranche of launchers in March 2022 with the fleet going through production over a four-year period. The upgrades will keep the equipment in service until 2050."



It is understood that the work will be carried out under an existing production contract with Lockheed Martin Missiles and Fire Control with the work being carried out at Red River Army Depot and Lockheed Martin's facility in Camden, Arkansas.

The British Army add that the UK is also developing UK-specific systems for the new launchers, including Composite Rubber Tracks, and a vehicle camera and radar system. A new Fire Control System will be developed collaboratively with the US, UK, Italy, and Finland. "To ensure soldiers are not outranged, the Army will develop a new extended range missile with MLRS partners, to be fired from the updated launchers, which should be in-service by 2025. The Guided MLRS Extended Range (GMLRS-ER) missile will extend the Army's reach from 84 to 150km. "

The 44 updated launchers will also be able to fire the US's Precision Strike Missile (PrSM) which has a range of 499km and is expected in-service from 2024. "These weapons will place the British Army at the cutting edge of global deep fires capability, ready to respond to long range air defence and missile threats presented by hostile actors."

## 22. Sensor Tech Key to Effective Missile Defense

04.02.2021

National Defense

<https://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2021/4/2/sensor-tech-key-to-effective-missile-defense>

"If you can't see it, you can't shoot it. And if you can't see it, you can't deter it either," said Air Force Gen. John Hyten, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In a recent interview, Hyten discussed the way forward for integrated air-and-missile defense, saying the key to missile defeat and defense is "the sensory capability that can track that missile." This sentiment has been echoed by other leaders.

During her Senate confirmation, Deputy Secretary of Defense Kathleen Hicks was asked about her priorities, replying: "I would assess ongoing efforts to improve national missile defense, with a particular focus on improving discrimination capabilities and sensors for detection of both ballistic and hypersonic missiles." The Defense Department has already worked to upgrade interceptor capabilities.

After scrapping the Redesigned Kill Vehicle program, the Missile Defense Agency began pursuing the Next-Generation Interceptor, expected to roll out within the next decade. The interceptor will

enhance the Ground-based Midcourse Defense system based in California and Alaska, but a 10-year gap in capability presents a risk. With growing concerns about potential threats, lawmakers are pushing for an additional layer of defense. Per the fiscal year 2021 National Defense Authorization Act, Congress has tasked the Pentagon to deliver 20 new interim ground-based interceptors capable of protecting the homeland. According to the bill, the interim interceptors should “address the majority of current and near- to mid-term projected ballistic missile threats to the United States homeland from rogue nations.” North Korea and Iran remain a threat to America and its allies, so the United States must be well-equipped to defend against long-range weapons.

But what about efforts to advance sensor technologies? Also noted in the NDAA were lawmakers’ concerns regarding the lack of budgeting for key programs to improve overall sensor architecture, including the Homeland Defense Radar-Hawaii and AN/TPY-2, as well as the development and deployment of the hypersonic and ballistic tracking space sensor. Senior “military and civilian officials have stated repeatedly that space-based sensors are the most effective path to improving both homeland and theater missile defenses against a wide range of missile threats,” states the NDAA. Those agreeing include Indo-Pacific Command, which just laid out its investment priorities for the new Pacific Deterrence Initiative. Included in the report — written by PACOM Commander Adm. Philip Davidson — was a request of \$2.3 billion for “a constellation of space-based radars.” Sensors are the eyes and ears of missile defense and are critical for detecting and tracking missiles through all phases of their trajectory, either by space-based satellites or by land- and sea-based radars. Some sensors, such as early warning radar and X-band radar, have discrimination capabilities to distinguish whether an incoming object actually poses a threat, is simply debris, or perhaps is a deliberate countermeasure.

As it faces the evolving threat of hypersonic missiles and maneuvering reentry vehicles, the U.S. defense industry is working to meet the challenge, with Northrop Grumman and L3Harris selected in January to build prototypes for the HBTSS space-based sensor. Lockheed Martin, Boeing and Raytheon have also won past contracts with the Missile Defense Agency to develop hypersonic missile defense systems. Dr. Mark Lewis, executive director of NDIA’s new Emerging Technologies Institute, and the immediate past director of defense research and engineering and acting deputy undersecretary in charge of technology modernization, said hypersonic weapons will add a new level of complexity to missile defense. “Hypersonic systems don’t just introduce speed; they bring a combination of speed, maneuverability, range and altitude that makes timely detecting, tracking and defeating particularly difficult. That’s why the United States is pursuing such weapons; it’s also why our peer competitors are doing the same,” he said. Lewis has observed that success requires more than just spotting and identifying a hypersonic weapon, but also retaining custody until it can be rendered ineffective. “These systems can be stopped but doing so will require leveraging state-of-the-art space sensors, rapid processing and decision-making, and an assortment of available intercept techniques.”

The question is whether the Pentagon considers sensor innovation a priority, as the allocation of funding per the fiscal year 2021 budget request has fallen short.

Hypersonic defense is clearly lagging when compared with hypersonic strike capabilities. If the United States wants to outpace competitors like Russia and China, an enhanced and integrated sensor architecture for ballistic and hypersonic defense is a necessary investment. Improving sensors can also enable other technologies. Laser weapon systems use directed energy to deter and even neutralize their targets, and they heavily rely on robust sensor technology for tracking and beam control. Working as a complement to more conventional systems, high-energy lasers can serve as an additional line of defense against missile threats.

The bottom line is, the earlier an incoming missile can be detected, the more time there is to react. Sensors are the first line of defense in the kill chain, and without them, the rest of the system cannot operate. The Defense Department should partner with industry and lawmakers to prioritize and bolster sensor capabilities and ensure the effectiveness of missile defense systems against emerging threats.

## 23. US Navy seeks GPS alternatives for hypersonic weapons

10.04.2021

Janes

<https://www.janes.com/defence-news/news-detail/us-navy-seeks-gps-alternatives-for-hypersonic-weapons>

The Department of the Navy is seeking prototype proposals for a non-GPS-based position, navigation, and timing (PNT) system, that will eventually be integrated into the sea service's future arsenal of hypersonic weapons and platforms.

The solicitation, issued by the navy via a Request for Solutions (RFS) notice by the Strategic & Spectrum Missions Advanced Resilient Trusted Systems (S2MARTS) other transactional authority (OTA), has yet to be formally released to industry for response. But programme officials noted in the presolicitation notice that recent advances in electromagnetic interference technologies prompted navy leaders to seek PNT alternatives outside GPS.

"Current navigation systems are heavily reliant on GPS signal technology for both commercial and military applications," according to the presolicitation. "While GPS has become a pervasive technology for military uses, it has security and availability challenges," it added. Most recently, GPS-

based navigation systems on space-based and air breathing platforms have been susceptible to advances in electromagnetic jamming, spoofing, or other means of interference.

On space-based assets in particular, navy leaders warned that evolutionary jamming or interference technology used against US armed forces could create a combat scenario where "it is possible that the GPS satellites themselves could be physically compromised," navy programme officials wrote. That scenario and the potential fallout from compromised platforms equipped with GPS-based satellite communication (satcom) and assured position, navigation, and timing (A-PNT), prompted the sea service to seek industry solutions.

## 24. Russia's Hypersonic Missile-Hunting Radar to Enter Combat Duty near Norway Border by late 2021

14.04.2021

Defense World

[https://www.defenseworld.net/news/29339/Russia\\_\\_\\_s\\_Hypersonic\\_Missile\\_Hunting\\_Radar\\_to\\_Enter\\_Combat\\_Duty\\_near\\_Norway\\_Border\\_by\\_late\\_2021](https://www.defenseworld.net/news/29339/Russia___s_Hypersonic_Missile_Hunting_Radar_to_Enter_Combat_Duty_near_Norway_Border_by_late_2021)

One of Russia's Rezonans-N anti-hypersonic missile radar will enter combat service in the Arctic, some 30km away from the border with Norway, by the end of this year. The first of these radars was deployed on the Novaya Zemlya archipelago in November last year. They have been operating near the towns of Shoina and Indiga.

"The third Rezonans-N radar station will go on combat duty on Novaya Zemlya this May or June," Alexander Shramchenko, Rezonans Science and Research Center Director General, was quoted as saying by TASS today.

Two more stations, the fourth and fifth overall, will enter service in the Arctic region - in Gremikha and Zapolyarnoye - by late 2021. The radar in Zapolyarnoye, very close to the Russian-Norwegian border, will ensure "round-the-clock control of airspace above northern regions of Norway and Finland." Rezonans radars operate in the meter band and employ the principle of wave resonance, which allows detecting aircraft based on stealth technology and also hypersonic targets flying at a speed of up to Mach 2.0. It can detect ballistic missiles flying at an altitude of 100 km from 1,200 km away. Russia is also deploying a new, long-range radar to monitor launches of cruise and hypersonic missiles over entire Europe.

## 25. Russia tests sea-denial systems with Soviet echoes

09.04.2021

International Institute for Strategic Studies

<https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2021/04/russia-sea-denial-systems>

Moscow is closing in on its goal to rebuild its anti-ship long-range attack capacity. The intended inclusion of the 3M22 *Tsirkon* hypersonic missile aboard Russian surface ships and submarines, complemented by air-launched weapons, will represent further improvements in Russian naval strike capabilities, Douglas Barrie and Nick Childs explain.

With the development of new (or upgraded) anti-ship and multi-role missiles, which are to be supported by satellite-based ocean surveillance, Moscow is now closing in on the next stage of its goal to rebuild its anti-ship, and particularly anti-aircraft-carrier, long-range attack capacity. The architecture of this capability is redolent of the Soviet Navy when it had a central focus on countering the perceived threat of the United States' carrier strike groups, though now there is the prospect of including an even higher-speed cruise-missile capability.

State acceptance tests of the ship- and submarine-launched 3M22 *Tsirkon* – a very high-speed (Mach 5+ hypersonic) anti-ship missile of which there will also be a land-attack variant – are planned to begin by mid-2021, while the air-launched Kh-32 (RS-AS-4A mod *Kitchen*) development of the Kh-22 (RS-AS-4 *Kitchen*) is intended to provide the primary anti-ship weapon for the Tu-22M3M upgrade of the *Backfire C* maritime strike aircraft. Developments are also continuing, as they have been for approximately a decade, with what is likely known as the Article 75 – sometimes also referred to as *Gremlin* – which is another very-high-speed missile that likely possesses an anti-ship capability. The Russian Ministry of Defence is also reconstituting its satellite-based ocean surveillance network by aiming to complete its *Liana* system. While the electronic-intelligence element of the constellation – the *Lotos-S1* – is in operation, the intended radar-satellite complement – the *Pion-NKS* – has yet to enter service.

### Surface and subsurface launch

The Project 22350 (*Gorshkov*) frigate *Admiral Gorshkov* carried out a series of *Tsirkon* test launches in 2020, which reportedly included two launches against naval targets and one against a land target. In addition to the planned firings from the *Admiral Gorshkov* in 2021, including at the start of the state acceptance trials, it has also been reported that the Project 885 (*Yasen*) submarine *Severodvinsk* will undertake the first *Tsirkon* test launches from a submarine, including one submerged firing. These are likely to take place in the second half of 2021, with the planned submarine tests expected to be carried out through its vertical launch system – in similar fashion to

the test shots from the *Admiral Gorshkov* which were carried out from its universal vertical launch system.

Moscow has declared its ambition to field naval hypersonic cruise missiles from the middle of this decade. If the planned state trials prove successful, this could clear the path to production for at least some *Tsirkon* variants perhaps as early as next year.

Having the platforms ready to accept such systems is another significant aspect of the equation. Moscow is currently in the midst of a substantial building programme of new hulls that could host the *Tsirkon*, which include Project 22350 frigates and their developed variants, as well as Project 08851 (*Yasen-M*) submarines and modernised legacy platforms. However, a great deal will depend on Russian industry's ability to deliver on those plans.

### **Air-delivered**

Service status and production numbers for the Kh-32 programme – a long-running project that likely began in the early 1990s – remain uncertain. A comparatively small number of the missiles, however, may already be in the air force as part of the Tu-22M3's weapons inventory. References to the Kh-32M may reflect a further development now intended for the Tu-22M3M, with the prototype of this upgraded aircraft having been first flown in December 2019.

As well as continuing tests of the Kh-32, or perhaps the Kh-32M, in 2020 a Tu-22M3 was also reportedly used to test an unspecified high-speed cruise missile. This may be related to the Article 75 project, but its relationship to the Kh-32 programme is unclear. It is possible that the Kh-32 may have been intended as an interim endeavour until the Article 75 was ready to enter service. The prolonged development of the former, however, could have resulted in the gap in time between the two projects being far smaller than first anticipated.

The Russian Navy may also field a combination of the *Kinzhal* (RS-AS-24 *Killjoy*) air-launched ballistic missile and the MiG-31K *Foxhound D* aircraft, with the *Kinzhal* purportedly possessing an anti-ship capability. Whether the navy would modify its remaining handful of MiG-31B/BS *Foxhound* aircraft to the MiG-31K standard in order to carry and operate the *Kinzhal* remains to be seen. A Russian press report suggested that the weapon could be deployed with the Northern Fleet's naval aviation.

### **Threat response**

The incorporation of a Mach 5+ cruise missile aboard Russian surface ships and submarines by the middle to latter half of this decade, complemented by air-launched weapons, will represent a notable development in Russian naval strike capabilities, particularly in the anti-ship capacity. As NATO continues to evaluate and evolve its plans for operating in an increasingly contested Atlantic maritime environment, with a particular aim in sustaining its transatlantic reinforcement capacity, the

Russian developments will be a foremost consideration for the Alliance given the challenges of countering such weapons.

There remains an array of potential tactical counters to such threats, including manoeuvre and deception, and evasion techniques. However, in terms of direct defensive capabilities, it was rather notable that, for example, recent announcements from the United Kingdom regarding the transformation of its armed forces included plans to upgrade and increase stockpiles of the *Sea Viper* area air-defence missiles fitted to UK Type-45 destroyers – a decision that was likely made with the awareness of challenging future air-defence threats such as those exhibited in the ongoing Russian developments. The UK has declared that its new Carrier Strike Group will be available to NATO, which underscores the fact that carrier task groups will prove central to US and Alliance plans in a future Atlantic battlespace.

## **26. Three industry teams demonstrate capability to destroy small drones at Yuma**

17.04.2021

Defense News

<https://www.defensenews.com/land/2021/04/16/three-industry-teams-demonstrate-capability-to-take-out-small-drone-threats-at-yuma/>

WASHINGTON — Three vendors demonstrated capabilities to destroy small drones using low-collateral effects interceptors at Yuma Proving Ground, Arizona, earlier this month as part of a bigger Pentagon effort to develop enduring systems capable of combating the growing and evolving threat, an Army official told Defense News in an April 15 interview.

Boeing-owned Aurora Flight Sciences, Elta North America and Xtend were each evaluated against different threat scenarios over the course of a week in April. The demonstration is the first in a series of events — likely to take place twice a year — where the joint force will examine the most “impactful solutions” that fill current capability gaps and are ready for transition into fielded systems, said Col. Greg Soule, the director for acquisition and resources at the Army-led Joint Counter-Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Office.

Following validation of the office’s operational requirements by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council in September 2020, the JCO moved out to address a list of capabilities. Its plan was to first focus on low-collateral effects interceptors, and the Air Force was assigned as the lead service for

the effort. The JCO issued a request for information, asking for whitepapers laying out technical solutions. The office received 37 submissions, Soule said.

“Some of those fit the category, others did not,” he said. “Then there were others that we screened out that fit the category, but they were already involved with government-funded, government-sponsored contracts in the same arena. We didn’t want to look at those at this demonstration. We wanted to bring brand-new ideas and products in from industry.”

That left 10 who were invited to give oral presentations. From that group, five were selected to attend the demonstration at Yuma, Soule said. However, one of the vendors screened itself out before the demonstration because it didn’t feel its product would be ready by April, and another had to bow out at the last minute because of members of its team were infected with COVID-19, Soule said.

The three remaining teams arrived a week prior to the demonstration to run flight tests, Soule said. During the official demonstration, the systems ran through 16 scenarios against a variety of threat-representative targets ranging from fixed-wing to rotary-wing quadcopters flying a variety of different patterns such as straight in, across, and in hover mode at different speeds and altitudes, “so we could have a good, well-rounded snapshot of everybody’s system,” Soule said.

Aurora Flight Sciences brought to the demonstration its Class 2 unmanned quadcopter system — MIDAS — equipped with an air gun. When the quadcopter gets close enough to the threat, the air gun fires a round consisting of two copper discs attached by a 12-inch Kevlar string. The gun shoots in six-round bursts at a target at a high velocity with the intent to foul up the rotor blades of the threat system. If the first round doesn’t neutralize the target, the UAV is capable of shooting subsequent rounds. If it does destroy the threat, it can move onto other targets, Soule said.

Elta North America, a U.S.-based subsidiary of Israeli firm Elta Systems, brought DKD — or Drone Kill Drone — to the evaluation. The quadcopter is smaller than MIDAS and is equipped with a net system on top, “so its intent is to fly up to the threat and get entangled with the target, and they would both fall to the ground,” Soule said. The system is not reusable, he added.

The final system at the demo, Skylord Griffon, from Israeli startup Xtend, also uses a net, but it instead positions itself over the target to tangle the net in the drone’s rotors. Then the net detaches so the quadcopter can continue on to another mission, according to Soule. Now that the demonstrations are over, each participant will receive a report detailing its performance against the criteria, he noted.

The Air Force, as the service lead, will welcome participating systems and other future systems for further evaluation and potential inclusion in a development program funded by the JCO starting later this year, Soule said. The Air Force plans to release a request for information to industry calling



for systems for its next round of assessment that will also be considered against already funded government solutions.

The JCO and the Army's Rapid Capabilities and Critical Technologies Office will hold a demonstration in September to focus on other capabilities beyond low-collateral effects interceptors, Soule said. "Specific topics are still being decided upon," he added, but an RFI is expected to be issued in May laying out capability focus areas for the event.

## 27. The Army wants an anti-tank missile that shoots twice as far as its current weapon

16.04.2021

Army Times

<https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2021/04/15/the-army-wants-an-anti-tank-missile-that-shoots-twice-as-far-as-its-current-weapon/>

The Army is looking for a vehicle-mounted missile to bust up current and future tanks on the battlefield out to 10,000 meters — more than double the distance of the missile its replacing. The Close Combat Missile System-Heavy would replace the half-century-old, tube-launched, optically tracked, wireless-guided, or TOW, missile currently in use. The Army uses the TOW on the Bradley Fighting Vehicle and on TOW-dedicated Humvees, and it wants whatever replaces the TOW to fit within the same space restrictions so that it can go on any Bradley replacement coming in the future.

Mark Andrews, chief of the Close Capabilities Branch, said the new missile would be used much like the TOW, to defeat armor as well as counter-defilade and fortified positions. He spoke at the annual industry days conference of the Maneuver Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate out of the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning, Georgia, April 7. The new missile will need to reach those farther distances but also be able to strike at shorter ranges, he said. "We want it armed early, we don't want to wait 1,000 or 2,000 meters for the missile to arm. We want to get it at less than 100 meters," Andrews said.

The process of firing the missile must be versatile, he said. They want to use command line-of-sight, fire and forget, and both lock on before launch and lock on after launch. Andrews said they also want the new missile to be able to target from a drone feed, a laser designator, or even fire to a box area then find the target itself. And it has to stay low. It must operate below 3,000 feet above ground level. That way, tactical units won't have to clear airspace to fire it.

In a similar session on maneuver requirements, Capt. Ari Perril said the CCMS-H would support the direct firefight against armor at the company or troop level, but also help shape operations at the battalion or brigade level. The missile will need to be able to defeat future active protection systems, those systems under use or being developed that use everything from electronic “soft kills” to their own munitions systems to knock down drones, incoming missiles or other projectiles.

Those are the primary capabilities. If those are met, the Army wants to be able to fire the missile on the move. The service would like to see the flight time reduced in comparison with the TOW, have it work without the need for GPS, and provide aided target recognition and identification. Lastly, they’d like this new missile to be programmed for prioritizing selected targets and fire from a single vehicle or from multiple vehicles within the platoon.

## 28. France, Italy update their joint air-defense weapon for faster missiles

24.03.2021

Defense News

<https://www.defensenews.com/global/europe/2021/03/24/france-italy-update-their-joint-air-defense-weapon-for-faster-missiles/>

PARIS – France and Italy have announced they are cooperating on a new generation of the SAMP/T anti-air system they developed in the early years of this century to give it new capabilities.

Florence Parly, French Minister of the Armed Forces, and her Italian counterpart Lorenzo Guerini jointly welcomed the launch of the new program on March 24. The SAMP/T, developed by the Franco-Italian consortium Eurosam, is used by the French Air & Space Force and by the Italian army to provide a ground-to-air, medium-range defense capability against aircraft and some ballistic missiles. It has been deployed operationally in a NATO framework. It consists of a multifunction fire control radar, a ground-based launch system and Aster 30 B1 missiles. The new SAMP/T NG program will evolve the current system so that it better meets new threats that are “faster, more maneuverable, stealthier and used in combination with cyber attacks, decoys, multiple jammings and saturation attack scenarios,” the DGA French procurement agency said in a statement.

The program will modernize the fire control system by integrating the latest technology active electronically scanned array radar adapted to the greater range of the future Aster 30 B1 NT Extended Capability missile which has been under development by the two countries since 2016. The DGA says the new capabilities will also improve the contribution made by the SAMP/T to

NATO's ballistic missile defense. OCCAR, which is managing the program on behalf of the DGA for France and Italy's SGD armament directorate, notified the contract to Eurosam on March 19.

## 29. America's next missile warning satellite arrives in Florida

29.03.2021

C4ISRNET

<https://www.c4isrnet.com/battlefield-tech/space/2021/03/29/americas-next-missile-warning-satellite-arrives-in-florida/>

WASHINGTON — The fifth geosynchronous satellite in the Space Based Infrared System constellation was recently delivered to Florida ahead of its anticipated May launch date.

SBIRS is the nation's premier missile warning satellite, providing 24/7 coverage to detect missile launches all over the world. Notably, the U.S. Space Force credits the system with saving lives by providing a critical warning to seek cover after Iran launched more than a dozen ballistic missiles at U.S. and allied forces in Iraq in January 2020. SBIRS comprises four satellites in geosynchronous orbit with another two hosted payloads in highly elliptical orbits. The GEO satellites have two sensors — a scanner that continuously monitors the Earth and a step-starrer that can provide more accurate coverage for theater missions — while the hosted payloads just have the scanner.

In 2014, the U.S. Air Force awarded \$1.86 billion to build the fifth and sixth GEO satellites to replace the first two. In 2018, Congress determined that GEO-5 and GEO-6 would be the final satellites in the SBIRS constellation, opting to fund a successor program called Next Generation Overhead Persistent Infrared instead. SBIRS GEO-5 was completed in October and delivered March 18 to Florida for launch. "This delivery represents a major milestone for the SBIRS program and is a critical step towards putting GEO-5 on orbit for the warfighter. It represents the hard work and dedication of the combined team of Lockheed Martin, Northrop Grumman, the Aerospace Corporation, multiple support contractors and government personnel," said SBIRS GEO-5/6 production material leader Lt. Col. Ryan Laughton in a statement.

According to the Space and Missile Systems Center, the satellite was transported from the Lockheed Martin Space Systems Center in Sunnyvale, California, to Cape Canaveral Space Force Station in Florida on one of the company's C-5M Super Galaxy transport aircraft. The satellite will now go through final ground testing of its integrity followed by fueling. Then the payload will be encapsulated and integrated with the launch vehicle.

This is the first military satellite to be built on Lockheed Martin's new LM 2100 combat bus. The company said the upgraded bus is built for improved resiliency, cyber-hardening, power and propulsion, while it's flexible design and common components streamline manufacturing. SBIRS GEO-6 will also utilize the new bus, as will the GPS III Follow-On satellites and the three Next Gen OPIR satellites the company is building for the Space Force. SBIRS GEO-5 is slated for a May 17 launch aboard a United Launch Alliance Atlas V rocket.

## 30. North Korea: What we know about its missile and nuclear programme

30.03.2021

British Broadcasting Corporation

<https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-41174689>

North Korea has made rapid progress in its weapons programme, which it claims is necessary to defend itself against a possible US invasion. Pyongyang started 2021 off with a bang, unveiling what state media has described as "the world's most powerful weapon". The new submarine-launched ballistic missile was launched at a parade overseen by leader Kim Jong-un - just days before the inauguration of US President Joe Biden. The weapon's actual capabilities remain unclear, as it is not known to have been tested. Mr Kim has also pledged to expand North Korea's nuclear arsenal and military potential, outlining a list of desired weapons. Here's what we know about North Korea's missile and nuclear programme and its military forces.

### Missiles that can reach the US

Throughout 2017, North Korea tested several missiles demonstrating the rapid advances of its military technology. The Hwasong-12 was thought to be able to reach as far as 4,500km (2,800 miles), putting US military bases on the Pacific island of Guam well within striking distance. Later, the Hwasong-14 demonstrated even greater potential, with some studies suggesting it could travel as far as 10,000km if fired on a maximum trajectory. This would have given Pyongyang its first truly intercontinental ballistic missile, capable of reaching New York. Eventually, the Hwasong-15 was tested, peaking at an estimated altitude of 4,500km - 10 times higher than the International Space Station. If fired on a more conventional "flatter" trajectory, the missile could have a maximum range of some 13,000km, putting all of the continental US in range.

In October 2020, North Korea unveiled its new ballistic missile. It has not yet been named or tested. Like the Hwasong-15, it is a two-stage liquid fuelled missile, but with a greater length and diameter.

It could possibly allow for multiple warheads. The colossal weapon is believed to be able to deliver a nuclear warhead to anywhere in the US, and its size had surprised even seasoned analysts when it was put on show last year. Just months later, in January 2021, North Korea unveiled a new type of submarine-launched ballistic missile at a military showcase, which it declared to be "the world's most powerful weapon". The unveiling of the new missiles appeared to be a message to the Biden administration of the North's growing military prowess, say experts.

Then in March, it carried out a launch of what it called a "new-type tactical guided projectile". North Korea said the new missile was able to carry a payload of 2.5 tons, which would make it capable of carrying a nuclear warhead. The weapon has not been formally identified but analysts at the James Martin Centre for Nonproliferation Studies told Reuters that it appeared to be "an improved variant" of a previously tested missile, the KN-23. Mr Kim had earlier declared that the US was its "biggest enemy", as he outlined a list of desired weapons including long-range ballistic missiles capable of being launched from land or sea and "super-large warheads". North Korea has managed to significantly advance its arsenal despite being subject to strict economic sanctions.

### **Thermonuclear bombs**

On 3 September 2017 North Korea conducted by far its largest nuclear test to date, at its Punggye-ri test site. Estimates of the device's explosive power, or yield, ranged from 100-370 kilotons. A yield of 100 kilotons would make the test six times more powerful than the bomb dropped on Hiroshima in 1945. North Korea claimed this test was its first thermonuclear weapon - the most potent form of nuclear explosion where an atomic detonation is boosted by a secondary fusion process to produce a far bigger blast. American military intelligence believes that North Korea has successfully miniaturised a nuclear warhead to fit inside a missile. In April 2018 North Korea announced it would suspend further nuclear tests because its capabilities had been "verified". North Korea then also promised to dismantle the Punggye-ri site and in May blew up some of the tunnels in the presence of foreign journalists but with no international experts. Pyongyang also said then that it would destroy all its nuclear material enrichment facilities.

### **Millions of soldiers**

North Korea has one of the largest standing armies in the world - with more than one million soldiers and estimated reserves of some five million. Much of its equipment is old and obsolete, but its conventional forces could still inflict massive damage on South Korea in the event of war. North Korea also has around 200,000 special forces troops which could be expected to infiltrate the South in the event of any conflict. They could potentially exploit a semi-secret network of 20-25 large tunnels which span the Demilitarized Zone (DMZ) - the border area - emerging behind South Korean and American forward lines. A further threat comes from thousands of North Korean artillery pieces and rocket launchers deployed along the border. Their firepower could devastate South Korea,

including the capital Seoul, which at a distance of less than 60km, is well within range. Chemical weapons could also be used. In 2012 the South Korean government assessed that North Korea could have between 2,500 and 5,000 tons of chemical weapons, potentially one of the largest stockpiles on Earth.

### **American forces in South Korea and the wider region**

The United States has had a military presence on the Korean Peninsula since the Korean War. Today, South Korea has the third highest deployment of US troops anywhere in the world with around 28,500 troops stationed across the country. Washington has also installed its controversial THAAD missile defence system in South Korea, which would be used shoot down North Korean short and medium range missiles in the event of war. In the wider region, Japan hosts more US forces than any other nation with some 50,000 deployed, the majority being naval personnel. It also has an aircraft carrier based in Japan. There are also significant US forces on the US Pacific island of Guam, which is sometimes described as a "permanent aircraft carrier". North Korea has previously threatened to fire missiles at the waters around Guam.

## **31. Rafael completa 10 anos desde a primeira interceptação do sistema de defesa Iron Dome**

07.04.2021

Defesa Aérea e Naval

<https://www.defesaaereanaval.com.br/defesa/rafael-completa-10-anos-desde-a-primeira-interceptacao-do-sistema-de-defesa-iron-dome>

7 de abril de 2021, Tel Aviv, Israel – Com mais de 2.500 interceptações de combate, a uma taxa de sucesso de 90%, e inúmeras vidas salvas, hoje marca o 10º aniversário da primeira interceptação de combate do Sistema de Defesa Aérea Iron Dome de Rafael. O desenvolvimento do Iron Dome começou em dezembro de 2007 e foi concluído em menos de 3 anos.

Menos de um mês depois de ser implantado em Israel, na noite de 7 de abril de 2011, o sistema foi desafiado em combate pela primeira vez. Um foguete lançado da Faixa de Gaza foi detectado pelo radar do Iron Dome. Em segundos, os dados transmitidos ao BMC (Battle Management Center) foram processados e os operadores da bateria precisaram decidir se ativariam um interceptor contra a ameaça. Com a localização precisa do impacto fornecida pelo BMC, apontando para a cidade de Ashkelon, no sul de Israel, com uma população de mais de 130.000 civis, a tripulação decidiu lançar

um míssil interceptador e fez história de combate ao interceptar a ameaça, evitando ferimentos civis e danos significativos à propriedade.

A primeira performance massiva e dramática do Iron Dome ocorreu durante a operação Pillar of Defense em 2012, quando interceptou mais de 500 ameaças diferentes disparadas da Faixa de Gaza em diferentes partes de Israel, incluindo fortes barragens de foguetes. O Iron Dome mudou o jogo, ganhando o Prêmio de Segurança de Israel em 2012.

O Iron Dome desempenhou um papel fundamental em todos os conflitos desde então, impedindo que milhares de foguetes atingissem Israel, abrangendo morteiros de pequeno a grande porte e foguetes com alcance e ogivas variadas. O Iron Dome atua como um sistema de missão dupla altamente móvel, projetado para derrotar o Very Short Range (VSHORAD), bem como ameaças de foguetes, artilharia e morteiros (C-RAM), aeronaves, helicópteros, UAVs, PGMs e mísseis de cruzeiro. Iron Dome fornece defesa robusta, mas seletiva. Sua capacidade de discriminar entre ameaças dirigidas a uma área povoada e aquelas que cairão no mar ou em campos abertos, reduz custos e limita lançamentos desnecessários de interceptadores. Uma única bateria pode proteger uma cidade de médio porte. O desenvolvimento do Iron Dome continuou ao longo dos anos e seus recursos hoje incluem uma cobertura mais ampla, fornecendo proteção contra um espectro mais amplo de ameaças, a capacidade de lidar com ameaças simultâneas, salvos de alto volume e muito mais.

Em agosto de 2019, o Ministério da Defesa de Israel e o Departamento de Defesa dos EUA assinaram um acordo para a compra de duas baterias Iron Dome para o Exército dos EUA. Ambas as baterias já foram entregues aos Estados Unidos. Em maio de 2020, Rafael e Raytheon Technologies Corporation assinaram um acordo de joint venture para produzir interceptadores e lançadores Iron Dome em uma instalação completa nos Estados Unidos. A parceria se chama Raytheon Rafael Area Protection Systems (R2S). Rafael desenvolveu variantes adicionais do sistema Iron Dome, para formar uma família que consiste na variante naval C-Dome, fornecendo proteção de recursos navais e terrestres estratégicos contra ameaças balísticas avançadas, aéreas e de superfície a superfície, incluindo ataques saturados. O C-Dome está operacional com a Marinha de Israel. O Iron Dome também é oferecido como um sistema integrado de defesa aérea (I-Dome) para manobrar as forças táticas em campo em um único veículo.

Presidente e CEO de Rafael, General Gen. (reserva) Yoav Har-Even: "Iron Dome é um nome conhecido em Israel e se tornou sinônimo de excelência. Estamos orgulhosos de nossas equipes de cientistas e engenheiros que desenvolveram este sistema extraordinário e continuam a fazê-lo diariamente. Graças a eles, as capacidades do Iron Dome estão anos-luz além do seu design original. Nós o vimos transformar de um projeto em um verdadeiro divisor de águas, salvando vidas, evitando escalada, permitindo militares e tomadores de decisões políticas para tomar decisões calmas e coletivas. Isso permitiu que Israel continuasse sua rotina diária, mesmo sendo alvo de um

inimigo indiscriminado. Agradecemos às nossas equipes, ao Ministério da Defesa de Israel e às FDI, nossas indústrias parceiras ELTA, nossa subsidiária mPrest e outras. Somos especialmente gratos às administrações americanas atuais e anteriores por seu apoio na fabricação do sistema.”

## 32. Rheinmetall, Diehl e HENSOLDT assinaram um acordo de cooperação para o sistema de defesa aérea alemão

30.03.2021

Defesa Aérea e Naval

<https://www.defesaaereanaval.com.br/defesa/rheinmetall-diehl-e-hensoldt-assinaram-um-acordo-de-cooperacao-para-o-sistema-de-defesa-aerea-alemao>

Rheinmetall Electronics GmbH (Bremen), Diehl Defense GmbH & Co. KG (Überlingen) e HENSOLDT Sensors GmbH (Taufkirchen) assinaram um acordo conjunto de cooperação no contexto de uma parceria especial (Arbeitsgemeinschaft ou ARGE) para apresentar uma proposta para o futuro alemão Sistema de defesa aérea de proteção de curto e muito curto alcance (LVS NNbS).

O projeto NNbS visa preencher a lacuna de capacidade atual para a proteção de tropas terrestres durante a operação, bem como proteger centros de operações táticas e locais contra ameaças aéreas de curto e muito curto alcance. O objetivo das três empresas é fornecer uma solução nacional e de baixo risco, rapidamente disponível com o auxílio de sistemas e componentes de sistema disponíveis no mercado. O projeto conceitual do sistema do ARGE NNbS recorre principalmente a sistemas e subsistemas comprovados por meio da integração de componentes que já estão em uso no Bundeswehr.

Outro foco especial da ARGE NNbS é colocado no extenso fornecimento logístico do sistema de proteção aérea de proteção de curto e muito curto alcance da Alemanha. A ARGE dispõe de pré-requisitos, qualificações e competências para responder a todas as necessidades do cliente, graças à concentração de competências essenciais complementares dos licitantes nacionais. Com suas divisões Soluções Eletrônicas e Sistema Veicular, a Rheinmetall contribui com seu conhecimento tecnológico especializado e anos de experiência no desenvolvimento e entrega de sistemas de defesa, especialmente nas áreas de veículos, comunicação e integração. A Diehl Defense é especializada no desenvolvimento e fabricação de mísseis guiados e se consolidou com soluções de sistemas modernos para defesa aérea terrestre no mercado internacional. Na qualidade de fornecedora de tecnologia de ponta nacional, a HENSOLDT contribui com seu know-how e



produtos testados em batalha, como radares. Tudo isso levando em consideração as semelhanças abrangentes de produtos, por exemplo, no contexto de conceitos de família de produtos, especialmente nas esferas de vigilância, classificação e identificação do espaço aéreo.

### 33. Russia's Northern Fleet Deploys Long-Range Interceptors to Remote Arctic Base

14.04.2021

CSIS

<https://www.csis.org/analysis/russias-northern-fleet-deploys-long-range-interceptors-remote-arctic-base>

Russia has increased and upgraded its Arctic military presence since 2013, in part by refurbishing and modernizing Soviet-era bases and airfields. One base that has received particular attention is Rogachevo Airbase on the Novaya Zemlya archipelago, where Russia has recently begun deploying MiG-31BM interceptors—supersonic, long-range aircraft capable of destroying air and ground targets. Satellite imagery captured on March 19 shows evidence of the interceptors' stationing at Rogachevo, as well as a Mi-17 search-and-rescue helicopter (NATO designation: Hip) and an Il-76 transport aircraft (NATO designation: Candid).

In early January, Russia's Northern Fleet deployed MiG-31BMs to Rogachevo. One month later, it cycled out those aircraft and their crews for a new deployment. It is believed the Russian Defense Ministry is testing the MiG-31's capabilities and use in the harsh Arctic environment and assessing the feasibility of extended, cold-weather deployments to remote airbases and airstrips, which has not yet been proven. Although the Russian Ministry of Defense claims the MiG-31 functions "excellently" in the cold weather, they also describe this deployment as experimental.

Present in the March 19 image are four melted positions on the snow- and ice-covered aircraft apron, which appear to be caused by the presence of small jet aircraft, likely the MiG-31BMs. There is evidence, however, that Rogachevo has not yet been optimized to host these aircraft for extended periods. The hangar positioned next to the apron, which we estimate to be roughly 46 by 25 meters, is barely big enough to hold four MiG-31s. Moreover, Rogachevo's fuel storage facilities would likely require further development to be able to support the aircraft for any kind of extended deployment. Permanent basing, in other words, will likely require an expansion of hangar space and additional fuel storage and distribution capacity.

If deployments of this nature can be eventually proven to be practical, they would increase Russian capabilities in the Arctic, with important security implications for the United States and NATO. When paired with range-extending aerial refueling, sustainable forward deployments of these aircraft can reach the U.S. airbase in Thule, Greenland, as well as allow Russia to extend its power projection capabilities. Russia's enhanced presence at Rogachevo, which already houses an S-400 missile defense system, also expands its anti-access/area-denial (A2/AD) capabilities at a time when Moscow has submitted additional scientific data to the United Nations to support more expansive outer continental shelf claims. It also occurs after Russia recently contemplated—but ultimately declined—extending the Northern Sea Route into the Barents Sea. The U.S. Department of Defense is well aware of the threat of Russian buildup in the region and has recently said they are “monitoring it very closely.”

The impetus for Russia's militarization of the region stems primarily from Moscow's desire to both protect its Arctic-based second-strike nuclear capability and to take advantage of an increasingly accessible and economically vital region. But the uptick in Russian military activities and exercises in the western Arctic, as well as the testing of new hypersonic missile capabilities in the White Sea, suggest that its posture may not be strictly defensive. In fact, rarely a week goes by without a new deployment, exercise, missile test, air operation, or naval patrol, as CSIS has recently begun to capture in our new Arctic Military Activity Tracker. By rebuilding bases and airfields, bolstering its regional missile defense capabilities, increasing the number of complex and combined exercises, and demonstrating more extended air operations—as the MiG-31 interceptors at Rogachevo represent—Russia's increased military capabilities in the Arctic begin to have strategic effect over time.

## **34. Goodbye, tanks: How the Marine Corps will change, and what it will lose, by ditching its armor**

22.03.2021

Marine Corps Times

<https://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/your-marine-corps/2021/03/22/goodbye-tanks-how-the-marine-corps-will-change-and-what-it-will-lose-by-ditching-its-armor/>

One year ago, the top Marine announced the first official steps of a major Marine Corps overhaul to shift to a Navy-centric warfighting role that would see many changes. The most noticeable? The elimination of Marine tanks. And the Corps moved fast. By summer 2020, the hulking behemoths of ground combat were being loaded on train cars and rolling away from the storied 1st Tank

Battalion at the Marine Corps Air Ground Combat Center at Twentynine Palms, California. Other inventories soon followed. And by the end of 2020, an official Marine Corps message allowed both armor officers and enlisted to end their contracts a year early. At the time of the initial overhaul announcement, the Corps had 452 tanks at its disposal. By December 2020, 323 had been transferred to the Army. The remaining tanks were scheduled for transfer by 2023, which included tanks in overseas storage and aboard maritime prepositioning ships, according to Marine Corps Systems Command.

Commandant Gen. David H. Berger has said that should armor be needed by Marines, he would look to the Army to provide that capability. At the annual Modern Day Marine Military Expo in September 2020, Berger emphasized that the Army's job is to be big, heavy and lethal while Marines must be light and expeditionary. "Army is huge," he said. "We need a big Army. They win our wars. The Marine Corps doesn't win the wars. We win the battles."

But the heavy emphasis specialization has some retired Marines and others in defense circles questioning the change might be an overreach that would diminish the Corps' versatility — a selling point for the service for much of its modern existence. A combination of recent concepts and a series of war games, experiments and more than a decade of push to return to naval warfighting led to the force design overhaul expected to take place over the next decade. Those sweeping changes began in 2020 with the divesting of tanks, reduction of cannon artillery in favor of longer-range missiles and a shakeup of how the infantry is used.

Those changes are leading to an entirely new formation, the Marine littoral regiment, which will hold infantry, artillery, logistics and an anti-air battery. The moves are to enable small units of 75 Marines down to a squad-sized element to disperse themselves across vast distances but at key chokepoints to help the Navy knock out enemy ships.

### **One less tool**

But the Corps might not get the war its planning for, retired Marine Col. Mark Cancian, now a senior adviser with the Center for Strategic and International Studies, has said in writings, public appearances and interviews with Marine Corps Times. In a piece published early 2020 in which Cancian cautioned the Corps not to go too far in its transformation, Cancian points to the U.S. Army's experience.

"The fact that the U.S. Army of 1965 was designed to fight Soviet tank armies in Europe did not stop President (Lyndon) Johnson from sending it to Vietnam to fight insurgents and a regional power," Cancian said. Cancian likened recent specialization to a Swiss Army knife with a few blades removed: somewhat versatile but not well-rounded. "A Marine Corps custom-designed for distributed operations on islands in the Western Pacific will be poorly designed and poorly trained for the land campaigns it is most likely to fight," Cancian wrote.

And should Marines be called into unplanned conflicts on land, as was the case in all of its major encounters in the past 70 years — Korea, Vietnam, Persian Gulf and Afghanistan — Cancian is skeptical that the Army, also pressed into the fight, would sacrifice its tanks. “Any Army support for the Marine Corps, if provided at all, will likely come from the later deploying elements of the Army’s reserve components after the Army’s own needs have been met,” he wrote.

Cancian has advocated that the Corps keep at least an enhanced battalion of six companies of armor in its reserve component and Marines trained to use it to keep the tool available. On the other side, retired Army Lt. Gen. Tom Spoehr, director of the Heritage Foundation’s Center for National Defense, agrees with the Corps’ decision. Spoehr told Marine Corps Times that with the focus of the National Defense Strategy aimed on China and Russia the Corps has to prioritize budgets and what it can offer to that strategy.

“Tanks have a lot of utility in the Middle East, but the strategy says we’re not going to put a lot of resources there,” he said. “For the Marine Corps, everything that doesn’t contribute to the goal of combating Chinese military aspirations has to go.” Spoehr did understand nervousness among some Marine leaders on looking to the Army for armor in a quick-response fight. But the Army recently did add two more Armored Brigade Combat Teams, putting those numbers up to 16 ABCTs. The retired three-star general still sees the importance of the tank land warfare, noting those added brigades, modernization and upgrades to the existing tank fleet and investment by the Army. “I don’t think we’ve seen the end of the tank,” he said. “There is no organizational effort in the Army to replace the tank.”

Where the tank treads meet the road for the individual Marine or soldier is when the fighting hits a city. Retired Army Maj. John Spencer, who started his career as an enlisted soldier and saw combat in Iraq, is now the chair of Urban Warfare Studies at the Modern Warfare Institute at West Point in New York. Spencer said that ditching the tank entirely severely handicaps the Marine Corps should it need to fight in a city. And with the majority of the world’s current and future megacities in the Pacific region, most in the littoral zones, the retired major sees that as inevitable.

“I cannot envision a littoral zone that would require an expeditionary force that would not include a city. ...they’re all urban littoral zones,” Spencer said. And, he noted, by not having mobile protected firepower such as a tank in the toolkit, dismounted troops entering a city will have to rely more on mortars, close air support and other assets that put both them and the civilian population at risk. Spencer pointed out that the 82nd Airborne Division, the Army’s Global Response Force, recently began experimenting with a light tank it can take anywhere in the world, airborne. He poked at how these changes will affect the Corps’ self-identified “America’s 911” moniker for decades through its use of forward-deployed Marine operating units with the Marine air-ground task force, a combined arms package to meet any threat. The point of expeditionary forces already on site is that the right

tools are available when needed. But not if the Corps has to rely on the Army to deliver an armor punch. "So, what, is the Army the Marine Corps' 911 now?" Spencer said.

He called that reliance a high-risk scenario that a forward-deployed Marine unit cannot afford. And it limits its likely needed presence in an urban conflict. "Stop at the beach, is that the new motto?" Spencer said.

### **A complicated relationship**

Though the Corps has proven itself worthy in battle many times over, it long has had a conflicted relationship with armor, even mechanized units, as it strains to remain a light force aboard ships while also being called upon to fight major land campaigns with the Army. Marines fought alongside tanks in the Corps' early World War I incarnations, but the service did not receive its own tanks to play with, train with and deploy until the mid-1920s. That first unit only lasted a few years before being disbanded.

Tanks saw employment on Tarawa in the Pacific Ocean and in other island campaigns. Though early fighting saw heavy equipment losses, infantry commanders saw the utility of the direct fire, protected asset, even modifying its use with flamethrowers specifically to rout out enemies in fortified bunkers. Less than a decade after the war, Marines relied on tanks in the frozen, rugged terrain of the Korean War. But, again, fairly quickly came questions of the vehicle's utility and where it fit in the Corps' scheme of maneuver.

In the October 1959 issue of the Marine Corps Gazette, then-Maj. W.C. Barrett, who'd spent most of his 15 years in the Corps at that time with 1st Tank Battalion, admitted that a "current and recurring question" in Marine tactics and techniques was the place of tanks in future warfare. "What shall we do with the tank? Shall the tank be abandoned as a weapon?" Barrett asked. Ultimately, his article concluded that the tank was needed, and actually was an ideal weapon for protected firepower on the battlefield, especially when used in conjunction with well-trained infantry.

But Barrett was making a case that was only one school of thought at the time. A new war would flavor Marine leadership's taste for tanks for decades to come: Vietnam. Kenneth Estes, author of "Marines Under Armor: The Marine Corps and the Armored Fighting Vehicle," told Marine Corps Times that young officers whose first taste of combat was Vietnam deployments didn't encounter the tank often so following the war didn't see its potential as much as their World War II and Korean War forefathers had. Those senior leaders who'd seen tanks used in the Pacific island campaign and again in Korea stood firm that the tank had a place, especially if the Marines were to play any significant role against the peer competitor of the time: the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

But those enlisted and officers who began their careers with Vietnam often rarely saw the armored companion in their fighting experience, Estes said. "Senior leaders come out of the Vietnam War

with not much of an appreciation of tanks," Estes said. Successive commandants failed to prioritize the tank, the author wrote. Commandant Gen. Robert M. Barrow refused to buy tanks during his entire four-year tenure from 1979–1983. Though the Army had begun its new M1A1 Abrams program to replace the aging M60 at around that time, the Corps was slow to follow.

Commandant Gen. Al Gray canceled a modernization contract for the M1 Abrams as a replacement midway through its cycle, losing funding and tanks for the Corps in favor of other, infantry-centric programs, Estes wrote. It partly contributed to the majority of Marine tankers riding into the Persian Gulf War in M60A1 tanks, originally fielded in 1959, fighting across the desert more than three decades later in 1991.

Though Marines in the aging platform performed well in engagements, and some Marines with 2nd Marine Division did go to combat on the new M1A1 Abrams tank, those successes held little attention shortly after the war ended. Commandant Gen. Carl E. Mundy Jr. wrote in 1994 that expanding the maritime pre-positioning force would not hinge on increased armor, reducing that priority for forward-station war stocks. He also told Congress at that time he had no concerns about a Marine tank shortfall. He leaned on the experience of I Marine Expeditionary Force in the recent Gulf War that had an Army tank brigade assigned to it during the conflict. Mundy's successor, Commandant Gen. Charles C. Krulak, went a step further, saying upon his 1999 retirement that he would "eliminate the tank fleet found in the Marine Corps today if I could," Estes wrote.

### **Future tankless operations**

Tanks do come with their own set of baggage, especially for a light force. They're hard to get on and off the ship and ashore in contested environments. The Army has modernized its tanks ahead of the Marine Corps. The most updated version is the M1A2 Sepv3 Abrams tank. That tank weighs 66 tons as a basic package and can come in at more than 80 tons with certain active protection systems equipment necessary for the modern battlefield. The upgraded Abrams runs over the weight limit for the Navy's ship-to-shore connector, or SSC.

The existing Navy landing craft air cushion, or LCAC, could carry a single tank, without upgrades, ashore at that weight limit. The LCAC maximum speed is 40 knots with a full load, while the SSC can run at 35 knots or faster. Another option for transporting tanks is the landing craft utility class 1700. This vessel would be able to carry two M1A1 tanks. Though the LCU 1700 would still be difficult for early-stage forcible entry as it runs at a speed of 11 knots. That translates into the Marines only being able to carry one M1A1 (older model, no protection system) at a time on the LCAC or SSC and two tanks on an LCU but at very slow speeds. The carrying capacity further limits tank upgrades for Marine armor to keep pace with modern anti-armor threats.

But the options have to be weighed when looking at forcible entry operations as compared to expeditionary advanced base operations, which could provide more opportunities for follow-on

equipment delivery that could take advantage of the LCU capacity. They cost a lot in acquisition, maintenance, fuel and logistics when compared with other platforms. Speaking at the International Armoured Vehicles Conference on Feb. 10, Lt. Gen. Eric Smith, deputy commandant for Combat Development and Integration, argued that early experiments already are proving a smaller, more effective force for anti-armor than bringing tanks to the fight. They were seeing armor kills using lightweight mounted fires from the joint light tactical vehicle at ranges of 15 times to 20 times the distance a tank was previously achieving.

“We can kill armor formations at longer ranges using additional and other resources without incurring a 74-ton challenge trying to get that to a shore, or to get it from the United States into the fight,” Smith said. “You simply can’t be there in time.” Though some have criticized the Pacific, China-countering restructure as too specialized, retired Marine Lt. Col. Frank Hoffman, distinguished research fellow at the National Defense University, sees application of the new, tankless force structure against other adversaries. In a Heritage Foundation virtual event in July 2020, Hoffman and Cancian debated the recent changes in force structure, including tanks. Hoffman said that he and a colleague had run multiple war games with the new Marine Corps configuration and found it useful in scenarios in the Baltics, Iran and the Korean peninsula, all peer or near-peer adversaries.

## **35. Your squad’s newest weapons: armed drones, shoulder-fired missiles and air-bursting munitions**

15.04.2021

Army Times

<https://www.armytimes.com/news/your-army/2021/04/14/your-squads-newest-weapons-armed-drones-shoulder-fired-missiles-and-air-bursting-munitions/>

Most of the attention for Army weapons changes has been focused in recent years on the Next Generation Squad Weapon, with versions that will replace both the M4 and the M249 Squad Automatic Weapon. But with increased firepower on all sides and more threats to handle than ever, the Army is working on improving hand grenades and shoulder-fired rockets, and finally finding a fix for the pesky problem of hitting enemy troops under cover. Some of the ongoing efforts, and new details, were revealed April 7 during the Maneuver Capabilities Development and Integration Directorate’s industry days at the Maneuver Center of Excellence at Fort Benning, Georgia.

First off, a problem that’s been lingering for more than a decade but was put at the top of the priority list late last year — counter-defilade. Right now, the best a soldier or Marine can do when enemy fire is coming from out of hand grenade range and behind a barrier is to hope for an airstrike to

arrive quickly. Col. Rhett Thompson, director of the Soldier Requirements Division at MCDID, told attendees that the biggest problem remains getting a counter-defilade weapon into the hands of soldiers at the squad level.

The new approach, which has replaced the cancelled XM25 program, is dubbed the Precision Grenadier System. This is a “flat velocity, high-velocity multi-shot weapons system,” presenters said, which has “firefight-ending lethality and precision” when compared with the current M203 and M320 grenade launcher systems. They want it to arm and strike at distances of 35 meters all the way out to 500 meters. To do that, it will need to be programmable, so soldiers can sight in the threat and tell the munition when to fire, much like tanks and other combat vehicles can do with certain munitions now, only in a much smaller package.

“The real sweet spot is the 300m range band,” Kennedy said. “And we’re looking to do that in less than 15 seconds.” Out farther than the 500m maximum range, or even around urban corners, the Army wants an armed drone that is more sophisticated than what they have now for squad level, beyond-line-of-sight counter defilade. Lt. Col. Christopher Kennedy, lethality branch chief for SRD, said Army leadership wants more than the existing Lethal Miniature Aerial Missile System, or LMAMs. The system has to be returnable, reusable, Kennedy said he was told.

“That sounds like armed Unmanned Aircraft Systems at the squad level,” Kennedy said. While there are some good fixed-wing options for simply striking a target, especially the “suicide drone” options such as LMAMs. They don’t fit into every scenario. “Think about urban, heaven forbid a megacity,” he said. “Fixed-wing moves too fast to engage targets we need to engage.” Rotary wing systems can fly over, do persistent sitting and staring, and get to the backside of buildings and terrain features. He added that it would be helpful to have embedded software that would allow the drone to lock onto a human target without someone having to fly it. Basically, the operator establishes the target, then the drone goes and finds it and follows it, he said.

But grenade launchers and squad-level armed drones are not the only non-rifle solution for soldiers at the tactical level. Kennedy’s team is also looking to vastly improve shoulder-launched missiles, putting much more capability into a single package. Currently, soldiers have almost too many options. The M141 Bunker Defeat Munition, a disposable, single-shot, 83mm rocket, can take out field fortifications such as bunkers and urban structures, that range from 8-inch reinforced concrete to 12-inch triple brick walls. Then there’s the M72 Light Anti-Armor Weapon, or LAW, a disposable 66mm rocket in use since the early 1960s, the AT-4, and upgraded variants of the 84mm, single shot, disposable, unguided anti-tank weapon.

Over the next seven years, the Army expects to have a single shoulder-fired rocket that can defeat all of the threats the old trio of rocket options handled. Soldiers will be able to fire that rocket, the Individual Assault Munition, from a confined space, strike at multiple targets, have a better hit



probability and lethality, reach the farthest ranges of the current rockets, about 500m, and do it all while weighing less than 15 pounds. By about 2030, the Army expects to go a few steps further, with the Next Generation Squad Multi-Target Munition that can do all of what the IAM can do but also hit targets in defilade and reach ranges of up to 1,000m.

### 36. Comitiva do Ministério da Defesa acompanha ações da Operação conjunta Ágata na fronteira oeste do País

08.04.2021

Ministério da Defesa

<https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/centrais-de-conteudo/noticias/comitiva-do-ministerio-da-defesa-acompanha-acoes-da-operacao-conjunta-agata-na-fronteira-oeste-do-pais>

Ponta Porã (MS) – Comitiva do Ministério da Defesa liderada pelo Chefe do Estado-Maior Conjunto das Forças Armadas (CEMCFA), Tenente-Brigadeiro do Ar Raul Botelho, acompanhou as ações e meios utilizados na Operação Conjunta Ágata de combate a crimes transfronteiriços nos dias 24 e 25 de março. O grupo observou a atuação dos militares das Forças Armadas e dos Órgãos de Segurança Pública e Fiscalização (OSPF) em Dourados e Ponta Porã, no Mato Grosso do Sul.

A Operação Ágata ocorre ao longo do ano em diferentes estados e períodos. Em 2021, foram planejadas 46 operações apenas neste primeiro trimestre, sendo esta a primeira realizada de forma conjunta, isto é, Marinha, Exército e Força Aérea atuando de forma integrada e coordenada com os OSPF da fronteira oeste do País, abrangendo os estados de Mato Grosso e Mato Grosso do Sul. Em 2021, serão quatro Ágatas conjuntas.

“Foi muito bom ver a atuação das Forças Armadas na ‘ponta da linha’. Partindo de um planejamento operacional bem feito, identificamos o emprego conjunto de tropas militares, potencializando o conceito de interoperabilidade, assim como o uso de novas tecnologias e efetivos equipados e capacitados para o cenário da operação. Destaca-se as características de emprego dual das Forças Armadas, seja nas ações subsidiárias de apoio do Estado seja nas ações de defesa da Pátria”, salientou o Brigadeiro Botelho. Ele ressaltou, ainda, que as Operações Ágata beneficiam também o cidadão brasileiro ao impedir que a droga entre nos centros urbanos e gere os problemas sociais advindos da fragilização da segurança pública.

Na quarta-feira (24), a comitiva reuniu-se com membros da 4ª Brigada de Cavalaria Mecanizada em Dourados, município localizado a 229 km da capital sul mato-grossense. A organização militar é a primeira unidade do Exército a implantar o Sistema Integrado de Monitoramento de Fronteiras (SISFRON).

Na oportunidade, foram discutidos o histórico de resultados da Operação em anos anteriores e o planejamento das ações desta edição. Em seguida, o Comandante da Brigada, General Adilson Akira Torigoe, apresentou as capacidades do SISFRON. "O SISFRON é formado por subsistemas, compostos por equipamentos óticos, eletrônicos, rádios para comunicação tática e estratégica, radares, que fazem vigilância", disse ele.

O General Akira informou, ainda, que o tráfico de drogas é o ilícito mais recorrente na região, sendo a maconha o entorpecente mais comercializado. Além disso, há também o contrabando, descaminho, roubos e furtos de carros. "Antes de iniciar a Operação, nós fazemos um trabalho de inteligência junto com os órgãos parceiros para levantar as principais rotas dentro do modal terrestre, aéreo e fluvial. Com conhecimento desses trechos, atuamos nos pontos mais utilizados nos ilícitos transfronteiriços", explicou.

Esta edição da Ágata é comandada pelo Comandante do Comando Conjunto Oeste, General de Exército Fernando José Sant'ana Soares e Silva, e estruturada com organizações militares da Marinha e do Exército da Região Centro-Oeste, além do apoio dos meios da Operação Ostium da Força Aérea Brasileira, que ocorre simultaneamente. Profissionais dos OSPF estaduais e federais, assim como órgãos de fiscalização dos estados do Mato Grosso e do Mato Grosso do Sul e da União atuam junto com as Forças Armadas. "Na medida em que conseguimos dificultar o transporte de drogas na faixa de fronteira, as organizações criminosas ficam com menos possibilidade de aterrorizar nossa população", disse o General Soares.

O componente da missão na Força Naval é o Comandante do 6º Distrito Naval, Contra-Almirante Sérgio Gago Guida. Ele ressaltou que duas das embarcações empregadas foram deslocadas por terra para uso na Operação. Saíram de Corumbá para os municípios de Mundo Novo e Guaíra, percorrendo uma distância de cerca de 800 km. "Estabelecemos pontos de fiscalização fluvial fixos nas áreas de maior trânsito na região próxima aos municípios de Corumbá e Porto Murtinho. Além disso, nossos navios patrulham os 800 km do rio Paraguai", explicou o Contra-Almirante.

No Exército, além da 4ª Brigada de Cavalaria Mecanizada (Guaicurus), a 18ª Brigada de Infantaria de Fronteira, localizada em Corumbá (MS), e a 13ª Brigada de Infantaria Motorizada, sediada em Cáceres (MT), também participam da Operação. Na quinta-feira (25), a comitiva visitou o 11º Regimento de Cavalaria Mecanizado, em Ponta Porã, município da fronteira do Mato Grosso do Sul com o Paraguai localizado a 312km de Campo Grande. Na oportunidade, eles conheceram os trabalhos realizados pela organização na Operação Ágata e as tecnologias e meios do SISFRON empregados. Em seguida, as autoridades estiveram no Posto de Bloqueio da BR-463 para observar in loco a ação de inspeção dos veículos que entram no País provenientes do país vizinho. No local, radares, equipamentos óticos, drones, cães de combate e farejadores auxiliam nas ações. Caso o suspeito não obedeça a ordem de parada do automóvel, equipamentos de fura-pneu são acionados para impedir a fuga.

## A Operação

A Operação Ágata foi criada em 2011, com a finalidade de intensificar a presença do Estado na faixa de fronteira e a integração com órgãos federais, estaduais e municipais, bem como a cooperação técnica, de inteligência e de logística entre os envolvidos. A doutrina conjunta e interações aperfeiçoa as ações contra os ilícitos nas fronteiras, inclusive combate os crimes ambientais, reforça o sentimento de nacionalismo e a Defesa da Pátria nessas regiões sensíveis. Vale lembrar que o Brasil faz fronteira com dez países da América do Sul, em uma extensão de 16.886 km.

Desde 2017, a Ágata tem novo formato de atuação. Antes todas eram operações conjuntas de grande porte e longa duração, voltadas apenas para a faixa de fronteira terrestre. Hoje contemplam também a fronteira marítima, são pontuais, sem data fixa e sem duração prevista para ocorrer, incluindo centenas de Operações Singulares de cada Força Armada.

## 37. Força Aérea Brasileira intercepta aeronave com mais de meia tonelada de cocaína

08.04.2021

Correio do Povo

<https://www.correiodopovo.com.br/not%C3%ADcias/mundo/pf-e-ca%C3%A7as-da-fab-interceptam-avi%C3%A3o-com-mais-de-meia-tonelada-de-coca%C3%ADna-em-porto-velho-1.600623>

A Polícia Federal e Força Aérea Brasileira (FAB) interceptaram e abordaram uma aeronave carregada com 579 kg de cocaína, na região de Porto Velho durante ação conduzida nesta quinta-feira, 8. As investigações da PF apontaram para a realização do transporte clandestino da droga, o que viabilizou a atuação da FAB para interceptação da aeronave, através da utilização de caças com base na chamada Lei do Abate. O piloto tentou escapar pousando em uma área de pasto, mas os agentes conseguiram realizar a abordagem em solo e prender o suspeito.

A ação integrou parte de estratégia institucional de integração entre a PF e a FAB, além das polícias estaduais, que tem alcançado resultados expressivos para o enfrentamento do tráfico de drogas transnacional e proteção das fronteiras nacionais. A FAB atuou por meio do Comando de Operações Aeroespaciais (COMAE), com apoio do Núcleo de Operações Aéreas da Secretaria de Estado de Segurança Pública de Rondônia (NOA) e do Grupo Especial de Fronteira da Secretaria de Estado de Segurança Pública do Mato Grosso (GEFRON).

Segundo dados da Polícia Federal, 12 aeronaves foram apreendidas no ano passado enquanto transportavam drogas, o que representa número 70% maior que no ano anterior. Em 2021, a PF já foram apreendeu três aeronaves, nas mesmas circunstâncias. A ocorrência foi encaminhada à Superintendência Regional da Polícia Federal em Rondônia para os procedimentos legais; para a contagem e pesagem da droga.

## 38. O Brasil participa do maior exercício de defesa cibernética do mundo

17.04.2021

Tecnologia & Defesa

<https://tecnodefesa.com.br/brasil-participa-do-maior-exercicio-de-defesa-cibernetica-do-mundo/>

A Marinha do Brasil (MB), o Exército Brasileiro (EB), e a Força Aérea Brasileira (FAB) deram sua contribuição em mais um passo dado pelo Brasil no desenvolvimento de tecnologias de defesa cibernética. Até a última quinta-feira, dia 15, o País participou pela segunda vez do maior e mais complexo exercício internacional de defesa cibernética de dupla ação (ataque contra defesa) do mundo, o Locked Shields, cujo encerramento da participação brasileira na atividade foi realizado no Comando de Defesa Cibernética (ComDCiber), localizado no Forte Marechal Rondon, em Brasília.

Organizado pelo Centro de Excelência em Defesa Cibernética Cooperativo ("Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence" – CCDCOE), órgão ligado à Organização do Tratado do Atlântico Norte (OTAN), o exercício foi realizado de forma remota e reuniu mais de 2 mil especialistas em cibernética de 32 países. Único representante da América Latina, o Brasil integrou o apoio técnico da equipe de Portugal, interagindo por videoconferência, em tempo real. Diferentemente da sua participação em 2019, nessa edição o Brasil foi convidado a compor sua própria equipe estratégica, que reuniu especialistas em cibernética das três Forças e representantes de agências governamentais e organizações ligadas à infraestrutura relacionada ao exercício.

Integraram a atividade o ComDCiber, o Centro de Comunicação Social do Exército (CCOMSEx), o Comando de Operações Aeroespaciais (COMAE) da FAB, o Gabinete de Segurança Institucional (GSI), o Ministério da Defesa (MD), o Ministério das Relações Exteriores (MRE), a Agência Nacional de Águas (ANA) e a Agência Nacional de Telecomunicações (Anatel). O chefe do Comando de Operações Terrestres (COTER), o general-de-exército José Luiz Dias Freitas, ressaltou a integração que marcou o exercício. "Todos os interessados, sejam organismos estatais ou privados, necessitam

de defesa cibernética. É importante que possamos integrar e potencializar o desenvolvimento da doutrina e o planejamento em possíveis situações de crise. O exercício é o momento ideal de praticarmos e desenvolvermos nossa doutrina”.

O chefe do Departamento de Ciência e Tecnologia (DCT) e ex-Comandante de Defesa Cibernética, general-de-exército Guido Amin, destacou que as características da área cibernética fazem com que o Brasil tenha condições de se igualar aos países mais desenvolvidos em capacidades de segurança da área. “É possível investir recursos não tão grandes e, mesmo assim, reduzirmos bastante essa distância que existe entre nosso país e países mais desenvolvidos em outras capacidades militares”.

O atual comandante de Defesa Cibernética, general-de-divisão Heber Garcia, também frisou a importância do exercício para o aprimoramento técnico das defesas nacionais. “Esta atividade vai contribuir para a maturidade do setor cibernético e o aumento da capacidade militar de defesa cibernética e vai colaborar com a troca de experiências entre agências nacionais e entre países envolvidos no exercício”. O chefe do Estado-Maior Conjunto do ComDCiber, contra-almirante Rudicley Cantarin, frisou o alto nível de exigência técnica da atividade. “É uma oportunidade única para que os países participantes exercitem sua capacidade cibernética em um ambiente seguro e contra um adversário de altíssimo nível. Isso favorece a interação na defesa de sistemas civis e militares em um ambiente de cooperação mútua”.

A oportunidade de obter, no exercício, mais informações sobre segurança cibernética foi um aspecto evidenciado pela representante do COMAE, major Carla Borges. “A atividade nos proporciona conhecimento das possibilidades das interferências que um ataque cibernético pode causar, seja na parte militar, seja em todo o país”. Já o segundo-sargento Leandro Souza, da MB, ressaltou que o Locked Shields forneceu a chance de executar procedimentos usados em situações críticas reais. “Fizemos proteção de rede tratando dos incidentes, da vulnerabilidade dos servidores, dos erros de usuário, das instalações indevidas e da verificação de suspeitos. Nossa função era dar o primeiro combate e reportar tudo aos escalões superiores como se fosse no mundo real”.

## **Locked Shields**

Com duração de um ano, o exercício se baseou em um conflito simulado entre dois países fictícios. As situações propostas trouxeram à tona diversas possibilidades da realidade atual, como as ameaças das “deepfakes”, a instabilidade do sistema financeiro e mudanças causadas pela crise da Covid-19, como os crescimentos da automação e do trabalho remoto. Ao longo de todo o exercício, 5 mil sistemas virtuais foram alvejados por mais de 4 mil ataques cibernéticos. Além de defenderem os sistemas, os participantes tiveram de lidar com simulações de problemas legais e midiáticos.

## 39. Exercício Alerta Antiaéreo 2021

14.04.2021

Tecnologia & Defesa

<https://tecnodefesa.com.br/exercicio-alerta-antiaereo-2021/>

Nos dias 07 e 08 de abril, A 1ª Brigada de Artilharia Antiaérea (1ª Bda AAAe) conduziu a primeira edição do Exercício Alerta Antiaéreo 2021, envolvendo militares de todos os Grupos de Artilharia Antiaérea (GAAAe) do Exército Brasileiro e da Bateria de Comando da Brigada.

O objetivo do exercício é adestrar os subsistemas de artilharia antiaérea, sobretudo o de controle e alerta, utilizando o software que simula incursões aéreas em pontos sensíveis localizados em diversas regiões do Brasil e transmitindo essas informações por meio rádio e cibernético, inserido em uma situação tática hipotética. A concepção geral da atividade consiste no desdobramento de um centro de operações militares e de um centro de operações antiaéreas principal, localizado no comando da 1ª Bda AAAe, permitindo a esse grande comando atuar na direção do exercício e exercer o comando e o controle simultâneo das defesas antiaéreas desdobradas nos diversos pontos sensíveis simulados.

Os GAAAe, cada qual em sua sede, desdobraram seus módulos operacionais compostos por:

- Uma Seção de Artilharia Antiaérea (Sec. AAAe) de canhão 40 mm;
- Uma Sec. AAAe de míssil Iгла S;
- Uma Sec. AAAe de míssil RBS-70; e
- Um Centro de Operações Antiaéreo Secundário.

Dessa forma, a Operação Alerta Antiaéreo possibilitou testar, a baixo custo, o estado de prontidão da tropa e a capacidade de prover a defesa antiaérea do território nacional.

## 40. Exército e Força Aérea realizam treinamento antiaéreo

08.04.2021

Tecnologia & Defesa

<https://tecnodefesa.com.br/exercito-e-forca-aerea-realizam-treinamento-antiaereo/>

Entre 22 de março a 01 de abril, no Campo de Instrução Barão de São Borja (CIBSB), em Rosário do Sul (RS), a 6ª Bateria de Artilharia Antiaérea Autopropulsada (6ª Bia AAAe AP) participou de um adestramento operacional conjunto com a Ala 4, Base Aérea de Santa Maria, da Força Aérea Brasileira (FAB). A operação teve por objetivo verificar a doutrina de emprego e os equipamentos das duas Forças, assim como adestrar as tropas em operações de guerra.

Empregando a 1ª Seção de Artilharia Antiaérea Autopropulsada, módulo de pronto emprego da 6ª Brigada de Infantaria Blindada (6ª Bda Inf Bld), em um contexto de operações de guerra, as tropas operaram como forças oponentes. Foram empregadas as viaturas blindadas de combate antiaéreo (VBC DA Ae) Gepard 1 A2, realizando a defesa antiaérea de estruturas estratégicas, e as aeronaves da Ala 4, desencadeando missões de reconhecimento, vigilância, apoio aéreo aproximado e ataque às posições. Com a operação, foi possível aumentar a capacidade de interoperabilidade, a operacionalidade e a prontidão das Forças, além de aperfeiçoar técnicas, táticas e procedimentos, com a participação de oficiais de ligação no local. Todas as atividades seguiram os protocolos de prevenção à Covid-19.

## 41. Grupos de artilharia realizam estágio de planejamento e coordenação de fogos

16.04.2021

Exército Brasileiro

[https://www.eb.mil.br/web/noticias/noticiario-do-exercito/-/asset\\_publisher/MjaG93KcunQl/content/id/13135485](https://www.eb.mil.br/web/noticias/noticiario-do-exercito/-/asset_publisher/MjaG93KcunQl/content/id/13135485)

Curitiba (PR) – No período de 29 de março a 8 de abril, os Grupos de Artilharia de Campanha do Comando Militar do Sudeste e da 5ª Divisão de Exército receberam adestramento no Estágio de Planejamento e Coordenação de Fogos (EPCF). Coordenado pelo Comando da Artilharia



Divisionário da 5ª Divisão de Exército (AD/5), a atividade empregou cartas topográficas e o sistema informatizado “Comando e Controle em Combate”.

Na primeira etapa do estágio, o Comando da AD/5 empregou a plataforma do Portal do Preparo do Comando de Operações Terrestres para disponibilizar o material didático, nivelar o conhecimento dos participantes e apresentar a documentação que foi utilizada para o planejamento inicial dos Grupos de Artilharia de Campanha.

A segunda fase do EPCF foi caracterizada pela execução do Exercício Salomão da Rocha, no qual os Grupos de Artilharia de Campanha, inseridos em uma situação tática, empregaram seus meios para realizar o apoio de fogo à manobra estabelecida, buscando soluções doutrinárias para os problemas militares simulados que foram formulados pelo Comando da AD/5.

O EPCF adestrou os Grupos de Artilharia de Campanha nos trabalhos de planejamento e coordenação de fogos, empregando meios que permitiram acompanhar a evolução do combate, a fim de desenvolver a doutrina e capacitar as unidades para a transmissão do conhecimento adquirido no âmbito de suas respectivas Grandes Unidades.

Participaram do Estágio de Planejamento e Coordenação de Fogos os seguintes Grupos de Artilharia de Campanha da 5ª Divisão de Exército e do Comando Militar do Sudeste: 5º GAC AP (Curitiba-PR); 15º GAC AP (Lapa-PR); 26º GAC (Guarapuava-PR); 28º GAC (Criciúma-SC); 2º GAC L (Itu-SP); 12º GAC (Jundiaí-SP) e 20º GAC L (Barueri-SP).

## 42. Brazil's president picks Army chief amid tension with military

02.04.2021

Defense News

<https://www.defensenews.com/global/the-americas/2021/04/02/brazils-president-picks-army-chief-amid-tension-with-military/>

The appointment of the Brazilian Army's former chief health officer as the new service commander is an effort by President Jair Bolsonaro to heal a rift created by his firing of the defense minister and the subsequent removal of the top generals of all three military branches, analysts said Thursday. Gen. Paulo Sérgio Nogueira, responsible for the Army's human resources, was appointed Army chief Wednesday following the hasty departure of the leaders of Brazil's Army, Navy and Air Force. The three men were forced out a day after Bolsonaro summarily fired retired Army Gen. Fernando Azevedo e Silva as defense minister.

There has been little transparency around this week's events, as neither the president nor the Defence Ministry explained what caused the change in leadership. Military and political experts said the unexpected firings, which some described as a "bomb," were partly the result of the commanders' reluctance to serve Bolsonaro's political interests. The reshuffle generated a deep — if brief — crisis within the military. Never since the return of democracy in 1985 had a president fired all the leaders of the military's three branches, analysts said. The move caused uneasiness and great uncertainty as to the future of Brazil's armed forces as the far-right president struggles with declining popularity and as COVID-19 batters the country.

But the tapping of Nogueira as Army chief was widely seen as an attempt by the president to ease tensions. "The choice was to lower the tone," said Juliano Cortinhas, who coordinates the research and study group on international security at the University of Brasilia. Inside the military, Nogueira has a reputation of being a conscientious, reliable officer. He is also the man behind the military's pandemic contingency plan, based on social distancing. In a rare interview with *Correio Braziliense* on March 28, Nogueira praised the results of the measures he implemented to limit the spread of the coronavirus among military personnel and said he was preparing for a third wave of infections. "The figures are relatively good in comparison with the population in general because of the prevention we have," Nogueira said. "If this improved in Brazil, the number of people infected would probably be smaller."

The lengthy interview was said by experts and the media to have greatly displeased Bolsonaro, who has strongly opposed the imposition by states and localities of strict health measures for the pandemic, arguing their economic damage will be more harmful than illnesses.

Brazil is currently battling with a fierce resurgence in coronavirus cases. The country reported a new daily high of nearly 4,000 deaths Wednesday, raising the toll for March above 66,000 deaths. That is more than double the number of deaths reported last July, which had been Brazil's worst month in the pandemic. "We have to be ready in Brazil. We can't waver," Nogueira said in the interview. "We have to work, improve the structure of our hospitals, have more beds, human resources so we can react if there's a stronger wave." In the list of possible candidate for the Army's top post, he was among the oldest serving generals on active duty, which preserves military traditions and hierarchy.

For Cortinhas, the University of Brasilia professor, the changes in the military will not alter profoundly their relationship with Bolsonaro, at least in the short term. "There was a name change, the game goes on," he said. "The military continues to make a very important part of the Bolsonaro government."

Other experts, however, said the crisis revealed a split in the ranks. Eduardo Munhoz Svartman, president of the Brazilian Association for Defense Studies, stressed the distinction between active-duty members of the military — a contingent of about 300,000 men and women — and retired

members. Those who have entered the Bolsonaro government, including the new defense minister, former Gen. Walter Braga Netto, are usually retired military members and support the president. But among active-duty military personnel, “there is a part that doesn’t want the armed forces to be used as a tool by the president,” said Svartman, who also teaches at the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul. “There is growing internal polarization.”

Some active-duty generals are also eager to distance themselves from Bolsonaro’s handling of the pandemic. Most of Brazil’s 320,000 deaths occurred under the watch of active-duty Gen. Eduardo Pazuello, who was the federal health minister from May until last month. Pazuello is being investigated by a federal court for his handling of the collapse of the public health care system in the Amazonian city of Manaus. While tensions have waned, João Roberto Martins Filho, a military expert, said things might never be the same between Bolsonaro and active-duty generals because of the removal of the three commanders. “He crossed a dangerous line, and lost,” Martins Filho said. “This left a scar.”

## 43. El Ejército Brasileño revitaliza la artillería autopropulsada y vehículos de remisión

24.03.2021

Infodefensa

<https://www.infodefensa.com/latam/2021/03/24/noticia-ejercito-brasileno-revitaliza-artilleria-autopropulsada-vehiculos-remision.html>

El Ejército Brasileño (EB) continúa inmerso en el proceso de reestructuración de su Artillería de Campaña. Después de dos años de trabajo, el Parque Regional de Mantenimiento de la 5ª Región Militar (Pq R Mnt/5) concluyó la revitalización de veinte vehículos blindados de combate autopropulsados M109A5 y 19 vehículos blindados de remuneración M992A2, de la segunda fase del proyecto de revitalización de este tipo de material.

En apoyo a estos trabajos, el Parque Regional de Mantenimiento de la 3ª Región Militar (Pq R Mnt/3) recibió suministros y formación técnica del Pq R Mnt/5, pudiendo así recuperar 18 M109A5 y nueve M992A2. El material revitalizado fue enviado al 5º Grupo de Artillería de Campaña (5º GAC AP), al 3º Grupo de Artillería de Campaña (3º GAC AP) y al Centro de Entrenamiento de Blindados (CIBld), ambos ubicados en la ciudad de Santa María (RS). La Academia Militar das Agulhas Negras (AMAN) también recibió parte de este material para utilizarlo en la formación de futuros oficiales. Además, se contemplará el 29º Grupo de Artillería de Campaña Autopropulsada (29º GAC AP), en Cruz Alta

(RS) y otras organizaciones militares a definir por el Estado Mayor del Ejército. Logística militar integrada La primera fase de este proyecto se completó en diciembre de 2019 con la entrega de 32 VBCOAP M109 A5+BR modernizados en Estados Unidos por BAE Systems, momento en el que también se produjo la formación de ingenieros y sargentos mecánicos del Pq R Mnt/5.

Este experimentado equipo trabajó anteriormente en el programa de modernización del VBTP M113BR , también realizado en Pq R Mnt/5 junto con BAE Systems. La participación de este personal cualificado en el M109A5 permitió la recuperación de los blindados M-109 almacenados en Brasil, una transferencia de tecnología que genera independencia.

## **44. Marinha cria o 1º Esquadrão de Aeronaves Remotamente Pilotadas de Esclarecimento**

06.04.2021

Marinha Brasileira

<https://www.marinha.mil.br/noticias/marinha-cria-o-1o-esquadrao-de-aeronaves-remotamente-pilotadas-de-esclarecimento>

No dia 30 de março, foi publicada no diário oficial da União, a Portaria nº 90/MB/MD, de 29 de março de 2021, criando o 1º Esquadrão de Aeronaves Remotamente Pilotadas de Esclarecimento (EsqdQE-1). O novo Esquadrão será subordinado ao Comando da Força Aeronaval, com sede na cidade de São Pedro da Aldeia (RJ), e terá o propósito de contribuir com o processo decisório de planejamento e emprego do Poder Naval por meio de Aeronaves Remotamente Pilotadas. Além de grande marco na história da Aviação Naval, sua criação visa à ampliação da capacidade operacional dos navios da Marinha em missões de Reconhecimento, Vigilância e Inteligência.

## 45. Portaria GM-MD n. 1.266, de 11 de março de 2021: Aprova novo manual de mobilização nacional

11.03.2021

Ministério da Defesa

Disponível para download em: [https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/arquivos/legislacao/emcfa/publicacoes/logistica\\_mobilizacao/md41-m-03-1a-edicao-11-mar-2021.pdf](https://www.gov.br/defesa/pt-br/arquivos/legislacao/emcfa/publicacoes/logistica_mobilizacao/md41-m-03-1a-edicao-11-mar-2021.pdf)

Em 11 de março de 2021, foi aprovado o Manual para o Planejamento da Mobilização Militar MD-41-M-03, que visa a apoiar a elaboração dos planos de mobilização das forças singulares.

## 46. Portaria COTER/ CEx, n. 024: Aprova Diretriz de Acionamento de Tropa dos Grupos de Emprego da Força Terrestre

18.03.2021

Boletim do Exército

O documento "be12-21", datado de 26/03/2021, está disponível para download em: [http://www.sgex.eb.mil.br/sistemas/be/boletim\\_do\\_exercito/](http://www.sgex.eb.mil.br/sistemas/be/boletim_do_exercito/)

Em 18 de março de 2021, foi aprovada Diretriz de Acionamento de Tropa dos Grupos de Emprego da Força Terrestre pela Portaria - COTER/C Ex, No. 024. O documento regula o acionamento de Grupos de Emprego da Força Terrestre (F Ter), definidos na Concepção Estratégica do Exército, para emprego em situações de guerra e não-guerra.

# ASTROS & INDÚSTRIA DE DEFESA

*Destaques sobre Indústria de Defesa e andamentos do Projeto ASTROS*

## 47. Lockheed Martin launches New Line of Mid-Size ISR Satellites

14.04.2021

Defense World

[https://www.defenseworld.net/news/29338/Lockheed\\_Martin\\_launches\\_New\\_Line\\_of\\_Mid\\_Size\\_ISR\\_Satellites](https://www.defenseworld.net/news/29338/Lockheed_Martin_launches_New_Line_of_Mid_Size_ISR_Satellites)

Lockheed Martin announced a new line of mid-size tactical Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) satellites on Monday. The company is pitching the new satellite- about the size of a small refrigerator- as an alternative to tactical surveillance platforms like airplanes and drones. These satellites, based on Lockheed Martin's LM 400 mid-size bus, will give the military the ability to track moving targets from space without having to put people at risk.

By following open standards like Open Mission System (OMS) and Universal Command and Control Interface (UCI), these LM 400-based tactical ISR satellites connect with other warfighting platforms and battle management systems from all services. The software-defined satellite capabilities of Lockheed Martin's SmartSat platform offer the ability to responsively develop and deploy new mission capabilities on orbit. The LM 400 can also support payloads up to 14 kilowatts and up to 1,500 kg of mass, enabling extended operation of a wide-range of sensor technologies. Powered by on-board processing and connectivity, this tactical ISR satellite line enables in-theater, low-latency sensor tasking, on-orbit processing of mission data, protected communications and direct downlink of situational awareness and targeting information, increasingly essential to shortening the sensor-to-shooter timeline against fleeting targets.

Lockheed Martin has established Gateway Center, a 3.5 million square-foot satellite manufacturing facility to support accelerated space vehicle production, assembly and testing in a single, flexibly configured space, accommodating multiple security classification levels. The LM 400-based tactical ISR satellites will play a key role in Joint All-Domain Command and Control (JADC2) by allowing tactical warfighters to better employ space-based capabilities.

## 48. Troops in Russia's South to Receive Over 1,600 New Weapons this Year

06.04.2021

Defense World

[https://www.defenseworld.net/news/29285/Troops\\_in\\_Russia\\_\\_\\_s\\_South\\_to\\_Receive\\_Over\\_1\\_600\\_New\\_Weapons\\_this\\_Year](https://www.defenseworld.net/news/29285/Troops_in_Russia___s_South_to_Receive_Over_1_600_New_Weapons_this_Year)

Russia's Southern Military District announced today that the troops stationed in the south of the country will receive over 1,600 new equipment by the end of this year. "In 2021, over 1,600 weapon systems are to be delivered, which will boost the share of advanced weaponry to 71% by the end of the year," Alexander Dvornikov, Southern Military District Commander, said.

The armed forces took delivery of around 100 pieces of new military hardware including multiple launch rocket systems, aircraft and armored vehicles in the month of March. The Tornado-G multiple launch rocket systems replenished the inventory of artillery units of a motor rifle formation in the Rostov Region while BTR-82A armored personnel carriers arrived for a marine infantry battalion of the Black Sea Fleet. The Black Sea Fleet seamen also received a Project 1388 boat and Graivoron Project Buyan-M small missile ship, the press office said in a statement.

A Ka-27PS search and rescue helicopter arrived for the Air Force and Air Defense Army of the Southern Military District. Radiation, chemical and biological protection units of motor rifle formations of the 8th and 49th combined arms armies received RKhM-6-01 special vehicles.

## 49. Lockheed Awarded \$1B Contract for Precision Fires All-Weather Rocket

30.03.2021

Defense World

[https://www.defenseworld.net/news/29235/Lockheed\\_Awarded\\_\\_1B\\_Contract\\_for\\_Precision\\_Fires\\_All\\_Weather\\_Rocket](https://www.defenseworld.net/news/29235/Lockheed_Awarded__1B_Contract_for_Precision_Fires_All_Weather_Rocket)

Lockheed Martin announced today it received a \$1.12 billion contract from the U.S. Army for Lot 16 production of Guided Multiple Launch Rocket System (GMLRS) rockets and associated equipment. The Army recently awarded Lockheed Martin ~\$2.8 GMLRS deal. Work for this contract is expected to be completed in October 2024.

Today's contract calls for the production of more than 9,000 GMLRS Unitary and Alternative-Warhead (AW) rockets, more than 2,000 Low-Cost Reduced-Range Practice Rockets (RRPRs) and integrated logistics support for the U.S. Army, U.S. Marine Corps and international customers. Work will be performed at the Lockheed Martin facilities in Camden, Arkansas; Dallas and Lufkin, Texas; and Ocala, Florida, and will be completed by September 2023.

GMLRS is an all-weather rocket designed for fast deployment that delivers precision strike beyond the reach of most conventional weapons. The munition is the primary round for the HIMARS and MLRS family of launchers and features a Global Positioning System (GPS) aided inertial guidance package and small maneuvering canards on the rocket nose, which add maneuverability to enhance the accuracy of the system.

The GMLRS AW was developed to service area targets without the effects of unexploded ordinance. GMLRS unitary rockets provide precision strike for point targets, exceed the required combat reliability rate and are cost-effective. The Reduced-Range Practice Rocket allows users to train with realistic, full-motored rockets with limited flight range, making them ideal for smaller testing ranges. Lockheed Martin is also developing the Extended Range (ER) GMLRS that will provide the same accuracy and reliability the munition is known for while significantly extending the range – reaching 150 kilometers.



## 50. 15° GAC AP CA recebe obuseiros M109A5

15.04.2021

Tecnologia & Defesa

<https://tecnodefesa.com.br/aumentando-o-poder-de-fogo-15o-gac-ap-recebe-obuseiros-m109a5/>

O 15° Grupo de Artilharia de Campanha Autopropulsado (15° GAC AP), “Grupo General Sisson”, aquartelado em Lapa (PR), recebeu oito viaturas blindadas de combate obuseiros autopropulsados (VBC AP) M109A5 e duas viaturas blindadas de transporte especial – remuniadoras (VBTE-Remun) M992A2 mantidas e preparadas pelo Parque Regional de Manutenção da 5ª Região Militar (Pq R Mnt/5).

As VBC AP M109A5 foram adquiridas dentro do Programa Estratégico do Exército (Prg EE) Obtenção da Capacidade Operacional Plena (OCOP), no Subprograma Sistema Artilharia de Campanha (SAC), em virtude do maior número de calibres e por possuir o sistema tubo-culatra mais reforçado, o que permite o aumento no alcance e a utilização de munições especiais, aumentando assim a dissuasão, operacionalidade e o poder de fogo da Artilharia Divisionária da 5ª Divisão de Exército (AD/5). Os blindados serão oficialmente apresentados na solenidade interna alusiva ao dia do Exército Brasileiro, a ser realizada no próximo dia 19 abril.

## 51. 6° RCB recebe viaturas M113BR e certifica seu pelotão Leopard

11.04.2021

Tecnologia & Defesa

<https://tecnodefesa.com.br/6o-rcb-recebe-viaturas-m113br-e-certifica-seu-pelotao-leopard/>

Entre os dias 05 e 07 de abril, o 6° Regimento de Cavalaria Blindado (6° RCB), “Regimento José de Abreu”, aquartelado em Alegrete (RS), recebeu quatro viaturas blindadas de transporte de pessoal (VBTP) M113BR, transferidas do 29° Batalhão de Infantaria Blindado (29° BIB), de Santa Maria (RS). As viaturas, que passaram por um processo de modernização pela empresa BAE Systems, nas instalações do Parque Regional de Manutenção da 5ª Região Militar (Pq R Mnt/5), foram transportadas 10° Batalhão Logístico (10° B Log) em viaturas especiais prancha, onde foram estacionadas no pavilhão de manutenção das viaturas sobre lagartas.

## Certificação do pelotão de carros de combate

No período de 05 a 09 de abril, o 3º Pelotão do 2º Esquadrão de Carros de Combate, pelotão integrante da FORSUL, realizou, a certificação nível 3, no Centro de Instrução de Blindados (CI Bld). Na certificação, os integrantes do pelotão carros de combate (CC) recebem ordens do instrutor avançados de tiro (IAT) do regimento, planejam e executam diferentes missões no terreno reduzido e no treinador sintético de blindados (TSB).

O TSB é composto de quatro cabines que retratam fielmente as posições do comandante e do atirador, além de possuir um posto externo para o motorista. Após a certificação nível 3 o pelotão CC fica apto a realizar o tiro real da viatura blindada de combate – carro de combate (VBC CC) Leopard 1A5BR. Em todas as atividades foram observadas as medidas previstas, pelos protocolos das autoridades de saúde, na prevenção e combate à pandemia da Covid-19.

## 52. Radar STREV – Exército realiza treinamento operacional

08.04.2021

Tecnologia & Defesa

<https://tecnodefesa.com.br/radar-strev-exercito-realiza-treinamento-operacional/>

O Centro de Avaliações do Exército (CAEx) realizou, entre 29 de março e 1º de abril, em São Bernardo do Campo (SP), nas instalações da empresa Omnisys Engenharia, o treinamento em fábrica para operação do Sistema Transportável para Rastreamento de Engenheiros em Voo (STREV). Em implantação no CAEx, o sistema tem como objetivo apoiar atividades de pesquisa e desenvolvimento (P&D) e de avaliação de engenheiros de voo, como a do míssil tático de cruzeiro MTC-300 e a do foguete guiado SS-40G, projetos do Programa Estratégico do Exército (Prg EE) Astros 2020.

Participaram do treinamento 13 militares e 3 servidores civis do CAEx, além de um militar do 1º Batalhão de Polícia do Exército (1º BPE), que receberam instruções sobre o funcionamento e a operação do sistema. Além de permitir obter dados essenciais para apoiar não apenas a P&D de diversos engenheiros em voo, o sistema permitirá atestar a conformidade de sistemas e materiais de emprego militar submetidos à avaliação no Exército Brasileiro. Dentre os dados que o STREV poderá obter destacam-se: posição, velocidade e aceleração, bem como imagens e gravação de vídeos em alta resolução de engenheiros em voo.

O rastreamento de engenheiros em voo é uma capacidade tecnológica estratégica dominada por poucos países. Devido à sua característica singular de ser transportável por meio de caminhões, o STREV

poderá ser operado em diferentes locais acessíveis por rodovias, em todo o território nacional, o que viabiliza a realização dos ensaios em área geográfica mais adequada para a missão de rastreamento e para o lançamento do engenho, um diferencial do sistema nacional que alçará o Brasil a um patamar de destaque.

Ainda no corrente ano, está prevista a última etapa do treinamento em operação do STREV (treinamento em campo), a ser realizada no CAEx, em que os operadores serão capacitados para desdobrar o terreno, bem como rastrear munições de obuseiro e de foguetes SS-30 do Sistema Astros.

As atividades de treinamento foram conduzidas em conformidade com as diretrizes do Exército, que visam ao enfrentamento da Covid-19. Assim, buscou-se cumprir as atividades planejadas com segurança, para preservar a saúde dos militares, dos civis e de seus familiares.

## 53. Shift in default position: the United Kingdom's Defence and Security Industrial Strategy 2021

01.04.2021

International Institute for Strategic Studies

<https://www.iiss.org/blogs/military-balance/2021/04/uk-defence-and-security-industrial-strategy>

In its new Defence and Security Industrial Strategy, the UK government has signalled a shift in defence-procurement policy. The UK will move away from 'global competition by default' and adopt a more nuanced approach that balances the required capability with both national security considerations and the potential impact on the country's 'prosperity', explains Fenella McGerty.

The 'global competition by default' policy will no longer serve as the UK government's bellwether for defence procurement, giving way instead to the adoption of a more nuanced approach. This change in policy – a core element of the government's Defence and Security Industrial Strategy (DSIS) published on 23 March – signals that a more protective industrial stance will be taken in future defence procurements.

The DSIS may have been somewhat overshadowed by the two major documents which immediately preceded it – the Integrated Review of Security, Defence, Development and Foreign Policy, published on 16 March, which aimed at a comprehensive reset of the UK's international stance, and the Defence Command Paper, published on 22 March, which laid out plans for a significant reshaping of the armed forces. Industrial considerations were not the primary driver of the

Integrated Review; rather, it was more a threat- and cost-driven exercise. Nevertheless, the DSIS does announce key shifts in industrial policy aiming to support the ambitions of the Integrated Review. These appear to build on recommendations in the 2018 government-commissioned report 'Growing the Contribution of Defence to UK Prosperity'.

### **The impact of defence on prosperity**

UK defence-procurement policy will shift from one of open global competition 'by default' to a more 'flexible and nuanced approach' that balances the required capability with both national security considerations and the potential impact on UK 'prosperity'. This will allow future procurement decision-makers to use 'competition where appropriate, but also to establish where global competition at the prime level may be ineffective or incompatible with our national security requirements'.

The move to improve flexibility in procurement decisions stems from the increasing recognition that the UK's defence industry is a strategic capability 'in its own right'. In the context of a more competitive global environment as described in the Integrated Review, the DSIS argues that flexibility is needed to deliver and develop the key onshore skills, technologies and capabilities that will ensure resilience in UK defence. Previously, protected areas of 'sovereign capability' were identified in the 2012 National Security Through Technology white paper and included information and communications, electronic warfare, and critical subsystems. Concepts of 'Operational Advantage' and 'Freedom of Action' were used to indicate instances where open global competition may not apply, but the DSIS states that these concepts were difficult to apply in practice. Instead, the government has established two new categories of protected capability: 'strategic imperatives' which are to be sustained wholly onshore, and include nuclear deterrence, cryptography and offensive cyber; and those capabilities that are needed to retain 'operational independence'. The latter constitutes areas in which the UK should maintain key competencies onshore but where full procurement independence is not required, thus allowing the UK to work with partners on the wider programme. These capabilities include complex weapons, novel (including directed-energy) weapons, test and evaluation, and chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear capabilities.

This approach brings the UK more into alignment with continental Europe, where countries clearly distinguish between key areas that are to be protected domestically and those that are less strategically vital and can therefore be developed with, or procured from, international partners. For example, this approach is outlined in Germany's 2020 Strategy Paper of the Federal Government on Strengthening the Security and Defence Industry.

While shipbuilding is not identified in the DSIS as a capability to be retained wholly onshore, the paper explicitly sets out naval-procurement policy, which it does not do for the air or land domains. Naval-procurement decisions look set to make full use of this new flexibility, not least by enshrining

a more broader definition of 'warship' than before, but also by considering the specific capability requirement alongside the long-term industrial impact of different options, including delivering value for money and 'maintaining the key industrial capabilities required for operational independence'.

### **Procurement reform**

The strategy clarifies how defence will deploy the government-wide mandated 'social value' requirement on public contracts. A minimum of 10% of the tender-evaluation weighting must be allocated to various social-value objectives. Of these objectives, the DSIS identifies the creation of new businesses, new jobs and skills, and an increase in supply-chain resilience and capacity, as the most relevant to defence. While this is not a new defence-specific measure, but rather merely an application of wider public-procurement policy, it does signal an intent to change the criteria against which procurement bids are assessed.

The DSIS notes that the UK's departure from the European Union provides an opportunity to reform its Defence and Security Public Contracts Regulations that were devised in 2011 in compliance with EU Defence Procurement Directive 2009/81/EC. Despite this, the basis of procurement policy will not shift significantly. Defence-procurement contracts will continue not to demand direct UK industrial participation and will also carry on with the policy of asking companies to set voluntary targets for UK content, as stated in the Defence and Security Industrial Engagement Policy of 2012. However, domestic companies will now also be asked to state their plans for opening up opportunities to the UK supply chain, rather than just foreign entities as has been the policy since 2012.

Recognising the increasingly contested and competitive global environment described in the Integrated Review, the DSIS seeks to bolster support of defence exports through increased clarity on programme requirements and use of a new government-to-government commercial mechanism. Balanced against this support for domestic industry and exports, the DSIS also highlights the need to work with allies and partners in order to secure international order and to develop defence and security capabilities.

### **Blurring the lines**

While intended to be an industrial strategy for both the defence and security sectors, the paper acknowledges that due to their differing natures, 'government policy has a far more market shaping effect on the UK's defence industry than its security sectors'.

Defence is characterised by a single source of demand, and is dominated by a handful of prime contractors with sufficient breadth of capabilities and capital to meet the demands for complex platforms. In contrast, the security sector functions much more akin to a private market, with multiple

sources of demand and supply. An interesting point made by Jeremy Quin MP, Minister of State for Defence Procurement, when announcing the DSIS was that engagement with small and medium-sized enterprises in the defence supply chain – one of the aims of the strategy – would increase by virtue of the change in the nature of defence requirements. The number of companies able to supply solutions will increase as the UK moves toward digital and cyber capabilities, which in turn will open up the market to less capital-intensive businesses.

## 54. Brazilian group seeks to stop aircraft carrier sale to Turkish company

09.04.2021

Defense News

<https://www.defensenews.com/naval/2021/04/09/brazilian-group-seeks-to-stop-aircraft-carrier-sale-to-turkish-company/>

MERSIN, Turkey — Two groups are hoping to make a last ditch effort to save a retired Brazilian aircraft carrier that's planned to be scrapped. One wants to turn the ship into a museum. The other, a training ship for the Turkish Navy. The Sao Paulo/Foch Institute in Brazil is trying to prevent the aircraft carrier Sao Paulo from making its way to Turkey for disassembly and instead hopes to turn it into a museum. Such moves may be a long shot.

The carrier, originally known as Foch when it entered service with the French Navy in 1963, was the second vessel of the Clemenceau class. Construction had begun in 1957. The ship was decommissioned in 2000, when the French Navy commissioned the Charles de Gaulle carrier. It was then transferred to Brazil and renamed Sao Paulo, with the bilateral agreement for the ship stipulating Brazil as its "final user." Sao Paulo entered service for the Brazilian Navy on November 2000. After Brazil decommissioned the ship in 2018, the government began the process of selling it, while the Sao Paulo/Foch Institute sought to convert it into a museum. The government was unable to find a buyer last year, but then sold the vessel to the Turkish company Sok Denizcilik in an auction last month for about 10.55 million reals (U.S. \$1.85 million) to dismantle it.

But the Sao Paulo/Foch Institute hasn't given up. "Our story has not yet ended with the sale of the ship," Emerson Miura, president of the institute, told Defense News. "The decommissioning of the aircraft carrier Sao Paulo left many people unhappy. The Sao Paulo aircraft carrier (ex-Foch) remains the last ship in its category and one of the oldest in the world. Our institute was prohibited from participating in the purchase because the auction notice specified the sale for cutting." He added that the organization has been preparing a new proposal to purchase the ship and turn it into a museum. "It would be much more profitable and beneficial than dismantling the ship.

Approximately 600 tons of asbestos — hazardous for human health and nature — are encapsulated in the ship. Such an agreement would decrease the ship's dismantling expenses, and transporting the ship to the Mediterranean will be very expensive. We are trying to contact [Sok Denizcilik]," he said.

Meanwhile, a former admiral in the Turkish Navy wants to see the Sao Paulo reequipped and used for training service members, rather than disassembled for scrap metal. The dismantling process is to take place at the Aliaga district's ship recycling facilities. Retired Adm. Cihat Yayci, who currently manages a global strategy center in Bahcesehir University, recently pitched the idea of reactivating the aircraft carrier for naval training. "Instead of dismantling this ship, we should equip it with different systems that are currently used and start the training of forward-looking aircraft carrier personnel today. It is critical to start the training of personnel for the future aircraft carrier. It does not matter how old Sao Paulo is, and it should be thought of as educational material in the form of puzzles, disassemble, use and wear. At this point, the important thing is to train naval personnel on this platform and to gain the habit of working with an aircraft carrier," Yayci said.

During the January launching ceremony for Turkey's first I-class frigate, the Istanbul, President Recep Tayyip Erdogan promoted efforts for local aircraft carrier production to strengthen the Turkish Navy's capabilities. "Even if we do not use Sao Paulo actively for the Turkish Navy, it could be used as a simulator to disassemble, attach, testing, dismantling, repairing," Yayci said. "It is a great and very cheap opportunity for education, engineering experience, observation, examination. The price of this ship is \$1.9 million while a similar simulator costs more than \$30 million."

But some defense industry experts question the cost-effectiveness refitting the Sao Paulo, even for training purposes, arguing money would be better spent on existing projects. Furthermore, the ship has had a problematic past. In May 2005, an explosion took place in the steam network of the engine room. There was considerable damage to the propulsion system. Following repairs, and with the vessel ready to enter service in 2013, it suffered another major fire in 2012. The ship was still undergoing repairs through September 2016; then-commander of the Brazilian Navy Adm. Eduardo Leal Ferreira, said plans were in place to renew the carrier's propulsion system. The ship's catapult was also reported to have problems. In addition, the original agreement between France and Brazil as well as a powerful Turkish government official would likely prevent a refit. The head of the Turkish government's Presidency of Defence Industries, Ismail Demir, who is responsible for defining and managing Turkey's defense industry policy, said there is no need to spend money and time on an old ship. "Constructing an aircraft carrier is not a big deal for the shipbuilding industry of Turkey. If we take it on the agenda in the future, we will start working on relevant systems ASAP," he said.

## 55. The Encryption Debate in Brazil: 2021 Update

31.03.2021

Carnegie Endowment for International Peace

<https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/03/31/encryption-debate-in-brazil-2021-update-pub-84238>

### Introduction

The encryption debate in Brazil, much as in Latin America and the Caribbean and across most of the globe,<sup>1</sup> continues to be framed as a tension between, on the one hand, data and communications security and, on the other hand, accessibility for law enforcement and national security purposes. End-to-end encryption in messaging services is central to this discussion, especially because these services are growing in popularity and now have a more profound impact on investigations and intelligence gathering. Two major cases mentioned in a previous brief<sup>2</sup>—both reviewing the suspension of WhatsApp for not complying with judicial orders requiring the company to hand-over decrypted data—are yet to receive a final decision from the Brazilian Supreme Court. The justices rapporteurs, however, have presented their opinions against the suspension of the messaging service.

### New Updates

The coronavirus pandemic brought a number of issues related to cybersecurity, online misinformation, and access to overseas data to the forefront of the tech policy landscape. Trying to address these issues, all three branches of the Brazilian government have directly or indirectly influenced the country's debate on encryption. The focus here is on the role of the judiciary, looking at the WhatsApp cases presented before the Brazilian Supreme Court. These cases are relevant because they are the first time that the Supreme Court has been asked to rule on whether end-to-end encryption is permitted under Brazilian law and if so whether it would not be obligatory to have access opportunities ("backdoors") for law enforcement agencies. The cases have repercussions not only throughout Brazil, but should also draw the attention of the international community because it hinges upon cybersecurity of private communication at large.

The issue of encryption was revisited with the enactment of the General Data Protection Law ("LGPD") in August 2018. The legislation reshaped the debate even before entering into force in September 2020.<sup>3</sup> The justices rapporteurs issued their opinions in June, yet they made express references in their votes to the Federal Constitution, the Internet Bill of Rights,<sup>4</sup> and the LGPD. Thus, data protection was front and center in the justices' views, and it builds upon the history of protecting digital rights brought by the Internet Bill of Rights and its implementing decree,<sup>5</sup> which already articulates, among others, the principles of net neutrality and privacy and different



safeguards against mass surveillance. The opinions also encourage the use of technologies that uphold the inviolability of data and the widespread adoption of encryption.

### **Ongoing Cases: Encryption Debate on Whatsapp Blocking**

End-to-end encryption, particularly on the messaging service WhatsApp, is a challenge for law enforcement and intelligence agencies, since it may preclude lawful access to the content of private communications, directly impacting investigations and the enforcement of personal liability. Between 2015 and 2016, even before the case reached the Supreme Court, regional courts suspended WhatsApp nationwide on three occasions. Court decisions aimed at gaining access to decrypted content hosted by the messaging service to further investigate alleged crimes committed by WhatsApp users in Brazil. The company's explanation that the application's architecture and encryption protocols were incompatible with the different judicial requests of access to decrypted data was deemed insufficient by the courts. This motivated two constitutional challenges that were subsequently brought before the Brazilian Supreme Court to discuss the nationwide suspension of WhatsApp's services, ADI No. 5527 and ADPF No. 403.<sup>6</sup> As of writing, both cases are pending final decisions.

The cases question whether the ban is proportional, given WhatsApp's inability to comply with legal requests to access data without fundamentally redesigning the application's architecture and encryption protocols. The outcome of the cases depends on two questions: Is encryption legal in the first place, and, if so, should companies that provide encrypted services be obligated to create either backdoor or exceptional mechanisms of access? The arguments raised in favor of encryption state that cryptography protects privacy, personal data, and free speech and should be allowed as a matter of freedom of enterprise. In other words, companies, as a matter of principle, should be free to choose their own business models. Critics, on the other hand, argue that law enforcement agencies uphold the fundamental public interest in security, and exceptional mechanisms of access, thus, should be able to request access to relevant data despite end-to-end encryption.

After a public hearing in 2017,<sup>7</sup> the justices rapporteurs issued their opinions in May 2020. In the Brazilian Supreme Court, the rapporteur is responsible for reviewing the case files and issuing an initial opinion that serves as a slate upon which the remaining justices will build until they reach a final decision. It is, therefore, a *seriatim* process where every justice writes her own individual opinion. There is no "opinion of the court." It is common for the rapporteurs to issue their opinions months (and sometimes years) before the court is ready to decide the case on the merits. In the WhatsApp cases, the rapporteurs highlighted the importance of data access to law enforcement agents, yet, at the same time, they underscored the significant role of encryption as a safeguard for certain rights, particularly the rights to privacy, inviolability of communications, and freedom of speech.

Justice Edson Fachin, one of the Rapporteurs, noted in his opinion<sup>8</sup> that encryption can buttress fundamental rights in democratic societies. He acknowledged that encryption is “the mechanism par excellence to guarantee the right to privacy” and noted that the only way to “disable encryption for one user is to disable it to all.” Therefore, in his words, “to weaken encryption is to undermine the right of all to a safe internet.”

Fachin argued that the imposition of solutions that involve exceptional access or that reduce the protection provided by strong encryption protocols are inconsistent with the Brazilian legal order. In his words,

the risk caused by the use of cryptography does not yet justify the imposition of solutions that involve exceptional access or other solutions that reduce the protection guaranteed by strong cryptography. . . . There is no way to force internet applications that offer end-to-end encryption to break the confidentiality around the content of communication.

Justice Rosa Weber, the second rapporteur, advanced similar arguments in her decision.<sup>9</sup> For her, the fundamental freedom that grants individuals the right to close their house’s doors and install curtains on their windows also entails a “fundamental right to encryption” in order to “safeguard one’s right to privacy.” In her view, it would amount to “an inadmissible contradiction . . . to make it illegal or to limit the use of cryptography.” Additionally, she stresses that end-to-end encryption does not prompt a trade-off between public security and privacy. In the long run, weaker encryption protocols expose the network and its users to even greater risks, ultimately undermining security.

It is important to note that both proceedings were stayed at the request of Justice Alexandre de Moraes. At the Brazilian Supreme Court, the justices have the power to suspend a case in order to further review the case’s files before coming to a conclusion on the merits. This is known as a *pedido de vista*, or request for examination. It is also noteworthy that, before joining the court, Moraes served as minister of justice in former president Michel Temer’s cabinet. At that time, Moraes stated in an interview that internet companies should be prepared to hand over information whenever it was deemed necessary to fulfill purposes of law enforcement.<sup>10</sup> It is unclear whether he will hold this position now as a justice on the Supreme Court. While the cases are still pending, the direction given by the rapporteurs is that encryption advances other rights such as the right to privacy and data protection. Therefore, encryption should not be weakened at the expense of these other rights.

## New Cases

Two other cases decided in 2020 by the Supreme Court support the argument in favor of encryption:

### **Brazilian Institute of Geography And Statistics**

On May 7, 2020, the Brazilian Supreme Court issued an injunction suspending the Provisional Measure No. 954/2020 issued by President Jair Bolsonaro,<sup>11</sup> which mandated telecommunication companies to share a massive amount of personal data with the Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (Instituto Brasileiro de Geografia e Estatística, IBGE). The justification for the provisional measure was the need to conduct a census through the phone since it is unsafe to conduct door-to-door inquiries during the pandemic. The court concluded that the measure was *prima facie* incompatible with the basic principles of privacy and data protection.

Even though the LGPD had not yet entered into force, a majority of the justices understood that the right to privacy and several principles of data protection were inherent to the constitution and serve as important safeguards that both the state and private enterprises should uphold. The majority decision argued that the measure did not cover: (i) clarity of the purpose of data processing; (ii) specificity on the necessity of the data requested; (iii) measures to mitigate risks; (iv) specific information regarding security measures; and (v) an accountability mechanism.<sup>12</sup>

This decision impacts the encryption debate in two ways. Firstly, it hardens the rights to privacy and data protection by enumerating both as protected under the constitution. This consequently makes it more burdensome for law enforcement agencies to advocate in favor of weaker encryption policies. Secondly, it reaffirms that principles of data protection also apply to the public administration. Hence, they shape and may even limit the ability of public officials to request access to encrypted data. If encryption supports the constitutional principles of privacy and data protection, then arguments to weaken encryption must be subject to a stricter scrutiny. It is necessary that public officials clearly demonstrate the existence of a public interest in accessing an encrypted data for law enforcement purposes.

### **Brazilian Intelligence Agency**

In June 2020, the Brazilian Supreme Court heard a second case related to lawful access to encrypted data, this time involving the Brazilian Intelligence Agency (Agência Brasileira de Inteligência, ABIN). The case revolved around changes to ABIN's structure that expanded its powers to request data from other organs of the government. This expansion was challenged before the court on grounds of violating the right to privacy, protection of personal data, and informational self-determination.

The majority of the justices decided that even in cases of data requests within the government for intelligence purposes, privacy and data protection should be at the forefront and may require

particular procedures to be followed.<sup>13</sup> One justice rapporteur noted in her vote a parallel with wiretapping that, in her view, demands guarantees to protect individuals' privacy and personal data. The presiding justice underscored the need for safety protocols around data transfer. However, the justice stopped short of assessing whether encryption should be a component of such protocols, urging instead for an accountability mechanism in cases of abuse or omission.

Coupled with the IBGE case, this decision strengthens the argument in favor of encryption in Brazil. It stresses that, as a matter of constitutional law, the public interest in intelligence services does not automatically outweigh privacy and data protection concerns. Similarly, the ABIN case underscored that public officials should offer compelling evidence of the existence of a public interest in accessing encrypted data when the effectiveness of law enforcement may depend on it.

## Outlook

Although the Supreme Court so far has pointed to a clear direction, it is too early to tell how the encryption debate will be settled in Brazil. After all, although the rapporteurs in both cases have issued pro-encryption opinions, it is unclear whether the remaining justices will follow their lead or join their peers in dissent. In a way, Moraes's request to suspend both cases can be perceived as a sign that the decision is unlikely to be unanimous. Furthermore, the executive and the legislative branches do not seem to be moving in the same direction, creating tensions between the three branches of government. The support for privacy and data protection even when intelligence services wish to access encrypted information seems to suggest, at least for the time being, that the Supreme Court is more likely to favor a higher degree of scrutiny toward any attempt to break or circumvent encryption.

## 56. Complexo Industrial Naval de Itaguaí: o que fazer após o PROSUB?

08.04.2021

Defesa Aérea e Naval

<https://www.defesaaereanaval.com.br/naval/complexo-industrial-naval-de-itagua-i-o-que-fazer-apos-o-prosub>

O Complexo Industrial Naval de Itaguaí no Rio de Janeiro concede ao Brasil uma posição regional de destaque. A construção de submarinos convencionais em andamento, assim como do submarino de propulsão nuclear no âmbito do Programa de Desenvolvimento de Submarinos (PROSUB), confere uma vantagem estratégica ao país, alçando a construção naval brasileira a um novo patamar, juntamente ao Programa das Fragatas da Classe Tamandaré, em Itajaí (SC).

Outrossim, é preciso atentar para o futuro no que diz respeito à substituição das atuais embarcações em operação (submarinos classe Tikuna e Tupi), pelos classe Riachuelo. Nesse sentido, indaga-se como aproveitar tal estrutura após a conclusão do PROSUB.

Recentemente, foi veiculado na imprensa especializada a intenção do Brasil de vender dois submarinos IKL-209 à Marinha da Indonésia. Ainda não se sabe em que estágio se encontra a negociação, porém esse assunto não é uma novidade para a Marinha do Brasil (MB). Países como Polônia, Peru e Argentina já aventaram a possibilidade de compra de unidades brasileiras no passado recente. Com isso, verifica-se uma inclinação para a substituição direta dos submarinos do Brasil, tendo em vista a construção de novas embarcações.

Ademais, ventilou-se, em 2019, a ideia de transferir os submarinos operativos da MB, baseados no Complexo Naval de Mocanguê, para Itaguaí, no ano de 2022. Apesar de não existir uma confirmação a este respeito, trata-se de um movimento natural, tendo em vista a estrutura já existente, não só para a construção de submarinos, mas também a capacidade de manutenção e de apoio logístico para os mesmos no futuro.

Sendo assim, o Complexo Industrial de Itaguaí é uma oportunidade para o Brasil se diferenciar na capacidade de construção de novos submarinos, não apenas substituindo-os, mas também ampliando a quantidade dessas unidades. Ademais, possibilitaria ainda a exportação, sobretudo aos países sul-americanos que não possuem a mesma capacidade de construção de submarinos em estaleiros locais; e a manutenção dos meios tanto à MB como a parceiros estratégicos.

É imperativo ter uma projeção de uso da estrutura de Construção Naval tão logo seja possível, uma vez que, atualmente, o país carece de investimentos nesta área, sendo capaz de aquecer a economia, gerar empregos, desenvolver-se socio economicamente e contribuir para o avanço tecnológico e nuclear.

## 57. Braga Netto evalúa los avances de distintos proyectos de Defensa en São Paulo

16.04.2021

Infodefensa

<https://www.infodefensa.com/latam/2021/04/16/noticia-braga-netto-evalua-avances-distintos-proyectos-defensa-paulo.html>

El nuevo ministro de Defensa de Brasil, Walter Braga Netto, evaluó junto al presidente de la Federación de Industrias del Estado de São Paulo (Fiesp), Paulo Skaff, los avances de Fintech

Defesa, un acuerdo de cooperación técnica entre el Ministerio de Defensa y Fiesp para desarrollar soluciones estratégicas de financiación e inversiones en la Base Científica, Tecnológica e Industrial de la Defensa (Bctid). Firmado en julio de 2020, Fintech tiene cuatro proyectos en desarrollo en la Fiesp. La asociación contribuye a fortalecer la Base Industrial de Defensa (BID), a través del desarrollo del sector que representa el 4% del PIB brasileño y genera cerca de 290.000 empleos directos y 850.000 indirectos, recordó el ministro. "El fortalecimiento del BID es un objetivo estratégico del Ministerio de Defensa y del Gobierno de Bolsonaro, y contribuye a la recuperación de la economía, una prioridad actual", destacó Braga Netto. Durante la reunión, el director del Departamento de Financiación y Economía de la Defensa, general Flávio Neiva, sostuvo que "el sector de la defensa es viable, la promoción de la base industrial de la defensa es necesaria y de ella depende la soberanía del país", dijo.

Por su parte, el secretario de Productos de Defensa, Marcos Degaut, destacó que "históricamente, los países desarrollados se forjaron sobre su Base Industrial de Defensa y tienen como eje principal de su política exterior la protección de su promoción". De la reunión también participaron el director del Departamento de Defensa y Seguridad de la Fiesp y presidente del Sindicato Nacional de Industrias de Material de Defensa (Simde), Carlos Erane de Aguiar, el director del Departamento de Defensa y Seguridad, Luiz Cristiano Vallim Monteiro, el jefe de la oficina de la Fiesp, teniente del aire Aprígio Azevedo, y otras autoridades civiles y militares.



ASTROS

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